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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Petitioner,
-vs.-

PUBLIC SER.YICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, W.
R. McENTIRE and STEWART M.
HANSON, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and UTAH NATURAL GAS
COMPANY, a C-orporation,

No. 7695

Respondents.
Appealed from the Public Service Commission of Utah
by Certiorari
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
TO THE HONORABLE S·UPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF· UTAH:
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to this Honorable Court by writ of
certiorari from the proceedings, Findings and Report
and Order, of the Public Service Commission of Utah
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2
in case No. 3504 before said Commission, entitled "In the
Matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas Company
for a certificate of convenience and necessity." The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by U'tah Pipe Line
Company, a corporation, an intervener in the above proceedings before the Public Service Commission of Utah
under and by virtue of Section 76-6-16 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. The writ of certiorari thus petitioned
for was granted by this Court. Respondents filed their
motions to dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari and
the writ of certiorari granted pursuant thereto "on the
grounds and for the reason that it affirmatively appears
from said petition for writ of certiorari that the petitioner, the Utah Pipe Line Comp·any, does not have ~
justiciable interest in the subject matter of the action."
This Honorable Court has heretofore overruled said motions to dismiss, and the case is now before the Court on
the merits. Except as otherwise indicated, all rtalics are
supplied.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL
The record from the Public Service Commission
consists of four volumes, Volume I being numbered R. 1
to R. 493, inclusive, and comp-rising a portion of the transcript of the testimony; Volume II being numbered R.
494 to R. 1039, inclusive, and comprising the transcript
of the balance of the testimony and of the arguments
made by counsel before the Commission; Volume III
being numbered R. 1040 to R. 1105, inclusive, and made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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up of the numerous exhibits received in the case; and
\'dlume IV being numbered R. 1106 to R. 1228, inclusive,
and comprising, among other things, the various applications, petitions to intervene, Findings and Report and
Order of the Commission, the petition for the rehearing,
and the petition for the writ of certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah Pipe Line Company, petitioner he;rein, is a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, qualified to do business in the State of Utah,
and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil Corporation. Delhi Oil Corporation and Utah Pipe Line Company have their principal offices at Dallas, Texas. Utah
Pipe Line Company proposes to construct and operate
a natural gas pipeline system extending a distance of
approximately 392 miles from a point near Aztec, New
Mexico, to a point or points in and near Salt Lake City,
Utah, and to commence the construction of such facilities
promptly after the issuance of the necessary certificates
of public convenience and necessity and to place the facilities in operation on or before January 1, 1952 at an
estimated overall cost of approximately $22,000,000. (R.
1148). Utah Pipe Line Company has pending before the
Federal Power Commission and before the Public Service
Commission of Utah its respective applications for the
necessary certificates of convenience and necessity (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1149, R. 1184). Utah Pipe Line Company has available
proven gas reserves approximating 1 trillion cubic feet
to be committed to its proposed pipeline and has been
in negotiation with industrial consumers in the Salt Lake
City area for the sale of natural gas to them (R. 1150)
Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company is a Delaware Corporation, qualified to do business in Utah, its
president and principal officer and stockholder being Mr.
John A. McGuire, an attorney who resides at Lowell,
Massachusetts (R. 19). At the commencement of the
hearing before the commission the paid in capital of Utah
Natural Gas Company was $1,000, all of which was subscribed for by Mr. McGuire (R. 21). Because of the
similar!ty of names, i.e. Utah Pipe Line Company and
Utah Natural Gas Company, we will sometimes hereafter
refer to the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company as
the McGuire Company and to the petitioner, Utah Pipe
Line Company, as Utah Pipe Line.
The McGuire Company has no gas acreage and does
not intend to .acquire any gas reserves, its plan being to
buy in the field from independent producers natural gas
for delivery into its pipeline as and when structures in
Utah may be drilled and natural gas in marketable quan-

.

tities deve loped (R. 27, 28). As a typical example of how
1

the McGuire Company intended to operate we refer to
Exhibit 50 (R. 1089) which is as follows:
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"EXHIBIT NO. 50
"N. G. Morgan, Sr.
N. G. ~Iorgan, Jr.
Dr. Paul T. Walton

Telephones 4-5521
4-5522

& wALTON OILS
Suite 518 Wasatch Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
H~IORGAN

December 14, 1950
"Utah Natural Gas Company
Salt Lake City, Utah
"Gentlemen:
"We agree to commit to the Utah Natural Gas
Company all gas produced to our interests in the
fo llowing structures in the State of Utah, wh~ch
we consider productive of gas:
1

Clear Creek Anticline
Scofield Reservoir Anticline
Flat Canyon Anticline
Joe's Valley Anticline
Lake Shore Anticline
"This agreement is contingent on the completion of the pipe line and its readiness to purchasers within two years from January 1, 1951.
"Before the delivery of any gas to said line,
a mutually satisfactory contract will be negotiated
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6
betwe.e·n us, pro:viding for a minimum rate of 10¢
per thousand for gas showing BTU content and
pressures of standard character."
Yours very truly,
MORGAN-WALTON OIL &
GAS, INC.
By

(s) N. G. MORGAN, SR.
(s) PAUL T. WALTON
(s) N. G. MORGAN, JR.

ACCEPTED BY:
UTAH NATURAL GAS CO.
( s) John A. McGuire
President"
That is to say, Mr. McGuire on behalf of the McGuire
Company obtained numerous conditional commitments
from Mr. N. G. Morgan, Sr., Byrd-F·rost, and others to
the effect that gas which might be developed from structures not yet drilled would be committed to the McGuire
Company pipeline. In short, Mr. McGuire's plan was to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
for the construction of a pipeline and as and when structures might be drilled in Utah by independent operators
and natural gas in commerciaJl quantities developed, the
McGuire Company would purchase in the field such gas
for delivery into its pipeline. The McGuire Company did
not contend before the Commission that it had committed
adequate proven gas reserves for delivery through its
pipeline and there is no conflict in the evidence that the
construction of its pipeline depends entirely upon the
results of wildcat drilling by independent operators.
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The pipeline project. of the McGuire Company proposes a pipe line to deliver 100 million cubic feet of natural gas into the Salt Lake area each day. The standard
requirement by financial institutions interested in financing natural gas pipelines is that a proven gas supply be
available to the pipeline for a period of not less than
twenty years (R. 471). Therefore a pipeline p,roject planned to deliver 100 million cubic feet of natural gas each
twenty-four hours for twenty years would need a suppiy
equivalent to: 100,000,000 x 365 x 20. This is a tremendous requirement and developed reserves less in
quantity than those adequate for a "break even" operation would not permit the required financing (R. 460).
Exhibit 58 (R. 1097) was produced by a witness for the
McGuire Company and shows that it would require a
daily sale of 76,169,958 physical units (MCF) at the
McGuire Company's proposed rates of 23-34¢ to Utah
industrial users and at 30¢ to other users per MCF for
the McGuire Company to reach the break even point on
its proposed project.
The only claim of proven gas reserves committed
to the McGuire pipeline consists of an insignificant
amount of naturai gas in the Boundary Butte structure
near the Utah-Arizona line. The insignificant quantity
.of gas in this structure will be dealt with in detail subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sequently in the brief. There is no pipeline to the Boundary Butte structure and the gas in the structure is of
an extremely low BTU content.
While the paid in capital of the McGuire Company
at the time the hearing began on December 11, 1950 was
$1,000, by the time the hearing adjourned the capital
stock issued or reserved for issue had grown to $78,760
(Ex. 68, R. 1105). The accountant for the McGuire Company would not certify to these figures and stated that aill
he knew about them was what Mr. McGuire had told
him, but that it was his understanding this increase represented unclassified expenditures such as for professional services, travel expenses and other items (R. 947
to 949).
The McGuire Company in its amended application
for the certificate stated that it had the ownership of or
could by firm contracts secure the ownership and delivery
of the required quantities of natural gas for its pipeline
and tha;t it was financially able to perform and carry
out the construction of the line and the required facilities (R. 1111, R. 1113). Notwithstanding the fact that Mr.
McGuire is a 1awyer and must appreciate the difference
be~tween a firm commitment and an instrument which
does not create any binding obligation, he produced Exhibit 45 (R. 1084) as evidence of ability to adequately
finance the project. This exhibit is as follows :
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"Chicago Office
231 South LaSalle Stree1t
"LEHMAN BROTHERS
One William Street
NewYork4
July 25th, 1950
"Utah Natural Gas Company
Suite 1311, Walker Bank Bui1lding
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
"Dear Sirs :
"This letter is to confirm the fact that officers of your company have discussed with us the
subject of your obtaining a financing for the construction of a gas pipe line from the four corners
area to the Salt Lake City market, and for the
purchase of other related facilities.
"While a number of things still remain to
be done, such as obtaining a certificate from the
Public Service Commission of the State of Utah,
obtaining assurance of adequate available gas
reserves, an engineering report covering construction and operating matters, etc., this letter is
further to confirm that we wi'll undertake to provide adequate financing for the Company, either
by a private placement or public offering of its
securities, when all the necessary preparatory
steps have been satisfactorily completed."
"Very truly yours,
LEHMAN BROS."
The Byrd-F.rost interests of Dallas, Texas, were active in support of the application of McGuire c·ompany
but Col. Byrd testified that neither he nor his associates
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1n Byrd-Frost had any stock interest in the McGuire
Company (R. 735 & 932-936). At the time of the hearing
the Byrd-Frost interests were drilling a weB. (Sitton No.
1) at Monticello and intended to drill what is commonly
called the Last Chance structure in Emery County.
The Commission permitted Utah Pipe Line to intervene in the McGuire Company's case but refused to permit Utah Pipe Line to offer any evidence as to its gas
reserves in New l\{exico and its proposed pipeline from
Aztec to Salt Lake City. The Commission also failed to
take any action with regard. to a hearing upon the application of Utah Pipe Line (R. 1221) for a certificate:.
The application of McGuire Company was filed with
the Commission on May 29, 1950, (R. 1106). No notice
of the app~ication was given and nothing was done with
regard thereto until November 17,1950, when an amended
application (R. 1111) was filed enlarging upon the program of the applicant. On November 24, 26, and 28, 1950,
notice of a hearing on the amended application was published in the Salt Lake· Tribune, the hearing being scheduled for December 11, 1950. Notice was mailed to J.
Glenn Turner, Dallas, Texas, gene.ral counse[ for Delhi
Oil Corporation and one of the attorneys for Utah Pipe
Line. Whether Mr. McGuire had learned of the plans
of Delhi Oil Corporation to build through a subsidiary,
a pipeline from the San Juan Basin of New Mexico to
SaJt Lake City is not certain, but it is a fair inference (R.
1028) that this accounted for the short notice and the
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sudden necessity of speed in the disposition of the McGuire Company's application. At the beginning of the
hearing on the McGuire application Mr. Turner entered
an appearance on behalf of Utah Pipe Line and asked
ieave to file its petition to intervene in the proceeding.
The petition of Utah Pipe Line set forth that there was
then pending before the Federal Power Commission an
application of Utah Pipe Line for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing the construction
and operation of a pipeline from Aztec, New Mexico to
Salt Lake City; that Utah Pipe Line proposed to construct and operate such line and that the gas reserves
available to Utah Pipe Line approximated 1 trillion cubic
feet; that Utah Pipe Line was informed and believed
that the McGuire Company had insufficien;t and inade~
quate reserves and that if a certificate were, granted to the
1\IcGuire Company it would be unable to furnish the service and that any attempt by the McGuire Company to
transport gas by its pipe line from outside Utah would
have to be made through the Federa:l Power Commission
(R. 1148-1153). When Mr. Turner presented the petition
of Utah Pipe Line for leave to intervene, counsel for the
McGuire Company strenuously objected and the foJlowing occurred :
"MR. TURNER: Mr. Commissioner, may I be
heard with reference to that~
"COM. BENNETT : You may.
"MR. TURNER: Utah Pipe Line Company ~s a
wholly owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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· pany. Delhi Oil Company owns substantial oil
and gas holdings in New Mexico.
"We exp·ect to prove, if allowed to participa1.e in this hearing, that we ourselves have
approximately 1 trillion feet of gas ourselves
under our own leases. It is a matter of common knowledge - it has been the subject of
consideTable comment, and it is generally
known we have been negotiating for quite
some time with industrial customeTs in the
Salt Lake City area, and those negotiations
are down to the last stages. We have had the
right of way surveyed; we have taken all the
steps-and i~t is true we just recently filed
with the Federal PoweT Commission, but we
expect to prove, if allowed to intervene, that
the applicant is merely trying to preempt the
Salt Lake City industrial market, that they
do not have sufficient gas reserves; that it
would be impossible to support this line unless
it is an interstate line, and that the Federal
Power Commission, if· it is going to be an
interstate line, is the first body who will have
to authorize a certificate.
"Now we have filed our application. We
propose to serve substantially the same market that these gentlemen p·ropose to serve, and
we say that it is in the public interest for this
Commission to hear both projects and bO'th
plans and decide which of the 2 plans it should
allow. We think that it is obvious that you
cou!ldn't have 2 lines coming in here, and we
think that as a direct competitor tha~t we do
have a direct interest in this proceeding, and
if allowed to intervene, we will present such
data as the Commission may desire to show
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that we do have ·the gas, that we. are in good
faith in wanting to serve the Utah are~a, and
that we will take all prompt steps to that end.
"But, we do think that if a certificate
"~ere here given the applicant without sufficient gas reserves, it would confuse the issues,
as counsel says, and we think it would be in
the public interest for this Commission to
hear both of these competing projects at the
same time .
"MR. CORNWALL: I think our views are expressed, ~Ir. Commissioner.
"C.O~I.

BENNETT: We will be 1n recess for 5
minutes at this- time."

*

*

:)(:

*

"COM. BENNETT : The hearing will be in session.
"The commission believes that the Utah
Pipe Line Company has shown sufficient interest to intervene. The Commission also feels
that such intervention should be limited as to
the reasons alleged-as to why the petitioner's application should not be granted, hut
in no instance should this be used as a place
for the Utah Pipe Line Company to try and
prove a case which the Commission does not
have before it.
"If they intend to petition this Commission for a hearing for a pipeline, why that
would have to be done in its usual manne-r.
"So, while the p·etition of intervention
willl be granted, it will be gran'ted in a limited
manner, as set out here.
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"MR. CORNWALL: Do I understand, Mr. Commissioner, that the showing which the Intervenor is entitled to make here will be a showing going to the merits of our application,
but, they will not be entitled to make affirmative proof with respect to their proposed application; is that the position of the Commission~

"COM. BENNETT: That is the position of the
Commission." (R. 10-13)
In other words, the ruling of the Commission was to the
effect that Utah Pipe Line would not be permitted to
offer any evidence with regard to its application pending
before the Federal Power Commission nor with regard
to its gas reserves in New Mexico or its proposed pipeline
projeet. That ruling of the Commission ~as never
changed and throughout the proceeding Utah Pipe Line
was barred from presenting any evidence in its support.
Its participation was limited to a showing of what the
McGuire Company did not have.
The hearing on the McGuire Company's application
continued ~through December 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1950, and
was then adjourned to January 29, 1951. On January
26, 1951 Utah Pipe Line filed with the Commission its
application entitled "In the Matte~r of the Application of
Utah Pipe Line Company," case No. 3578, a copy which is
attached as Exhibit "C" to the petition for the writ of
certiorari herein, and will he found at R. 1199, and a map
of its proposed line will be found at R. 1204. On the fo~
lowing day, January 27, 1951, Utah Pipe Line filed with
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the Commission a request that the Commission arrange
with the Federal Power Commission for a "joint hearing"
of the two applications of Utah Pipe Line (R. 1188).
Utah Pipe Line, in its verified application for such
certificate, again stated that in excess of 1 trrllion cubic
feet of proven natural gas reserves in the Angel's Peak,
Blanco, Largo and Glade areas in San Juan County, New
Mexico, were available to Utah Pipe Line for transmission and disposition through its proposed pipeline into
the Salt Lake area. Without considering any of the said
matters and without granting Utah Pipe Line a hearing
on its application and without granting or denying its
motion for a joint hearing with the Federal Power Commission and after limiting Utah Pipes Line's participation as aforesaid in the hearing upon the application of
the McGuire Company, on March 12, 1951, the Commis,..
sion made its Findings and Report and Orde-r and
granted to the McGuire Company certificate of convenience and necessity No. 925.
The Commission recognized that the McGuire Company had not made a sufficient showing of proven gas re-serves or of adequate financing. The Findings of the
Commission are clear in this regard. On page 6 of the
Findings (R. 1169) the Conrmission says:
"The Commission further finds that the estimated reserves in the area where the applicant
has gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if
proved, to make the construction of applicant's
pipe line and facilities economically feasible."
* * * *
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"The Commission further finds that if said
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas
purchase contracts to deliver the gas so pur. chased and developed into its pipe line. The Commission further finds that the operation of the
pipe line will be economically feasible with the
available market if the estimated reserves are
proved; and that if said pipe line is economically
feasib~e the applicant can secure the necessary
financing for the construction of the same."
In short, the Findings and Report are to the effect
that the McGuire Company claimed to have adequate
proven gas reserves, and based upon that assumption,
the c·ommission then found that "estimated reservesare sufficient, if proved," and "that if said reserves are
proved, the applicant can secure gas purchase contracts
to deliver the gas so proved." In effect, the Commission
, found that the McGuire Company was entirely dependent
upon the results of limited wildcat drilling for its gas
sup~ply.

Although recogn1zmg that the McGuire Company
had not made a sufficient showing of proven gas reserves or of the required financing, nevertheless the
C.ommission granted the certificate and gave the McGuire
Company one year within which to:
" (a) File with this Commission the unconditional commi!tment of a financial house of recognized responsibility committing itself to supply
the funds necessary for the construction of the
pipe line and facilities to be installed by Utah
Natural Gas Company;
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H(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of
such committnent and as a part thereof, Utah
Natural Gas Cotnpany shall file with this Commission the certificate of an independent geologist of
recognized professional standing, acceptable to
this Coimnission, that there are p-roven gas reserves conunitted to Utah Natural Gas Company
adequate to justify the construction of the line and
faci!lities ·

'

" (c) Deposit with this Commission copies
of any gas purchase contracts entered into with
owners of producing gas wells;
" (d) Deposit with this Commission a copy
or copies of its contracts then entered into with
a recognized responsible construction firm or
firms for the construction of said line and facilities; and
'' (e) Pending the compliance with the conditions herein imposed, Utah Natural Gas Company shall make no public offering of its stock
or other securities." (R. 1173).
OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT
I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDER; THE
FINDINGS AND REPORT DO NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER
AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE.

The Findings and Report in substance merely state
that the McGuire Company claims to have gas reserves
and as a consequence claims it can obtain the necessary
financing. It is true that the evidence supports a finding
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that the McGuire Company makes such claims. But more
than mere claims are required to sustain the issuance
of a certificate of convenience and necessity.
II. THE COMMISSION UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED
TO AN UNKNOWN AND UNDETERMINED GEOLOGIST
THE POWER WITHIN ONE YEAR TO MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW OF THE COMMISSION
AND TO THEREBY PERFECT AND EXTEND THE McGUIRE
COMPANY CERTIFICATE; THIS ACTION OF THE COMMISSION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
PETITIONER.

The order of the Commission de1egates to a geologist
to be selected by the McGuire Company (subject to the
Commission's determination of his qualifications) the
power, ex parte, without hearing, without investigation
by interested parties into his background or qualification,
without investigation as to his interest in the controversy
or his relationship with McGuire Company, to pe·rfect and
extend the certificate by filing with the Commission the
geologist's opinion that the McGuire Company has obtained the required gas reserves. These are the matters
exclusively reserved to the Commission by law for their
determination and such delegation is unlawful and void.
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution
and that of the Constitution of the State of Utah required that Utah Pipe Line be· given a full hearing before
any certificate was granted to the McGuire Company;
the vesting by the Commission in an independent geo[ogist of the power to perfect and extend the certificate,
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ex parte, does not give to Utah Pipe Line that impartial,
fair and full hearing which both the Federal and the
State Constitutions require.
III. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO REGULARLY PURSUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY..

The authority of the Commission is wholly statutory
and although an administrative agency, it does not have
unlimited authority in granting certificates of convenience and necessity and particularly may not constitute
itself a conservation and development commission for
the State of Utah.
IV. THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE AND IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER..

The restriction on the participation of Utah Pipe
Line in the hearing on the McGuire application; the refusal of the Commission to hear any evidence, on the
pipeline project of Utah Pipe Line and its reserves.;
the fai,lure to take any action on Utah Pipe Line's request
for a joint hearing; and the order requiring Utah Pipe
Line to stand aside and defer presentation of its project while the McGuire Company embarked on a "hunting expedition" for natural gas, all were arbitrary and
capricious and in excess of ~the jurisdiction and powe,rs of
the Commission.

Preliminary Statement Relative to Points on Appeal
The petition for the writ of certiorari sets forth
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ceeded its jurisdiction and failed to pursue its statutory
authority (R. 1189-1192). These points are numbered a,
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, 1 and m. For the purposes of the
argument and to save repetition Utah Pipe Line has
grouped these points so that they may be embraced within
the four general headings above set forth. The alphabetical identity of the points has been retained with
designation in capital letters.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ORDER; THE
FINDINGS AND REPORT DO NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER
AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE. POINTS A,
B, C, AND L.
I.

In General
This is the first case presented to the Supreme Court
of Utah involving the question as to what showing must
be made by an applicant for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline. While the case is of first
impression nevertheless the requirements for a showing
of an adequate gas supply and firm commitments for
the necessary financing actually are no more than the
application of the well settled rule in any type of certificate of public convenience and necessity case that the
applicant must show that it is able to furnish the proposed service and that the financing thereof is economically sound and feasible. The whole purpose of a
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hearing upon an application for such ce:rtificate is to
determine not only that public convenience and ne.cessity
require the service but the applicant is in a position to
furnish the service. Applications for certificates of convenience and necessity are not treated lightly. Commissions and courts recognize that the granting Q·f such
certificate materially affects the publlic welfare.
The application of the McGuire Company 1s not
unlike the application before the Idaho Commission in
Re Wilcox, P.U.R. 1916C., 35, 37, involving a proposed
construction and operation of a gas plant and where the
Commission in disposing of the application said :
"The whole plan or scheme of applicant Jones
seemed to be, as we gathered from the evidence
adduced, that he would secure a certificate of
convenience and necessity, thereby securing the
control of that field for a time at [east, and then
endeavor to secure the necessary capital, either by
subscription or by bonding the plant, with which
to construct the plant and distribution system.
He presented no definite tangible plan of procedure, but trusted to the future to 1take care of
itself. In other words, it app·eared that he was
acting purely as a promotor."
There has grown up in natural gas pipe line cases
three fundamental requirements which courts and commissions recognize must be met before a certificate for
the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline
should issue. These requirements are sometimes embodied in regulations of commissions ; sometimes are to
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mental and have become well settled rules of law. The
Federal Power Commission has considered these requirements in a more extensive manner than probably all
other commissions and courts combined. These rules of
law require an applicant to show:
1. Proven gas reserves dedicated to the pipeline in sufficien't quantity to justify the project
from the standpoint of consumer and investor.
Adequate financing for the construction
and operation of the pipeline.
2.

Adequate showing of consumer demand
for the natural gas.
3.

With reference to the last requirement, i.e. adequate
showing of consumer demand, we make no contention.
The Commission found that there was an inadequate supply of gas in the Salt Lake area; that home owners,
schools, apartment houses, small and large industry, are
suffering from a lack of adequate gas reserves. Newspaper photographs of people standing in line in the hope
of obtaining a gas connection; repeated notices in the
newspapers to the Hffect that gas is limited for new
home construction; all are facts with which we are familiar. We wi]l, therefore, confine our argument to the
first two requirements.
POINT A
THAT THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPLICANT,
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY, IN THAT THE RECORD
"(a)
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CONTAINS NO COl\IPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SUSTAIN A REQUIRED SHOWING OF ADEQUATE
PROVEN GAS RESERVES COMMITTED TO SUPPLY APPLICANT'S PROPOSED LINE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, THE
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT APPLICANT HAS AVAILABLE
INCONSEQUENTIAL AND WHOLLY INADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF GAS."
ST.A.TE~IENT

UNDER POINT A

Respondent, lTtah Natural Gas Company, proposed
to construct a system of natural gas pipelines from the
Southeastern area of the State of Utah :to the Salt Lake
City area at a total cost of approximately $32,000,000
(R.. 242 and Ex. 42). The pipeline system as proposed
would have a maximum daily delivery capacity into the
market area of 135,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas
(R. 300), with a proposed actual delivery of 100,000,000
cubic feet (R. 304) and a required minimum economic
"break-even" delivery of 76,000,000 cubic feet per day
over a twenty year period (R. 718, Ex. 58). It was proposed that gas with a heating value of 875 British thermal
units per cubic foot would be delivered to the consumers
(R. 521).
The Utah Nrutural Gas Company offered evidence
pertaining to several different areas in an attempt to
show that it had adequate natural gas reserves to furnish the requirements of the proposed system. The areas
primarily relied upon were rthe areas known as Boundary Butte, Last Chance and Greater Monticello. As to
Boundary Butte, all witnesses agreed that there were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
some "proven" reserves of natural gas but there was a
sharp conflict of testimony as to the extent of such
"proven" reserves.
A report on the gas reserves of Byrd-Frost, Inc.English interests, made by the independent consultant
firm of Cummins, Berger and Pishny, page 20 of which,
along with a correcting telegram (R. 1103), was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 66, attributed to Boundary
Butte a total proven recoverable reserve of 62,467,000,000
cubic feet and to the net interest of Byrd-Fros~t, Inc.English 13,661,000,000 cubic feet.
Of the total productive area estimated by witnesses
of Utah Natural Gas Company to be in Boundary Butte,
Utah Natural Gas Company has a gas purchase contract committing gas to its proposed line from only the
Byrd-Frost, Inc.-P. B. English interest, which accounted
for ownership of only one-fourth of the ownership in
the Boundary Butte structure (R. 515-516, Ex. 46). While
there was some testimony to the effect that a trade of gas
owned elsewhere by the Byrd-Frost, Inc.-P. B. English
interests for the remaining three-fourths interest at
Boundary Butte had been considered (R. 530), there
was no evidence that such trade had or would be made.
As to the area or s'tructure known as Last Chance,
there was sharp conflict in the testimony a.s to whether
or not there were recoverable "proven" reserves of
natural gas in that structure.
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Witnesses for petitioner testified that there were
no proven reserves at Last Chance and not enough basic
data to estimate reserves (R. 671, 744). A witness for
~Iountain Fuel Supply Co. testified that at the most the
total reserve at Last Chanee was slightly over 406,000,000
cubic feet (R. 763).
As to the area or structure known as Great.er Monticello, all witnesses "\Vere in accord that it did not have a
"proven" reserve of natural gas (R. 86, 92, 147, 672, 705 ),
and the principal witness for Utah Natural Gas Company
denoted it as a ''probable" reserve (R. 92, 147), with
the admission that they were in the ''field of conjecture"
(R.93).

'Vitnesses for petitioner testified that there was no
accurate estimate of reserves possible on the data available and that there was no substantial amount of gas
proven today at Greater Monticello (R. 672, 705).
While Utah Natural Gas Company introduced testimony as to other "unproved structures" (R. 99, Ex. 1), it
relied primarily on the foregoing to establish the natural
gas reserves upon which its application was predicated.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT A
(a)

Public Interest as Paramount Concern.

The U'tah statute under which the certificate of convenience and necessity here concerned was sought is,
pri1narily, Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. 1943, which reads in
part as fallows :
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" ( 1) No ... gas corporation . . . shall henceforth establish, or begin construction or operation of a . . . line, route, plant or system, . . .
without having first obtained from the commission
a certificate that present or future public convenience and necessi~y does or will require such construction."
"(3) ... The commission shall have power,
after a hearing, to issue said certificate as prayed
for or to refuse to issue the same, or to issue it
for the construction of a portion only of the conrtemplated railroad, street railroad, serial bucket
tramway, line, plant or system, or extension thereof, or for the partial exercise only of said right
or privilege and may attach to the exercise of the
rights granted by said certificate such terms and
conditions as in its judgment public convenience
and necessity may require."
1

It is a well settled fundamental in the public utility
law of Utah thrut the interest of the public is paramount
in determining whether or not a certificate of public
convenience and necessity, under the above and similar
statutes, should be issued. As this court stated:
"It is the public good and convenience which
is the ya.rds1tick to be used in determining the
advisability of granting or denying a certificate
of necessity and convenience. Mulcahy v. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P2d 298;
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Cornmission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P2d 683." Salt Lake &
Utah R. Corp. v. Public Service Commission, et al.
(S·up. Ct. 1944) 106 Utah 403, 149 P2d 647. See
also, Collett et al. v. Public Service Commission,
et al., (Sup. Ct. 1949) 211 P2d 185.
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(b)

.A.dequate Su-pply Basic Prerequisite to Protect,ion of Public Interest.
It would seen1 basically fundamental that whe-re a
particular applicant is seeking such a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to perform a particular service,
such applicant musJt show, in order to establish the public
convenience and necessity for his particular service, that
he can furnish the services concerning which he is seeking a certificate. Such requirement has been clearly
stated by the Public Service Commission of Missouri
in the case of Re Achtenberg (1934) 8 P.U.R., N.S. 397.
In that case the Commission, in consideTing and discussing the Missouri strutute authorizing the Commission to
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity,
which statute is partially quoted on page 407 of such
opinion and is substantially the same as Section 76-4-24,
U.C.A. (1943) abo-ve quoted, observed the following at
pages 408-9 :
"We have always regarded this statute and
the similar statutes relating to other utilities, as
involving conside-ration of two questions-first,
whether public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service; second, whe1ther the applicant is a proper person to fulfill this need. The
combination of these two elements in a finding
constitutes a certificate of convenience and necessity. * * * * But the question as to whe;ther the
two features which have been indicated may be
separately considered by the Commission seems,
so far as we are ab~e to ascertain, undecided.
On principle it seems that this division might and
should be recognized. Going to 1the fundamentals
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of regulation first announced in the case of Munn
v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.ed. 77, it will
be observed that regulation proceeds upon the
theory that the owner of p·roperty theretofore
held in private tenure, has by volimtary act devoted it to some use which the state denominates
as affected with a public interest. It seems reasonable to regard one of the purposes of the
finding of convenience and necessity as ~that of
stamping the property so proposed to be used
as being within the category of property affected
with a public interest. That can only be done
by the determination of the sttate, through its
agent, the Public Service Commission, that the
business is really necessary and convenient for
the public. That question having been decided,
the next question to be determined by the Commission is the suitability of the owner of the property
to use it in meeting this public need. The two
findings together consti1tute the certificate or
franchise granted to the applicant when such certificate is issued."
The wording of Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943), indicates that such a requirement was contemplated by the
legislature . Such section states that no utility shall begin cohstruction "without having first obtained from the
commission a certificate that present or future public
convenience and necessity does or will require such con-

struction."

Fur~theTmore,

the actual procedure set out

by the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Public
Service Commission of Utah indicates that such is the
interpretation of its duty by that Commission. Section
11.2 of the Rules of

Prae~tice

and Procedure· requires that
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applications for certificates of convenience and necessity
shall sho,v, a1nong other things, the financial condition
of the applicant, the manner of financing the operation
and the construction proposed.
In situations where the applicant for a certificate
desires to furnish so1ne commodity to be used by the
public this inquiry into whether or not the applicant is
capable of performing the service to be certificated necessarily involves the very i1nportant inquiry into whether
or not the applicant has at its disposal an adequate
suppl~T of the commodity to be furnished to the public
to help meet its "present or future convenience and
necessirty." For example, the California Railroad Comnlission in 1933 denied an application of an individual
for a certificate to operate as a water utility where, by
reason of pending litigation, there existed grave doubt
as to the right of the applicant for the certificate to
operate a plant from the proposed source of supply and
where, also, the applicant had failed to give reasonable
assurance of an adequate supply of, or the ability to
obtain additional, water to meet demands. Re Morgan,
(1933) 38 Cal. R. C.R. 667.
(c) Adequate Supply Means Adequate Reserves of
Natural Gas.

Certainly, in situations where the activity to be
certificated is a pipeline for the transmission of natural
gas, the adequacy of the gas supply to meet the demands
of the public and to insure that the continuation of the
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pipeline will be a sound investment from the standpoint
of the public interest will be of the utmost importance in
determining the public convenience and necessity and the
ability of 1the applicant to meet and fulfill that public convenience and necessity.

The Commissions and Courts

which have considered the problem have so held.
The Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in the
case of Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., (1936) 13 P.U.R.
(N.S·.) 445, said at page 451:

"In a former opinion this Commission held
that, in order to justify the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for
a gas utility to construct a natural gas pipe line
under Act 9, Public Acts of 1929, three things
should be established and they were briefly stated
as follows.
(a) The utility should establish its financial ability to cons1truct the facilities and carry
out the enterprise.

The utility should establish that it has
available a sufficient quantity of natural gas to
serve the locality it seeks to serve for a reasonable length of time. Just what that reasonable
length of time is it is difficult to say but certainly
it should have a sufficient supply of gas to serve
rthe locality it proposes to serve for eight or ten
years.
(b)

(c) Said utility should have a market ready
to receive the· natural gas it proposes to transport."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
Further, in connection with its requirement of adequate supply, the Comn1ission stated rut page 456:
"Public convenience and necessity wiD not
be served if the service of natural gas must be
terminated (through lack of supply) at the end
of two or three years, and if the expense of the
pipe line and equipment must be added to the
rates charged to customers over so short a period
of time."
The Michigan statute was no more detailed in its
requirements concerning public convenience and necessity
than is the Utah Statute.
The Tennessee Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, in considering the application of Tennessee Gas
& Transmission Co. to bring gas into the State of Tennesee, inquired into, and made a definite requirement of a
showing of the adequacy of, the reserves of natural gas
available to the applicant; and this, even though the
statute of Tennessee specifica1ly referred to certain inquiries to be made by the Commission in such cases, such
as the financial ability of the applicant, but was silent
as to reserves. In discussing this requirement which it
imposed, the Commission stated in its opinion, Re Tennesee Gas and Transmission Co., (1941) 40 P.U.R. (N.S.)
129, at page 133 :
"When the Federal Power Commission refers
1to the regard due 'to the sufficiency of its available reserves of natural gas,' it is returning to one
factor which is clearly indispensable in any case
involving the granting to a company of a certifiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cate of public convenience and necessity for the.
introduction of natural ·gas. Beyond this, the economic feasibility of the projeClted construction
would certainly be an essential factor. Other
factors which are referred to, even including so
important a matter as financial resources, are collateral ones under the most normal circumstances
which may arise in certificate cases. In other
words, if a company has clearly adequake reserves
of natural gas, and if a market exists in which it
is economically feasible to sell such natural gas
to the advantage both of the public and of the
company, it is almost certain that financial resources would be made available for constructing and operating the project. Accordingly, it will
first be necessary for the Commission to analyze
and ascertain whether · the Tennessee Gas and
Transmission Company has available adequate.
supplies of natural gas . . ."
The Federal Power Commission has, of course, considered the problem of reserves many rtimes in its deliberations. The statute under which jt issues certificates
of public convenience and necessity is very similar to and
almost equally as brief as the statute under which the
Public Service Commission of Utah issued the certificate
in this case.
The applicable provisions of the United States statute, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 717f (c) and (e) (Natural Gas Act,
Sec. 7 (c) and (e) ) compare in substance with Sec. 76-4-24
Utah Code Anno. 1943.
"(c) No Natural-gas company or person
which will be a natural-gas company upon comple1tion of any proposed construction or extension
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shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or ex·tension
of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate
any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless
there is in force with respect to such nrutural-gas
company a certificate of public convenience and
necessity issued by the Commission authorizing
such acts or operations."

*

*

*

*

*

" (e) Except in the cases governed by the
provisions contained in subsection (c) of this seciton, a certificate shali be issued to any qualified
applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any
part of the operation, sale, service, construction,
extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is able and
willing properly to do the acts and to perform
the service proposed and to conform 1to the pro~
visions of this chapter and the requirements,
rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition, to the
extent authorized by the certificrute, is or will be
required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application
shall be denied. The Commission shall have the
power to attach to the issuance of the certificate
and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as
the public convenience and necessity may require."
The applicable provisions of the Utah S1tatute, 76-424, U.C.A. (1943) are set out above.
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In view of the similarity of the U.S. Statute to the
Utah Statute, of the fact that few states have dealt with
the problem of reserves and that the problem before this
court appears to he one of first impression in the State
of Utah, it would be hellpful, it is believed, to observe the
problem as handled by the Federal Power Commission.
In its first case under the Natural Gas Act, Re
Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., the Federal Power Commission attempted to lay down some· of the principles by
which it conceived itself bound under the Natural Gas
Act. That case

invo~ved

the applications of two com-

panies to construct pipelines, one from the Hugoton
gas field in Kansas to the Mesabi Iron Range in Minnesota and the other from North Dakota to a region on
the N o~th Dakota-Minnesota border.
In its opinion, Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co.,
(1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 321, the Commission had this
to say about reserves at page 332 :
"We are of the opinion tha;t applicants
who contend that 'public convenience and necessity' requires or will require the construction of
facil~ties for the transportation of natural gas
must show that they possess a supply of natural
gas adequate to meet those demands which it is
reasonable to assume will be made upon them.
It is obvious that the public convenience and
necessity would not be served by certificruting an
applicant who had an insufficient supply of the
product which it proposes to make available to
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the publJ.ic. Cf. Incorporators of Service Gas Co.
v. Pttblic Service Commission, (1937) 126 Pa. Super. Ct. 381, 190 Atl. 653.
The Commission then proceeded to examine and
evaluate very carefully the available gas reserves of the
applicants. In connection with the gas reserves of one
applicant, Kansas-Pipe Line & Gas Co., the Commission
observed that, although the terms of the gas purchase
contract between the producer and applicant had be:en
agreed upon, there was as yet no firm commitment between the producers and t.he applicant which would specifically dedicate the reserves to the applicant's pipeline. In its disposition of the matter the Commission refused to issue certificates of convenience and necessity
to the applicanrts,requiring additional showing by them
of many facts in connection with the· proposed projects,
including the requirement that the "Kansas Pipe Line &
Gas C·o. must present to us for our further consideration
a firm commitment for the purchase of natural·gas in the
Hugoton gas field in the State of Kansas," 30 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 348.
In its recent opinion in Re Atlantic Seaboard Corp.,
(1948) 76 P.U.R. (N.S.) 410, the Commission evidenced
its continued adherence to the principles announced in
the Kansas Pipe Line Co. case, supra. In the Atlantic
case the Commission had before it the applications of
Atlantic Seaboard Corporation and Tennessee Gas
Transmission Company seeking a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing additional faciliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties to expand the capac~ty of their then existing pipeline facilities. In considering the adequacy of Tennessee's gas rese-rves, the Commission observed at page 412:
"The Commission in its opinion dealing with
the Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Company case (1939)
2 FPC 29 referred to certain minimum requirements that an applicant must meet 1to entitle it to
a certificate of public convenience and necessity
under §7. In that opinion, among other requirements to be met by certificate applicants, i1t was
stated that 'We are of the opinion that applicants who contend that "public convenience and
necessity" require or will require the construction
of facilities for the transportation of natural gas
must show that they possess a supply of natural
gas adequate to meet those demands which it is
reasonable to assume will be made upon them. It
is obvious· that the public convenience and necessity would not be served by certificating an applicant who had an insufficient supply of the pro~
duct which it proposes to make available to the
public'.''
After reviewing Tennessee's evidence as to ~ts supply of gas the Commission determined that Tennessee
had not shown that it had a supply of natural gas reasonably adequate to meet its contracted obligations to its
customers and the demands which it was reasonable to
assume would be made upon it. The Commission observed
that the extensive capital expenditures proposed by Tennessee would be financed principally by sale of securi~ties
to the public and that, in reliance upon the proposed service to be undertaken by Tennessee, substantial capital
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expenditures were planned to be made by its customers,
not to mention the expenditures by ~thousands of ·gas
consumers for appliances in expectation of gas services.
The Commission then stated, at page 414:
"Consumers, investors and the public generally expect to and do rely upon this Commission,
in issuing certificates of public convenience and
necess~ty to natural gas companies, to iss.ue certificates only to companies clearly showing ability
to perform the services proposed. Section 7 of the
Natural Gas Act requires such finding by this
Commission in certificate proceedings as a condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate."
The Commission denied the cer.tificate sought and
provided for a later hearing wherein Tennessee was
required to make additional showing as to certain facts,
primarily gas reserves. It is true that two Commissioners
dissented, primarily on the ground that since this was
an application for enlarge·ment of existing capacity, and
not an entirely new project, and since Tennessee had
made a substantial showing as to reserves, it should be
given a conditional certificate. It is also true, however,
that the dissenting Commissioners recognized thlVt there
would be a difference in the case of a new enterprise. At
page 418 they make the following observations :
"As a practical matter such a showing might
well be required in the interest of the inves~ting
or consuming public were the surrounding circumstances different - as in the promotion of an
entirely new enterprise, or where a pipe line relied
for its gas supply on an area where large addiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tional reserves of gas were not known to be available or in reasonable prospect. But these are not
the circumstances of this case."
In answering the dissent, a commissioner of the
majority wrote the following at page 412:
"In our 1944 report to the Committee on
interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House
of Representatives, entitled 'The First Five Years
of the Natural Gas Act,' the Commission, including Commissioner Smith, stated:
'Where the basic reserves of an industry
are exhaustible, as in the case of natural gas,
it is obviously desirable ·that, before millions
are invested in well drilling and pipe lines
and before thousands of consumers are induced to invest in appliances, there should be
positive determination, after public hearings,
that the enterprise is sound and the reserves
are sufficient to insure adequate service at
reasonable rates over a sufficiently long period to justify every dollar honestly invested.
'If such effective regulation had existed
during ~the earlier days of the industry, we
might not now be confronted in certain of
the eastern areas with petitions for the abandonment of service, which will leave . communities unsupplied with the gas to which
they have grown accustomed and for the
utilization of which they have made large
facility investments.' (Italics supplied.)
"The minority clearly recognize· that Tennessee Company sought to establish a 20-year firm
supply of gas but failed. They also recognize that
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additions to the gas reserves, committed to supply
its line, are necessary. But they are willing to
accept, in this particular case, as a substitute
for a positive determination of adequwte gas reserves, the assmnption that Tennessee Company
'vill be able to acquire additional reserves .
.. Thus, by their dissent, the n1inority would
effectually repudiate the statemen't quoted above,
although only recently 'they participated in a decision in the Trans-Continental Pipe Line Case
in complete accord therewith, without the deleterious results which they conjure up here. It
is a \Yell-kno,vn fact that the unanimous decision
to reopen that case for lack of a proper showing
on the supply side had a beneficial effect on ~the
general availability of gas for the pipe-line market
and that Trans-Continental was able, within a
few weeks, to come in with a showing of dedicated
reserves affording both investors and consumers
co1nplete protection.
"The faet is that the Commission has a responsibility to millions of investors as well as consumers to make a positive determination that adequate supplies of gas are assured. For a certificate of convenience and necessity is recognized as
a great aid to the issuance of securities because
it implies th8Jt the e·vidence as to adequate supplies
of gas for the term of the f~ancial obligations
has been well tested by an impartial body."
The same two Commissioners who dissented in Re
Atlantic Seaboard Corporation, supra, had this to say
concerning the importance of a determination of natural
gas reserves in their report to Congress entitled Federal
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Power Commission, Natural Gas Investigation (Docket
No. G-580) Report of Commissioners Smith and Wimberly (1948), at page 31:
"For individual fields or local areas, however, estimates of natural-gas reserves have always been a requirement of the industry. Before
a pipe-line company can justify the construction
of a line to bring gas from a particular area to a
market, it must know that there are sufficient
quantities of gas available to permit prof~table
operations. Bankers and investors, before financing gas development projects, require a determination of the gas reserves of the area being considered. Regulatory commissions, having authority as to methods of financing and conditions of
service, must be apprised of the extent of the gas
supply before appropriate authorizations for the
construction of pipe lines or distribution facilities
can be granted.
"A distribution utility also has an kterest in
the availability of gas reserves, either in local
areas or those within feasible distance. Not only
is there a need for the justification of capital expenditures in the expansion of facilities for new
services, but the matter of rates, utility rules and
regulations, and other policy considerations are
affected by the abundance or scarcity of available
gas. The consumer is, of course, anxious that
there will he large enough quantities of gas available to afford reasonable rates for service and to
assure him a continued use of his appliances."
While decisions of federal commissions are not conclusive on a state commission, they are important auSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thority as was said by the State Commission in National
Tube Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Company, P.U.R.
1918 D., page 68:
""Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, although not binding upon a state commission should be considered as persuasive
authority by it."
On ~the basis of the foregoing and by all reasonable
standards, it is inescapable that an applicant for a certificate of convenience and necessity t? construct a natural gas pipeline Inust first establish as the basic prerequisite that it has available at its disposal sufficient
volumes of natural gas to supply the requirements of the
proposed line. The public interest is safeguarded only
when the supply is sufficient to give the project a usable
life sufficiently long to insure that ~the costs to the
public in preparing itself to use the new facility and the
costs to the applicant of the project, which are passed on
to the public in the rates it pays, will be amortized over a
reasonable period. Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co.,
supra.
When an applicant fails to show that it has an ade:quate supply of gas to furnish the needs of its proposed
line it would seem that the logical procedure for a commission ~to follow would be to either dismiss the application or reopen the proceedings at a later date for the
taking of additional evidence on gas supply. The Public
Service Commission of Pennsylvania dismissed the application in such a situation in Incorporators of Service
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Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, (1937) 190
Atl. 653, 18 P.U.R. (N.S.) 256. In Memphis Natural Gas
Co., 4 F.P.C. 197, 608, the Federal Power Commission
dismissed the application for a certificate because of
the inadequacy of the gas supply showing and subsequently granted a rehearing in order to afford the applicant an opportunity to make a further showing. In
several cases where, upon initial consideration of the
application, the supply of natural gas available to the
applicant has been found inadequate, the Federal Power
Commission has reopened the proceedings for the taking
of additional evidence on gas supply and has allowed the
applicants a period of time within which to make a
further showing on that subject. The periods of time
allowed for such further showings have varied from sixty
days (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442;
Piedmont Natural Gas Corp., March 30, 1950) and three
months (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., Docket No.
G-962, September 29, 1948; San Juan Pipe Line Co. and
El Paso Natural Gas Co. ,et al., Dockets Nos. G-1067,
et al., July 13, 1949) to as much as six n1onths (Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. G-704, Ma.rch
31, 1948).
(d)

How Adequacy of Reserves Is Determined.

Estimating the volume of gas reserves is not an
exact science. The test is not to determine by mathematical calculation the exact extent of the gas reserves in
particular reservoirs. This does not mean, however, that
the requirements for showings of adequate gas reserves
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are lax or haphazard. ..A..\..s the Federal Po,ver Co1nmission
puts it, Hin evaluating the evidence as to gas reserves it
is not realistic to atten1pt a determination of the precise
or exact volumes of gas available to a proposed project.
Rather we are called upon ~to determine whethe·r the
available gas supply is sufficiently adequate to support
the project for 'Yhieh a certificate of public convenience
and necessity is authorized." Re 11:!ichigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co., (19±7) 67 P.U.R. (N.S.) 427. However,
the Commission feels that its determination that adequate supplies are assured must be positive determination. (See quotation from "The First Five Years of
the Natural Gas Act,", supra.)
To make a positive determination of adequate supply, it would seem that a commission could only rel:-.r
upon proven reserves of natural gas; that is, reserves
in fields where actual wells had been drilled and recoveTable natural gas discovered. Thus, it will be noted that
the Michigan Public Utilities Commission, in the case of

Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., supra, carefully and
conservatively considered only estimates of proven reserves, or reserves from fields in which wells had been
drilled and gas discovered and from which gas was being
produced. 13 P.U.R.(N.S.) 451 to 454.
In this connection, the Commission made some observations relative to natural gas reservoirs, of interest
here, at page 449 :
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"Natural gas in Michigan comes mostly from
what is called Michigan stray sand. It is not found
in open spaces or in pools. The 'pay sand' underlying the surface of this state is not a continuous
sheet. In some places pay sand has been found
to be as much as 27 to 30 feet in thickness; in other
places it is only 2 feet thick or less. A well on
one forty may discover commercial pay sand,
while a well a few hundred feet away is a dry hole.
The porosity of the sand itself frequently determines the amount of natural gas which may be recovered from it. More natural gas is found in
~the interstices of pay sand which is coarse than
can be recovered from a tightly packed sand, and
obviously more natural gas is recoverable as the
thickness of the pay sand increases. The amount
of reserves of natural gas in a certain area does
not at all depend upon the amount of so-called
'open-flow.' A large pipe driven into pay sand of
open porosity and of considerable depth may develop an open flow in excess of 30 million cubic
feet but this does' not increase the amount of
gas in the area or necessarily indicate the extent
of the reserves. As a simple comparison we may
consider a gas area as a barrel which ho~ds only a
certain amount of contents. Boring a large hole or
a large number of smalle-r holes into the barrel
may remove the contents 1nore rapidly, but only
so much can be taken out of the barrel as it originally contained. Natural gas is not being manufactured underground. It is there in fixed quantity, and taking out the ga.s does not increase the
quantity. In fact, if taken out too rapidly the
amount of recove.rable gas may be substantially
decreased and a.s in the Muskegon field, the usefulness of the area may be· rapidly destroyed.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

The Federal Po,ver Connnission also looks fundaInentally to proven reserves. Re llfichigan-Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co., supra, at page 442 et seq.; Re J(ansas
Pipe Line & Gas Co., supra, at page 332 et seq.
(e)

Inadequacy of

Et~idence

of Reserves zn this

Case.
In delineating the scope of its review of proceedings
of the Public Service Connnission of Utah under Sec.
76-6-16, U.C.A. 1943, this Court reannounced in the
comparatively recent case of Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp.
et al. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., (Sup.
Ct. Utah 1944) 106 U. 403, 149 P. 2d 647, the rule which
it had prescribed for itself, as follows :
"Under 76-6-16 U.C.A. 1943, which provides
that · * * * The findings and conclusions of the
con1mission on questions of fact shall be final and
shall not he subject to review * * *' this court has
many times said that it is limited in its review of
a decision of the connnission to ascel"tain whether
the connnission had proceeded according to law
and whether it had sufficient substantial evidence
before it upon which to base its findings. Only
in the event that it is apparent from the record
~that there was not sufficient substantial evidence
before the connnission and that its order was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, will this court
set aside its decision. Utah Light & Traction Co.
v. Public Service Comntission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.
2d 683; Mucahy et al. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298; Salt Lake
City et al. v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 52 Utah
210, 173 P. 556,3 A.L.R. 715; Union Pacific Service Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915."
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In the recent case of Universal Camera Corporation
v. N.L.R.B. (Supreme Court of U.S. 1951), 340 U.S. 474,
95 L.Ed. 304, the Supreme Court of the United States
had before it an appeal involving the question of the
extent of ~the scope of review of appellate courts of the
United States in cases appealed from the N.L.R.B. under
the Taft-Hartley Law and the Administrative Procedure
Act. The Wagner Act had originally provided that "the
findings of the Board as ~to the facts, if supported by
evidence, shall be conclusive." Act of July 5, 1935 §10
(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, ch. 372, 29 USC §160 (e). The
Supreme Court construed "evidence" to mean "substantial evidence" and hence establish the so-called substantial evidence rule. Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 US 142, 81 L.ed.
965, 57 S. Ct. 648.
The Administrrutive Procedure Act, dealing with judicial review of administrative proceedings in general,
provided in part under the section dealing with scope
of revie·w that reviewing courts should deal with administrative actions, findings and conclusions which were
found to be violative of certain standards there set out
(such as arbitrary or capricious, excess of statutory jurisdiction, unsupported by substantial evidence and
others) in the manner outlined. Then this section provided: "In making the foregoing dert:erminations the court
shall review the whole record or such portions thereof
as ma.y be cited by any party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error," 60 Stat. 243, 244,
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ch. 324, 5 lT.S.C. Sec. 1009(e). The Taft-Hartley Act,
passed subsequent to the Administrative Procedure Act,
was made to conform to the corresponding section of
the Administrative Procedure Act above referred to.
In the court's opinion Justice Frankfurter struted at 95
L.ed. 312:
"\vnether or not it was ever permissible for
courts to determine the subs,tantiality of evide·nce
supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the
basis of evidence which in and of itself justified
it, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which- conflicting inferences
could be drawn, the new legislation definitively
precludes such a theory of review and bars its
practice. The substantiality of evidence must
take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both statutes that
courts consider the whole record."
:Further, the court stated at page 314:
"We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act direet that courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of
Labor Board decisions than some courts have
shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate
the conventional judicial function. Congress has
imposed on them responsibil~ty for assuring that
the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That
responsibility is not less real because it is limited
to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear
substantial when viewed, on the record as a whole,
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ing the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The
Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they
must nonetheless be set aside when the record
before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the
Board's decision from being justified by a fair
es·timate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses
or its informed judgment on matters within its
special competence or both.
"From this it follows that enactment of these
statutes does not require every court of appeals
to alter its practice. Some -. perhaps a majority
- have always applied the attitude reflected in
this legislation."
It is believed that

~the

Supreme Court of Utah, in

applying its "substantial evidence" rule to orders of the
Public Service Commission on appeal before it, has
consistently applied such rule in the same manner as Justice Frankfurter states that perhaps a majority of courts
have always applied the substantial evidence rule, i.e.
to the evidence as viewed "on the whole record." The
very manner in which this court reviewed the evidence
in the Salt Lake & Utah R. R. Corporation case, supra,
indicates that it reviewed all evidence in the record pertinent to the points complained of and then concluded that
the Commission had and could reasonably reach the conclusions it did. See also Gilmer v. Public Utilities Com-

mission. (Sup. Ct. of Utah 1926) 67 U. 222, 247 Pac. 284,
and the statement at the conclusion of the court's review
in that case at page 290.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

Summary of Inadeq~tacy of Reserves
What, then, did lTtah Natural Gas Company show
in the way of reserves for its proposed pipeline~
Upon the basis of the evidence the only structure the
reserves of 'vhich could be classed as proven would be
Boundary· Butte; and, of course, that gas has a very
low B.T.U. content, falling far short of meeting the
market requirements as set by Utah Natural Gas Company itself of 875 B.T.U. per cubic foot. Taking the most
favorable estii,Ilate of proven reserves at Boundary Butte,
we find that Utah Natural Gas Company's witnesses
estimated 133,980,000,000 cubic feet of recoverable pro;v-en
reserves. Computing the amount of such reserves available for use in the pipeline on the same basis that Utah
Natural Gas Company used in arriving at the amount
of net recoverable reserves available (i.e. from approxim8ltely 348 billion of proven and probable reserves they
estimated a net available for the pipeline of 255 billion)
we find that not more than 98 to 100 billion cubic feet
would be available for use in the pipeline over a twentyyear period, or roughly 13 to 14 million per day. This
figure, of course, is based upon full ownership of the
gas at Boundary Butte. The amount of 1:.he gas at
Boundary Butte actually committed to the pipeline, then,
would be only about 25 billion cubic feet of reserves
available for the pipeline, or only about 3lf2 million cubic
feet per day over a twenty-year period. This evidence
was contradicted by very convincing evidence, for the
record fairly reflects that the reserves were even smaller
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than above set out. Compare this with the McGuire
Company's pipeline requirement of 100,000,000 cubic feet
a day.
This Boundary Butte gas would necessarily have to
be mixed with gas from some other area with a very
high B.T.U. content in order to make it usable at all.
And what did the Utah Natural Gas Company offer~
The- Greater Monticello structure, a doubtful probable
area of gas reserves about which no one knows much
and about which Utah Natural Gas Company offered
pitifully little evidence upon which to base any more than
a faint hope that gas was there. The net effect was that
the backbone of the pipeline was left without any gas
to support it. Nor did the "stepchild" structure of Last
Chance offer any support. This structure, apparently an
after-thought in the planning of the pipeline project,
could not, with its low pressure, low B.T.U. and small
volume reserves, furnish the sustenance needed; even
if the fantastic claims of the witnesses of Utah Natural
Gas Company are admitted. All in all, this is certainly
not the "stuff' upon which pipelines are built and it certainly should not be the "stuff" upon which certificates
are issued.
The public Service Commission of Utah in its finding specifically recognized and found that the respondent had failed to establish that it had adequate pro:ven
reserves for the pipeline sought in its Findings and
Report. The Commission stated at page 4 :
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HThe principal structures upon which applicant relies for its sources of supply are designated
and known as Boundary Butte, ~fonticello and
Last Chance. Witnesses for the applicant estimated recoverable reserves of gas from these
structures of one trillion, one hundred thirty-four
billion cubic feet. In addition the evidence indicates that there are other structures located at
points and places along the course of applicant's
proposed pipe line and in the southeasterly part
of the State of Utah which are likely sources of
additional supplies of natural gas. None of the
fields from which the applicant proposes to obtain gas, however, have been sufficiently explored
to prove the extent of the reserves."
(f)

s~trnmary

From the foregoing it 1s submitted that, in safeguarding the public interest as the paramount concern,
the basic fundamental prerequisite to the issuance of a
certificate that present or future convenience and necessity does or will require the construction of a gas pipeline
is a showing that the ap·plicant for such certificate has
an adequate supply of natural gas to supply the needs
of such pipeline in the form of adequate, available, proven
reserves of natural gas. It is fuJ'Ither submitted that,
by all reasonable and recognized standards, the Utah
Natural Gas Company has wholly failed to show such
reserves and that the record in this case contains no
competent substantial evidence which would establish
that such prerequisi~te has been met. In fact, the, evidence
in the record shows clearly 'that respondent Utah Natural
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Gas Company has available inconsequential and wholly
inadequate supplies of gas for its pipeline. The Commission, in its Findings and Report, so held. In view of
the fact that the applicant, Urtah· Natural Gas Company,
failed to establish that it had met such a fundamental
prerequisite, the Commission erred in finding that a
certificate of public convenience and necess~ty should be
granted to Utah Natural Gas Company.
POINT B
"(b) THAT THE COMMISION ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPLICANT,
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY, IN THAT THE RECORD
CONTAINS NO COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SUSTAIN A REQUIRED SHOWING THAT FIR.M COMMITMENTS F R 0 M FINANCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
SOURCES FOR THE REQUIRED FINANCING OF THE
PIPELINE HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY,
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE APPLICANT HAS
NO FIRM COMMITMENTS FOR THE REQUIRED FINANCING AND CANNOT OBTAIN SUCH COMMITMENTS UNTIL
SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROVEN GAS RESERVES
MAY BE AVAILABLE TO APPLICANT."

STATEMENT UNDER POINT B
The Utah Natural Gas Company was organized for
the express purpose of transporting gas through its
proposed pipeline. The corporation was set up with 1000
shares of stock outstanding

wi~th

a par value of $1.00

per share, all of which was subscribed by Mr. McGuire,
its president (R.21). President McGuire advanced money
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or incurred indebtedness to the extent of $77,760.79 for
expenses of the co1npany ( R. 505), and this was added to
the capitalization of the con1pany as reflected by Exhibit
68 (R. 943-947) and ~Ir. McGuire was to take stock in
return (R. 946).
Witness niehrten, for Utah Natural Gas Company,
in Exhibit 42, page 4, offered a proposed plan of financing "for purposes of illustration only" whereby the funds
required for financing the $32,000}000 pipeline project
might be raised (R. 258-9).
Witness McGuire stated that he had undertaken to
procure financing for the pipeline and that he had procured a commitment from a responsible financial house
that would undertake to finance the construction of the
line (R. 37-8). The letter (supra) from Lehman Brothers
to Utah Natural Gas Company, dated July 25, 1950, introduced as Exhibit 45, was offered as the commitment above
referred to.
Utah Natural Gas Company also introduced a second
letter from Lehman Brothers to Mr. John A. McGuire,
President, Utah Natural Gas Compay, dated January
23, 1951, as Exhibit 53, which letteT stated, in effect, that
Lehman Brothers had employed two individuals to make
a report on proven gas reserves dedicated to supplying
the pipeline.
Utah Natural Gas Company witnesses Fell and
Rusmisel testified in effect that the letter of July 25,
1950 was not a firm commitment to make a loan and
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that considerable developme~nt work remained to be done
before they would be ready to make a commitment (R.
457-461, 471-472.)
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT B
The second fundamental prerequisite to the issuance
of a certificate is a showing ,that the applicant has adequate means of financing the proposed construction.
Before a commission can reasonably say ~that the public
convenience and necessity require a such construction"
(76-4-24, U. C. Anno. 1943) it would seem elementary
that it must inquire into, and be satisfied with, the adequacy and soundness of the proposed financing of the
projected construction. Logically, this entails a showing
by an applicant that either it has the requisite ability
itself or that it has a firm commitment to furnish such
financing from some source which has such financial
ability. From an observance of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Public S-ervice Commission of Utah, it
is apparent that such commission has so conceived its
purpose and function. Section 11.2 of such Rules requires
that applications for certificates of convenience and
necessity must show, in addition to other requirements,
"a statement showing the financial condition of the application" and "the manner in which it is proposed to
finance the operation." The commissions and courts of
other states have also so conceived the requirement of
such a showing in order to safeguard the public interest
involved.
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The Supren1e Court of Wisconsin in 1931 had before
it a case which involved the question of 'vhether or not a
commission could require a showing of adequate financing in reference to proposed construction under a certificate of convenience and necessity. Union Co-operative
Telephone Company vs. Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin (Sup. Ot. Wisconsin 1931) 239 N.W. 409,
P.U.R. 1932B, 269. The facts in the case reveal that the
Ontario & Wilton Telephone Co. served a small comlnnnity in Wisconsin. The Company proposed a change
in rates and the citizens, resenting this change in rates
allowed by the Railroad Commission, organized the
Union Co-op for the purpose of furnishing compe·ting
telephone service. Union Co-op applied for a certificate
and was turned down by the Railroad Commission on
the grounds that the dissatisfied patrons had not exhausted the remedies available for improvement of the
service. This was an appeal, with the Public Service
Commission, successor to the Railroad Commission, as
defendant on appeal. The Public Service Commission on
appeal did not agree with the Railroad Commission's
reason for dismissing the application, but maintained
that the failure to sho-\v proper financial ability was sufficient reason for the denial. In reference to this point
the Supreme Court said at P.U.R. 1932B, page 272:
" . . . While the· Public Service Commission
does not approve the reason assigned by the
former Railroad Commission for the denial of
the certificate it does approve of the determination, because there was no showing made by the
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applicant that i't possessed the proper financial
ability to install and maintain a competing utility.
This seems to be a condition required by many
Public Service Commissions before such a certificate will be granted. Re Gulick (1925) 26 CoL
R.C.R. 312, P.U.R. 1925E, 359; Re Fulton Petroleum Corp. (Colo. 1930) P.U.R. 1931A, 373; Re
Wyoming-Montana Pipe Line Co. (Wyo. 1930)
P.U.R. 1931B, 63; Re Universal Bus Line Co. (Ill.
1922) P.U.R. 1923B, 90; ReSt. Louis-Kansas City
Short Line R. Co. (1925) 15 Mo. P.S.. C.R. 327
344. The Supreme Court of Illinois set aside a
certificate of convenience and necessity issued by
the Public Service Commission of that state, for
the reason that the application was not supported
by proof showing that the applicant possessed the
financial ability to furnish an adequate service
or to otherwise discharge its duties as a public
utility in the field which it was authorized to
enter. Roy v. Illinois Commerce Commission, ex
rel. North Shore Connecting R. Co. (1926) 322
Ill. 452, 153 N.E. 648. Such a showing would seem
to be a very reasonable requirement if exacted by
the administrative body as a condition precedent
to the issuance of the certificate, and all that can
be said is that this would seem to furnish an additional reason justifying the withholding of the
certificate by the Railroad Commission. The determination of the Railroad Commission here
challenged was fully justified by either of the
considerations above mentioned ... "
Under a statute almost identical to the Utah Statute
here involved, the Missouri Public Service Commission,
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in Re Achtenberg (1934) 8 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1937, had this
to observe about the requirement of adequate financing,
at pages 410-411:
'~Respecting

the suitability of the applicant
and his associates to perform this function we
mean, of course, no inquiry as to personal fitness
but n1ean that before granting the certificate
prayed, we should exainine a concrete proposal
and ascertain 'vhether i.t is reasonably adapted
to serve permanently the public need which we
have found to exist. This involves the financial
feasibility of the project generally and also the
probable stability and soundness of the particular
securities to be offered .to the public for sale. We
take this responsibility seriously and are gratified
that in the present period of unprecedented financial distress and disorder, no secured obligation ever approved by this Commission is in default in this state.
"The proposed financing of the applicant is
in our judgment too uncertain and vague for us to
place the stamp of our approval upon it in advance. The amount which the applicant will have
to pay for the properties in question is as yet
unascertained. The amount which can reasonably
be anticipa;ted to be derived from the sale of preferred stock is wholly conjectural. The amount of
the proposed borrowing from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation is dependent upon the
amount derived fron1 the sale of the preferred
stock and is, consequently, equally vague. This
Commission has not as ye:t had occasion to pass
upon the method by which the requirements of
the RFC may be reconciled with the principles of
finance heretofore deemed essential by the ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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miSSion. The principal difficulty which we apprehend grows out of the requirement that such government loans shall be self-liquidating that is,
that the company shall devote enough of its earnings to effect retirement of this indebtedness within a period prescribed by the RFC. We have not
yet formulated a method by which this requirement can be reconciled with the principle that the
utility is authorized to charge such rates as will
yield a fair return upon the fair value of the
property used and useful in the public service,
and no more. The actual retirement of such a loan,
not by way of consumption of capital by use in
the public service, but by charging rates which
will enable the amount of such capital to be definitely withdrawn from the project, presents a
question of considerable difficulty for which we
have not yet found or been obliged to find a solution. F·or these reasons we withhold expression
of approval or disapproval of the applicant's proposed financial arrangements."
The New York Public Service Commission has had
at least two interesting cases dealing with the point under
discussion. In Re Buffalo Jitney Owners Association
(1923) P.U.R. 1923C, 645, there were involved applications for certificates to institute a bus line. The application of Buffalo was denied and one of the primary
reasons for such denial was lack of a plan upon which to
finance the acquisition and operation of the bus line.
Concerning this the Conrmission said at pages 653-654:

"* * * the petitioner has no funds with which
to finance the enterprise and has no definite plans
for procuring such funds.
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''There is n suggestion that a corporation may
be forined later 'vlrich will be capitalized at $150,000, about $75,000 of 'vhich it is said will be furnished by the members of the association and the
other $75,000 by citizens and business men of
the City of Buffalo. If stock of this amount were
sold, it would provide only $150,000 of the $350,000 which the association esti1nates will be required to purchase 50 busses. But there is nothing
definite as to 'vhere any of the money is coming
from. Even in respect of the $150,000 which the
association hopes to raise by the sale of stock,
nothing has been done, no subscription paper has
been circulated, and in the words of the President
of the association, there is 'nothing binding' so
far as the sale of stock is concerned."
In Re Niagara (New York Public Service Commission 1916) P.U.R. 1917A, 278, the New York Commission had before it another application for a certificate
of convenience and necessity, this time to construct a
railroad. In holding that the applicant had failed to
show that public convenience and necessity required such
construction, the Commission said this in relation to
financing at page 286 :
"As to financing the Niagara River & Eastern
Railvvay, the record does not disclose any agreement on the part of any person to furnish the
necessary moneys. The only evidence produced
before the Commission on this important subject
is found in the :testimony of Mr. Frank A. Dudley,
who presented certain letters and telegrams from
three incorporators, which were claimed to be sufficient to show that those who sent them could
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be relied upon to furnish the necessary funds.
Mr. Edward G. Connette, of Buffalo, the President of the International Railway Company,
stated that 'when necessary consents from public
authorities are obtained, I shall assist as far as
possible in the financing of the proposition.' Mr.
E. R. Wood of Toronto, a man of financial importance, telegraphed that 'when the company secures the necessary rights and permission, I will
be glad to assist in financing.' Mr. Clifford D.
Beebe of Syracuse, the President of a syndicate of
electric railroads in Central New York, wrote that
'in refinancing the Niagara River & Eastern Railroad, our associates in connection with New York,
Buffalo and Canadian interests will be prepared
to carry our share of the cost of that enterprise.'
The communications, which are given verbatim,
· contain all the facts which may be claimed as a
basis for any agreement, subscription or obliga~
tion on the part of any person to assist in financing this project."
The Federal Power Commission has also considered and made requirements concerning the proposed
financing of any project coming before it on an applica~
tion for a certificate of convenience and necessity. In
its first case under the Natural Gas Act, Re Kansas Pipe
Line & Gas Company, (1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 323, supra,
the Commission announced certain fundamental prerequisites which must be established prior to the issuance of a certificate of convenience and . necessity.
The requirement of adequate natural gas reserves has
been heretofore referred to and discussed under Point
A. In reference to financing, the Commission had this
to say at pages 342-343 :
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"\"\Te believe that applicants for certificate:s
. of convenience and necessity should show that
they possess adequate financial resources with
which to construct the facilities for which certificates are sought. Other regulatory Commissions
have denied applications for certificates where
the applicants have been unable to show adequate
financial resources. Re Niagara River & E. R. Co.
(X.Y. 1916) P.U.R. 1917A, 278; Re Buffalo Jitney
Owners As so. (N.Y.) P.U.R. 1923C, 645; Re Wyom·ing-lllontana Pipe Line Co. (Wyo. 1930) P.U.R.
1931B, 63; see also Re Carver (Colo. 1922) P.U.R.
1923B, 242. When we consider that. one effect of
the issuance of a certificate to construct and
operate facilities to and in a given area is to preclude from that territory other construction or
operation except under a certificate issued by
us, the necessity that the present applicants be
financially able to consummate their proposed
construction becomes the more apparent.
"In the instant proceedings the applicants
have stated that they intend to rely for their finances entirely upon the successful disposition of
applications each has filed with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Witnesses for both
applicants have testified that for projects of the
magnitude of those here under consideration the
ordinary financial channels are closed ; that the
sale of securities to the general public in customary fashion is impossible for this type of project.. We pass no comment upon this latter contention other than to note that neither applicant
appears to have seriously made any attempt to
finance through such channels.

"Neither applicant has submitted any firm
co1nmitment from the Reconstruction Finance
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Corporation that that organization will loan applicants the necessary funds. The record is silent
upon the subject of the terms, conditions, type
of security, method of repayment, amount, and
other details of any financing program. Under
these circumstances we could justifiably deny the
applications before us; certainly we cannot
authorize the issuance of unconditional certificates
or, without assurance on this vital point, make
a finding that the present or future public convenience and necessity requires or will require the
construction and operation of the proposed facilities.
"However, we have been informed from the
beginning that applicants intended to finance
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and there is evidence in the record to the effect
that that body had informed the applicants that
action on their pending applications for loans
would be held in abeyance until applicants had
presented their applications for certificates to
this Commission. Unde·r these circumstances we
do not feel it expedient presently to deny and dismiss the applications forthwith solely for lack of
proper financial support.
"We have no desire to foreclose the consideration of these matters by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. We realize that the standards
by which applications are judged by the two
agencies may vary and the matters on which we
place e.mphasis may not be the same which the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation considers
important.
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"Accordingly with regard to this matter we
find that: neither applicant has made a satisfactory showing that it possesses the requisite
financial ability to construct the facilities for
'vhich certificates are sought: applicants must,
therefore, make further showing satisfactory to
us that they have secured adequate finances with
'vhich to prosecute the proposed undertakings before we can finally dispose of the pending applications."
The Commission has continued to adhere to this
requirement of a showing of adequate financing as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate of convenience
and necessity.
The record in the proceedings before the Commission in this case fails to show any definite plan of financing or any firm commitment from any financially
responsible source to guarantee that the project will be
financed. In fact, not only does the record fail to show
such, but it affirmatively establishes that such facts did
not exist at the time of the hearing. The letter from
Lehman Brothers to Utah Natural Gas Company, dated
July 25, 1950, (Exhibit 45) was introduced to show that
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, had a firm
commitment for financing of the gas pipeline. Actually,
as can be readily seen from the letter it is nothing more
than a statement by Lehman Brothers that if all the conditions as there set out are met, it will undertake to
provide adequate financing. Exhibit 53, a letter from
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Lehman Brothers to the President of Utah Natural Gas
Company, dated January 23, 1951, adds nothing to the
letter it supplements, insofar as a firm commitment for
financing is concerned.
Mr. Mehrten, the Certified Public Accountant witness for Utah Natural Gas Company, offered for "purposes of illustration only" his idea as to a possible breakdown and ratio of securities which could be used in procuring funds wi:th which to finance the proposed pipeline.
Such ideas were indeed meager and vague (R. 258-9,
Ex. 42, page 4). In testifying in relation to such "illustration," witness Rusmisel, an executive with Lehman
Brothers, stated at page 474 of the Record:

"Q.

Have you discussed with him (Mehrten) in
what proportion the stock and the bank loans
would be to make up the $3,000,000~

"A.

Well, I have discussed this with him. I don't
know that I attempted to tell Mr. Mehrten
how we would vary this, because I understood
that this was being used for illustrative purposes really, and I think my own testimony
has to be treated pretty much on the srune
basis."

In relation to a general plan of financing Mr. Rusmisel
stated, at page 470 of the Record :

"Q.

As a matter of fact, the truth is that you
don't have a definite plan set up and agreed
to on this project, do you~

"A.

No. I think it is impossible to have a definite
plan at this time."
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Concerning :the July 25, 1950 letter (Ex. 45) and the
so-called "commitment" to finance supposedly containe.d
therein, ·utah Natural Gas Company's witness Fell, a
partner in Lelunan Brothers, testified as follows, at pages
457-458 of the Record:

"Q. Lehman Brothers today is not committed to
make any loan is it~
"A.

No Sir."

"Q. You have given a letter of intent, isn't that
all this is~
"A.

Yes, but I'd like ... I think it is only fair
to say that we have given more thought to this
than just a letter of intent. As I said earlier,
we do not write these letters as a means of
obtaining a call on a piece of business."

"Q.

We are discussing whether or not there is
a firm commitment to make a loan. That is all
I am asking you, Mr. Fell.

"A.

This is not a firm commitment to make a
loan as of today."

In discussing the matter of reserves and the geological report on reserves which Lehman Brothers would
require as a prerequisite to financing, witness Fell testified at R. 459-61 :

''Q.

Why haven't you as yet hired the engineers
to make this report~
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"A.

Well, I don't believe that ... Now, this is my
opinion, not as a geologist at all or as a petroleum engineer, or really knowing much at all
about the gas and oil business ... it doesn't
seem to me that there has been enough development in this area probably to ... or the
rest of the development required to build ...
well, to complete this whole project to where
a report at this :time would be of much use to
you.

"Q. In other words, it is your opinion that on
the basis of the proven reserves up to this
date it wouldn't support any such financing
as we are talking about~
"A.

The estimated proven reserves as of today?

"Q. Yes, s·1r.

"A. It would not."

* * *
"Q. Now, you have heard the testimony, you are
aware that some 60 per cent of the prodected
gas comes from Greater lVIonticello, which
the applicant itself treats as possible reserves,
or probable reserves, isn'~t that true~
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Then, rn your oprn1on, do you think that
would require considerable development before you would be satisfied that that was a
proven field~

"A.

I think Monticello would require considerable
development, or, if not Monticello, so1nething
else.
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"Q. I see. Then at best there is a great deal of
""'"ork to be done before you will be ready to
make a commitment 1
" ..A...

Yes, Sir."

Concerning the same subject, witness Rusmisel stated the
following at page 471 :
"A. Well, that report would have to show . . .
as I understood most of the testimony that
has been given, a large percentage of the reserves have been designated as estimated
reserves. We understand that there is a great
deal of exploration work going on now and
planned, and that report would have to show
that these reserves had passed from the category of 'estimated reserves' to 'proven reserves,' so that we would be assured of a sufficient supply of gas for the line.

"Q. For a reasonable period of :time~
"A.

For a reasonable period of time, that's correct. As a matter of fact, I would say in that
connection, a minimum of 20 years."

From the evidence in the record, it is readily seen
that Utah Natural Gas Company did nort have itself the
financial ability to construct the line and that it had no
firm commitment from a financially responsible source
for the required financing of the pipeline. In fact, the
evidence in the record clearly shows that the financial
source upon which Utah Natural Gas Company has
relied will not, and cannot, furnish such commitment
until the time when adequate proven reserves have been
shown rto be available to the pipeline.
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Obviously Mr. McGuire had gone to Lehman Bros.
and stated that it would help him before the Commission
if he had something in writing which indicated Lehman
Bros. might be interested in the financing. The attempt
to construe the Lehman Bros.' le'tter (Ex. 45, R. 1084)
as a financial commitment is pure distortion. Lehman
Bros. considered it no such commitment and the letter
is the kind that could be written on any project no matter
how fantastic. Further, the Commission recognized the
inadequacy of the financial arrangements offered by the
Utah Natural Gas Company in that it provided in its
Findings and Report that the certificate which it was to
grant should be conditioned upon the requirement that
within one year Utah Natural Gas Company should "file
wi'th this Commission the unconditional commitment of a
financial house of recognized responsibility committing
itself to supply the funds necessary for the construction
of the pipeline and the facilities to be installed by Utah
Natural Gas Company."
It is not here being contended that complete and
minute financial details are absolutely necessary at the
initial hearing concerning an application for a certificate
of convenience and necessity. Furthermore, it is not
here being contended that in certain circumstances a
certificate cannot be issued with the attachment of a
condition :to later furnish adequate evidence of firm
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commitments of complete financing. In situations where
an applicant has shown that it has available adequate
supplies of natural gas and that the pipeline itself is
economically feasible, a Commission might conclude that
the procurement of adequate financing would be relatively easy, and under such circumstances the C.ommission might conclude that the issuance of a certificate with
a condition that the evidence of firm commitments for
financing could be later shown.
In Docket No. G-704, In the Matter of Trans-Con-

tinental Gas Pipe Line Company, Inc., Opinion No. 165,
May 29, 1948, the Federal Power Commission had before
it the reopened proceedings concerning the application
of Trans-Continental for a certificate to construct a
natural gas pipeline from South Texas to New York City
and other points in the East. After reviewing the record
as to other points and finding that the proposed project
was economically feasible, the Commission said, in relation to the plan of financing, the following:
"Trans-Continental proposes a capitalization
consisting of Bonds and Bank Loans equalling
78%, Preferred Stock 12%, and Common Stock
10%. Applicant's witnesses testified that conversations with responsible financial institutions
indicated that the Applicant could issue the
twenty-year serial bonds at a cost of 3¥2% to
334% and obtain ten-year bank loans at approximately 3%, dependent upon market conditions at
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Continental stated that he had entered into no
firm commitments for financing the project at
this time. We recognize that more definite comInitments on the part of the Applicant or financial
institutions are not feasible or to be expected at
this stage.
"Applicant's witnesses testified that preferred stock representing 12% of the total capitalization could be issued at a cost to the Applicant
slightly in excess of 5%, with the qualification
that dependent upon market conditions at the
time of financing, it may be necessary to issue
Common Stock in conjunction with the sale of
the Preferred Stock. Testimony also has been
presented indicating that with the possible exception of the Common Stock which may be issued
in connection with the sale of the Preferred S.tock,
none of the Common Stock would be initially offered to the public.
"On the basis of the financial'testimony in the
record, the recent firming of contracts providing
for gas reserves over a probable twenty-year
period, and the willingness of the marketing companies to purchase the gas at rates which will
carry the project, it appears that the proposed
plan of financing is economically feasible. However, since Trans-Continental has not entered into
any firm com1nitments concerning its proposed
financing, it seems reasonable in the public interest to require the submission by Trans-Continental of a definite plan of financing for consideration by the Commission, including full description of the securities to be issued and the
teTms and conditions of the sale thereof."
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It will be noted in connection with the above Federal
Power Conunission opinions that in each instance the
Commission had before it far more definite plans of
financing than 'vere presented in the hearing involved
in this appeal. Furthermore, it will also be noted that in
each instance the Con1mission was dealing with situations
where the evidence presented by the applicants had conclusively established that the applicant in each case had
adequate and sufficient supplies of natural gas to furnish
the anticipated needs of their respective projects over
the life of such pipe lines. It appears to be in such an
instance only that the Federal Power Commission ":ill
allow any'ihing less than an absolute showing of a firm
commitment for financing a particular proposed project.
Certainly, in a situation where an applicant has failed
to prove that it has adequate reserves, the Federal Power
Commission or any other Commission can ill afford to
issue a certificate on such meager showing of financial
commitments as was presented in this proceeding below.
From the foregoing, it is submitted that a fundamental prerequisite to the issuance of a certificate "that
present or future convenience and necessity does or will
require such construction" is a showing that the applicant for such certificate has adequate means of financing the proposed construction. This would necessarily
mean that an applicant must either have the financial
ability to carry out the construction itself or a firm commitment from a financially responsible source committing such source to the financing of such construction.
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The record in this case contains no competent substantial
evidence which would establish that such prerequisite
had been made. In fact, the evidence in the record shows
clearly that respondent Utah Natural Gas Company ·has
no firm commitments for the required financing and cannot obtain such commitments until such time as adequate
proven reserves are available to the pipeline. The evidence here is of the same character as, and surely no
stronger than, the evidence relied upon by applicants
in the cases of Re Buffalo-Jitney Owners Association
andRe Niagara, supra. The Commission, in its Findings
and Report, in effect, so held. In view of the fact that
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, failed to
establish that it had met such a fundamental prerequisite,
the Commission erred in finding that a certificate of public convenience and necessity should be granted to Utah
Natural Gas Company.
POINT C
THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION IN GRANTING SUCH CERTIFICATE
AFTER FINDING IN EFFECT: (1) THAT APPLICANT
DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE PROVEN GAS RESERVES
COMMITTED TO THE LINE; AND (2) THAT APPLICANT
DOES NOT HAVE FIRM COMMITl\iENTS FOR THE REQUIRED FINANCING OF THE LINE."
"(c)

STATEMENT UNDER POINT C
'

The Commission found in effect that Utah Natural
Gas Company did not have adequate proven reserves
of natural gas available for its pipeline. Quoting from
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the Findings and Report of the Commission we find
these statements in relation thereto:
at page 4:
"The principal structures upon which applicant relies for its sources of supply are designated
and known as Boundary Butte, Monticello and
Last Chance. Witnesses for the applicant estimated recoverable reserves of gas from these
structures of one trillion, one hundred thirty-four
billion cubic feet. In addition the evidence indicates that there are other structures located at
points and places along the course of applicant's
proposed pipe line and in the southeasterly part
of the State of Utah which are likely sources of
additional supplies of natural gas. None of the
fields from which the applicant proposes to obtain
gas, however, have been sufficiently explored to
prove the extent of the reserves.
at page 5:
"From the foregoing general findings, the
Commission expressly finds that public convenience and necessity require that the quantity of
natural gas applicant proposes to furnish be supplied to the area within the State of Utah covered
by the application, and if adequate gas reserves
are proved as herein provided public convenience
and necessity require the construction, operation
and maintenance of the pipe line and facilities
proposed hy the applicant.
at page 6:
"The Commission further finds that the estiInated reserves in the area where the applicant
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has gas purchase con tracts are sufficient, if
proved, to make the construction of applicant's
pipe line and facilities economically feasible.

* * *
"The Commission further finds that if said
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas
purchase contracts to deliver the gas so proved
and developed into its pipe line."
The Commission then concluded that the certificate
should issue to Utah Natural Gas Company, but upon
the condition, among others, that:
"Concurrently with the furnishing of such
commitment and as a part thereof, Utah Na;tural
Gas Company shall file with this Commission the
certificate of an independent geologist of recognized professional standing, acceptable to this
Commission, that there are proven gas reserves
committed to Utah Natural Gas Company adequate to justify the construction of the line and
facilities;"
Further, the Commission found in effect that Utah
Natural Gas Company did not have- firm commitments
for the required financing of the line. Quoting from the
Findings and Report of the Commission:
at page 5:
"Lehman Bros., a reputable and responsible
financial house of New York City, has committed
itself to furnish the necessary financing for the
construction of the applicant's pipe line provided
that a study by a geological firm acceptable to
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ment work proves that there are sufficient developed gas reserves available to make the operation of applicant's proposed pipe line economically
feasible.
at page 6:
HThe Conunission further finds that the operation of the pipe line will be economically feasible with the available market if the estimated
reserues are proved; and that if said pipe line is
economically feasible the applicant can secure the
necessary financing for the construction of the
same."
The Commission then concluded that the certificate
should issue to Utah Natural Gas Company, but upon
the condition, among others, that:
"File 'vith this Commission the unconditional
co1nm·itment of a financial house of recognized
responsibility committing itself to supply the
funds necessary for the construction of the pipe
line and facilities to be installed by Utah Natural
Gas Company;"
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
UNDER POINT C
This point is closely allied with points "A" and "B"
but because the respondents claimed before the Commission that Section 76-4-24, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
permits the Commission to issue conditional certificates
we will elaborate on the effect of such a section where
the fundamental requirements of adequate proven gas
reserves and the necessary financing are not fulfilled.
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Obviously the legislature never intended by Section 764-24 to give the Commission a "blank check" in the issuance of certificates. The legislature realized that there
might be occasions when substantially all of the requirements had been met by the applicant but that some minor
showing was lacking. To argue otherwise would be to
in effect say that all that an applicant need do is make
a written application to the Commission for a certificate
and the Commission will then issue the certificate but
impose the necessary conditions. A careful examination
of the section which vests in the Commission the power
to issue the certificate (Section 76-4-24) makes clear
that public convenience and necessity would not require
a particular service or a particular commodity from an
applicant unless he had that which the public needed.
That is to say, the Commission must find that public
convenience and necessity "require such construction."
The Commission cannot properly safeguard the public interest by ruling, in effect, that it would be nice to
have a gas pipeline into the Salt Lake City area supplying 100,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day and, although
you, Utah Natural Gas Company, have not shown that
you have that much gas available nor the necessary
financial arrangements to carry it through, we will,
nevertheless, give you a certificate to build such pipeline
and a year within which to find the gas which you hope
to find and to get the financial commitments which you
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hope Y?U can get. The statute allows no roo1n for such
a procedure. And yet, that is exactly what the Commission did in this case.
It is true that Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. 1943, provides
that the Commission may attach "to the exercise of the
rights granted by said certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment public convenience and necessity
1nay require." As one authority pointed out, such a provision is common in such statutes, and at the time he
wrote, he listed some twenty-three states as having such a
provision in their statutes. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessity, (1930) 28 Michigan Law. Rev.
276, 296. Furthermore, the statute creating the Federal
Power Commission has a similar provision. 15 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 717 f (e), supra. In discussing such a provision,
~fr. Hall had this to say at 28 Michigan Law Review,
page 297:
,
"The proVIsion that 'conditions' may be attached to certificates is designed to give the Commission a greater regulative control over the
particular utility than it might otherwise possess.
That body can n1ake regulations which it would
be unable to make under its general statutory
control. It also enables the Commission to make
different regulations for different applicants.
Such a provision makes for more flexibility in
regulation, as t.he Commission can fit the conditions which it attaches to each individual case."
Undoubtedly, legislatures intended such provisions
as a means to allow commissions to more efficiently carry
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out their regulatory duties under the various statutes
involved. In accordance with such view, commissions have
attached such conditions as the securing of necessary
authorizations from the S·ecurities and Exchange Commission to the issuance of securities, Re Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. (F.P.C. 1947) 67 P.U.R. (N.S.) 427,
requiring a taxicab company to make adequate provision
for public liability insurance, Re Sun Cab Co., P.U.R.
1930 D, 260, the making of a certificate non-assignable,
Re Rodgers (Colo. 1940) 35 P.U.R. (N.S.) 379, and other
requirements relating to the methods of construction and
the quality and exte~t of service in relation to rates and
other such matters, Dept. of Public Utilities v. McConnell
(Sup. Ct. Ark. 1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 53, 130 S.W. 2d 9.
No case has been found where a commission issued
a certificate with a condition allowing and requiring the
applicant to later show, after the record had been closed,
the very basic facts for which the hearing was held to
determine. Nor does Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943),
indicate that the legislature had any such thing in mind.
In fact, the wording of the statute indicates clearly the
contrary. S·ubsection (3) thereof provides that the Commission has power to refuse to issue the certificate or to
issue it for all or a part of the construction requested
and may attach to the exercise of the rights granted
such terms and conditions as in its judgment public convenience and necessity may require. But, as required by
Subsection (1), the certificate, when it is issued, must
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be based upon the Co1nmission's determination, properly
arrived at after the hearing provided for in Subsection
(3), that the public convenience and necessity does or
will require such construction. As heretofore pointed out,
such a determination could not properly be made without
having first determined, at least, that the applicant had
an adequate supply of natural gas in the form of proven
reserves committed to the pipeline. and adequate financing. This the Conrmission recognized, in effect, as is
clearly shown by the manner in which its Findings and
Report and Order condition everything upon the proposition "if the reserves are proved," so to speak.
If the Commission can issue such a certificate as
it did in this case, then it has in effect done away with
the requirement in Subsection (1) that the public convenience and necessity does or will require such construction and the requirement for a hearing in Subsection (3).
Yet, it, is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
significance and effect should be accorded every part of
an act, including every paragraph, sentence, clause,
phrase and word. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 358, page
362; Dunn v. Bryant (Sup. Ct. Utah 1931) 299 P. 253.
What alternatives are open to a Commission in a
situation of this sort 1 As heretofore pointed out under
Point A, when an applicant has failed to show that it has
an adequate supply of gas to furnish the needs of its
proposed line, it would seem that the logical procedure
for a coinmission to follow would be to either dismiss the
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application or reopen the proceedings at a later date for
the taking of additional evidence on gas supply. The Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania dismissed the
application in such a situation in Incorporators of Serv-

ice Gas Company v. Public Service Commission (1937)
190 Atl. 653, 18 P.U.R. (N.S.) 256. In Memphis Natural
Gas Co., 4 F.P.C. 197, 608, the Federal Power Commission
dismissed the application for a certificate because of
the inadequacy of the gas supply showing and subsequently granted a rehearing in order to afford the applicant an opportunity to make a further showing. In
several cases where, upon initial consideration of the
application, the supply of natural gas available to the
applicant has been found inadequate, the Federal Power
Commission has reopened the proceedings for the taking
of additional evidence on gas supply and has allowed the
applicants a period of time within which to make a
further showing on that subject. The periods of time allowed for such further showings have varied from sixty
days (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 3 F.P.C. 442;
Piedmont Natural Gas Corp., March 30, 1950) and three
months (Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., Docket No.
G-962, September 29, 1948; San Juan Pipe Line Co. and
El Paso Natural Gas Co., et al., Dockets Nos. G-1067,
et al., July 13, 1949) to as much as six months (Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. G-704, March
31, 1948).
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In Re Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. (1941) 40
P.U.R. (N.S.) 129, the Tennessee· Commission, where they
considered the evidence of finances inadequate, directed
the applicant to present its plan of financing the project
within 120 days from the date of their order. After stating that all requirements, other than financing, had been
met, the Commission said, at page 145:
"It therefore follows that if the further showing made by the applicant, Tennessee Gas and
Transmission Company, on the matter of the adequacy of its financing, is satisfactory to the Commission, it is then the intention of the Commission
to authorize the issuance of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to the Tennessee Gas
and Transmission Company to authorize the
construction and operation of facilities for the
transportation or sale of natural gas in the state
of Tennessee in the various communities which
it is proposed to serve, under the conditions recited and set forth hereinabove with reference to
the service of particular customers. This disposition of the application is based upon the facts
shown in the record presently before the Commission. In arriving at the final disposition of
the case, it is intended to take into consideration any changed facts and circum.stances that
may bear upon these proceedings, either as a
result of our direction for further showings by the
applicant, or otherwise. Nothing in this order
shall be construed to prevent consideration by the
Commission of any other application.
"It is accordingly ordered by the Commission
that this cause be retained on the docket of the
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Commission for such further and future disposition as may be warranted upon future proceedings in this cause."
Whatever may have been a proper procedure for the
Commission to follow, it is submitted that the procedure
actually followed was not it. To illustrate the futility
of the actual manner in which the Commission handled
this case, let us consider what might happen during the
wild search for gas.
As heretofore pointed out, the whole pipeline project
of applicant depends upon a finding of tremendous, high
B.T.U. content gas at Greater Monticello, because the
only way the gas a:t Boundary Butte can be utilized is
by mixing that gas with such large quantities of high
B.T.U. gas. But suppose those reserves are not found
at Greater Monticello, but at some other point not as
conveniently located as Greater Monticello in relation
to the proposed pipeline. Or, suppose the required volumes of and B.T.U. content gas are found at several
other points removed from the proposed line. Or, suppose Last Chance might conceivably be the structure
where the large volumes of gas are found (which is,
of course, not admitted but denied). There the gas is
very low in B.T.U. content,_ and the whole pipeline project
would have to be revised. The possibilities of varying
conditions could he enumerated indefinitely. In any
of such events, the Commission, the applicant-respondent
and all the persons concerned would have to virtually
start over to determine whether or not the pipeline of
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applicant 'vould be required by the public convenience

and necessity. The order granting the certificate is specific and grants the right of construction as originally
proposed. If the reserves were found at other locations
as above indicated, requiring a different pipeline system,
then the certificate would be inadequate and inaccurate
and construction thereunder would probably be illegal.
What does this mean~ It means that the applicantrespondent's project and activities had not reached the
state of development where it was ready for a certificate,
and the Commission, in attempting to award such certificate exceeded its power under the statute.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is submitted that
the legislature has prescribed in Section 76-4-24, U.C.A.
1943, that before the Commission can issue a certificate
it must properly determine that the public convenience
and necessity require the particular construction proposed by an applicant; that this requires a de'termination
as pointed out under Points A and B, that, at least, the
applicant has adequate reserves and adequate financing,
and that, by allowing the Commission to attach to a certificate "such terms and conditions as in its judgment public convenience and necessity may require," the legislature did not intend that the Commission could, by the
use of such conditions, allow the applicant to forego the
:·

showing of such basic prerequisites at the hearing and
later show them after the hearing and the record had been
closed.
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Mark K. Boyle, Deputy Attorney General and counsel for the Commission, summed up the matter in no
uncertain terms: (R. 479)
"Mr. Boyle: Isn't it true that if Lehman
Brothers have not given a commitment and don't
promise to give one until further exploratory work
is done and more reserves are proven, that a
certificate from the Commission will not by any
means guarantee the existence or construction of
a pipeline, and that it appears to me that the Commission should have the same information that
Lehman Brothers insists upon. * * *"
POINT L
THAT THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE
HEARING WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY
THE FINDINGS AND REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION."
"(l)

This point will be presented under two sub-points as
follows: (1) the evidence ·introduced at the hearing was
insufficient to support or justify, generally, the substance
of the Findings and Report and Order to the effect that
the public convenience and necessity requires the issuance
of the certificate to Utah Natural Gas Company and,
specifically, the finding that "if adequate gas reserves
are proved as herein provided public convenience and
necessity require the construction, operation and maintenance of the pipeline and facilities proposed by applicant;" and (2) the evidence introduced at the hearing
was insufficient to support or justify the finding that
the project proposed by Utah Natural Gas Company
will be economically feasible.
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SUB-POINT (1)
"THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE HEARING WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY, GENERALLY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
FINDINGS AND REPORT AND ORDER TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PUBLIC
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRES THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CERTIFICATE TO UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY AND, SPECIFICALLY,
THE FINDING THAT 'IF ADEQUATE GAS RESERVES ARE PROVED AS
HEREIN PROVIDED PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRE
THE CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PIPELINE AND FACILITIES PROPOSED BY APPLICANT.'"

STATEMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (1)
To avoid undue repetition, the statements heretofore
made under Points A, B, & C, are adopted as statements
under this subpoint. In addition, it will be noted that the
C.ommission, in its Findings and Report (Exhibit "C" to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari) found specifically at
page 5 thereof :
"From the foregoing general findings the
Commission expressly finds that public convenience and necessity require that the quantity of
natural gas applicant proposes to furnish be supplied to the area within the state of Utah covered
by the application, and if adequate gas reserves
are proved as herein provided public convenience and necessity require the construction, operation and maintenance of the pipe line and
facilities proposed by the applicant."
ARGUMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (1)
Let us assume first that Utah Natural Gas Company
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posed pipeline system. That is, assume for the purposes
of argument that they will find the reserves of natural
gas they hope to find in the locations they are relying
upon; and let us assume that they are successful in
procuring the necessary gas purchase contracts; and
let us assume that they are successful in procuring adequate finances for the proposed construction; and that
they are successful in constructing the project according
to the plans and financial estimates they have offered;
and, finally, let us assume that they are successful in
negotiating and procuring the necessary gas sales contracts to users in the Salt Lake City market at the prices
they hope to get in order to make their project pay. Assuming all of the foregoing, the evidence introduced at
this hearing was insufficient to support or justify the
findings that 'the public convenience and necessity required the issuance of the certificate to Utah Natural
Gas Company.
As heretofore pointed out several times (see primarily Arguments under Points A, B and C), the primary duty of the Commission in proceedings of this sort
is to look to and safeguard the interest of the public who
will be served (or dis served) by a proposed utility servIce.
This duty of commissions to look to and safeguard
the public interest requires that, where conflicting applications are before it to serve substantially the same area
with substantially the same service, a commission must
dete·rmine which of the conflicting applicants will best
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serve the interest of the public. When only one applicant is before the commission, obviously its only duty
is to determine whether or not that applicant and the
service which it proposes are in the public interest. However, when two or more applicants seek to perform substantially the same service, then the commission's duty is
to determine whether either one of the applicants and
its project can meet the public convenience and necessity,
and then if both can, "\vhich one will do the better job.
And priority in time of filing applications should enter
into the commission's determination as a factor influencing its decision only after the commission has determined that the applicants can equally meet the public
interest and requirements in all other respects.
As has been pointed out throughout this brief, the
Commission here had before it applicants with conflicting
applications. From the very beginning, the Commission
consistently foreclosed, by denial of complete intervention, separate hearing of petitioner's application or joint
hearing with the Federal Power Commission, any consideration of petitioner's application whatsoever and proceeded to issue the certificate to the Utah Natural Gas
Company. It is submitted that by so doing the Commission has failed and refused to perform its primary duty
and it has thereby rendered itself incapable of finding
that the public convenience and necessity require the
construction proposed by the Utah Natural Gas Company.
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However, we cannot indulge the assumptions that
Utah Natural Gas Company will be as successful as it
hopes to be. As heretofore pointed out under Points A
and B, Utah Na;tural Gas Company has miserably failed
to show by competent substantial evidence that it has
either adequate proven gas reserves or adequate financial
arrangements whereby its proposed construction is in
any sense of the word practical or feasible. As also
pointed out under the Arguments and Authorities under
those Points A and B and under Point C, showing of adequate proven gas reserves and adequate financial arrangements are, as minimal requirements, basic prerequisites to a finding by the Commission that the public
convenience and necessity does require "such construction." Tlie Commission found, in effect, as pointed out
in the Argument and Authorities under Point C, that
Utah Natural Gas Company had failed to show that it
had either adequate proven gas reserves or adequate
financial commitments. The Commission has recognized
by conditioning its order granting the certificate to the
effect that such needs must be shown before the cons'truction under the certificate can be in the public interest
and required by the public convenience and necessity
under Section 76-4-24, U.C.A. (1943), that such showings
are necessary for valid certification.
Under such circumstances, it is submitted that the
evidence introduced in the proceedings is wholly insuffiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cient to support or justify the action and the Findings
and Report and Order taken and entered by the C.omnnssion.
SUB-POINT (2)
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT THE HEARING WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY THE FINDING THAT THE PROJECT PROPOSED
BY UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY WILL BE ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE.

STATEMENT UNDER SUB-POINT (2)

In presenting its case in support of its application
for a certificate before the Commission, Utah Natural
Gas Company presented testimony of a general nature
in an attempt to show that there would be a demand for
gas in Salt Lake City. It presented a witness who gave
his opinion, as a result of general surveys of the community, as to the possible demands for natural gas in
the Salt Lake City area in the future. He concluded by
giving estimates of certain volumes which could be used
by three segments of the community-home and small
commercial users, general industrial users and, if they
were there, chemical industrial users ( R. 414-430). Other
witnesses offered testimony to the effect that their companies might or could use gas if it were available, but
these other witnesses accounted for only a total of approximately 3 million cubic feet of gas per day (R. 35360, 390-394, 408-414, 430-434) .

Mr. McGuire, president of Utah Natural Gas Company, testified that when he first considered the proposed
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pipeline he talked with three of the large industrial users
in the Salt Lake City area in relation to gas purchase
contracts. In those conversations he testified that he
proposed a price of 22lj2 ¢ per thousand cubic feet (R. 520521). No gas sales contracts with these large industrial
users (or any other potential users) were offered in
evidence by U'tah Natural Gas Company. The price proposed and relied upon by Utah Natural Gas Company in
its calculations and evidence was 23%¢ per thousand
cubic feet to industrial users (R. 521).
The Commission found in its Findings and Report,
Exhibit "C" of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at
page 6 thereof :
"The Commission further finds that the estimated reserves in the area where the applicant
has gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if
proved, to make the construction of applicant's
pipe line and facilities economically feasible."

* * *
"The Commission further finds that the operation of the pipe line will be economically feasible with the available market if the estimated
reserves are proven."
ARGUl\fENT UNDER S·UB-POINT (2)
Couched in n~merous "ifs," the Findings and Report
of the Commission contain the equivocal determination
that the project outlined by the respondent is economically feasible-this in spite of the fact of complete failure to prove adequate reserves, adequate financing and
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commitments by prospective purchasers of natural gas.
Apparently, the sole consideration has been that there
exists a market in 'vhich natural gas is sorely needed, and
such consideration has been given undue weight by the
C-ommission in its deliberations in this case.
Once it has been proved to the satisfaction of the Commission that there exists a 1narket, the serving of natural
gas to the market being required by public convenience and
necessity, the Commission should then require that the
applicant prove a plan which is economically feasible, i.e.,
a plan which, in reasonable probability, will be successful.
Such finding of economic feasibility should be based on
clear and concise proof of (1) the existence of adequate
reserves, the cost of developing same, and the ability of
the applicant or its associates to meet such cost; (2) the
cost of laying, operating and maintaining the necessary
pipeline, compressor stations and related facilities, and
the ability of the applicant to meet such cost; and (3)
firm commitments by prospective purchasers of natural
gas to purchase same at a price certain, as and when
delivered, adequate enough to repay investment costs.
The inadequacy. of proof relative to the first two
matters has already been discussed hereinbefore.
With reference to the third matter mentioned above,
i.e., whether or not the respondent has firm commitments
from prospective purchasers of its gas in the Salt Lake
City area, the attention of t.he Court is invited to those
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portions of the Record mentioned above, a reading of
which will indicate that at no place in the hearing concerning the respondent's application did the respondent
offer proof of the existence of firm commitments from
prospective purchasers of its natural gas. True, a num~
ber of witnesses stated that a certain volume of natural
gas, insignificant in relation to the total proposed volume, of a certain B.T.U. content could be used by their
companies in the operation of their plants. There is also
testimony in the record that Mr. McGuire conferred with
prospective purchasers of natural gas in the Salt Lake
City area at some indefinite dates in the past, that a price
of 'twenty-two and a half cents (22¥2¢) per thousand
cubic feet was discussed at these conferences, and that
such conferences never ripened into the execution o.f
definite contracts by which prospective purchasers bound
themselves to purchase a certain

.~mount

of gas of a

certain B. T. U. content at a price certain, as and when
delivered to their plants by the respondent. It is also
to be noted that the above witnesses from specific companies placed on the stand by the respondent, with a view
to proving up the fact of a market which was ready
and willing to purchase its gas, were witnesses having
an engineering or technical background, these witnesses
at no place in their testimony stated the price at which
their firms or companies would purchase this gas and,
in fact, such witnesses were unable and unwilling to attempt to hind the corporations they represented.
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It is not sufficient to say that, since natural gas is
sorely needed in the Salt Lake City area, those corporations desiring to purchase such gas are willing to pay any
price at which such gas is delivered. Apparently, the
officials of the three large industrial users (Kennecott,
American Smelting & Refining Co., and Utah Power &
Light Co.) to whom Mr. McGuire talked knew that Delhi
Oil Corp. had the gas and that Mr. McGuire could not
supply them with their much needed requirements, because these officials didn't waste time by making any
agreements with Utah Natural Gas Company. In brief,
no matter how much natural gas is desired and needed
in the Salt Lake City area, it is futile to authorize the
construction of a pipeline by respondent if the company
cannot render such service adequately and at a price
which is agreeable to the prospective purchasers. It is
interesting to note in this connection that, whereas Utah
Natural Gas Company has estimated the cost of its pipeline to be Thirty-two 1\fillion Dollars ($32,000,000.00),

Utah Pipe Line, in its petition in intervention in this
matter, the proof of which was not allowed by the Comtnission, estimated the cost of its pipeline to be TwentyTwo Million Dollars ($22,000,000.00). Any rate which is
charged by the respondent, if, as and when it delivers
natural gas to the Salt Lake City area, must, of necessity,
be based upon all of its costs incurred in developing resources and laying, n1aintaining and operating its pipeline. Any rate charged on the basis of a Thirty-Two MilSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lion Dollar ($32,000,000.00) pipeline will, of necessity, be
higher than a rate charged on the basis of a Twenty-Two
Million Dollar ($22,000,000.00) pipeline.
Thus, the Record in this case clearly indicates an
utter lack of a reasonable guarantee by the respondent
that its natural gas will be purchased when delivered to
'the Salt Lake City area. Without proof of firm commitments by prospective purchasers, how can the Commission state in its Findings and Report that respondent's
project is economically

feasible~

The argument can well

be made that corporations in the Salt Lake City area
will purchase natural gas, as opposed to other fuels, only
if such purchases are of economic benefit to their operations. Natural gas, at a rate which precludes economic
operation of a business, will receive no buyers.
The Alabama Public Commission, having before it
an application for the extension of an electric transmission line in Re Alabama Power Co. (1923) P.U.R. 1923
E, 828, at page 833, made the following observation:
"WhetheT the application is for authority to
construct a new plant or to make an extension
of an existing system not in the usual course of
business, the burden is upon the applicant to show
there is a reasonable guaranty of sufficient business ~to warrant to the public a sufficient operation of a permanent utility enterprise

* * *
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~'The

fact that the utility must balance the
burden of risk of unfavorable results that may
follo-\v the investment in either a new· plant or
the extension of an existing system does not exempt the Commission from responsibility of ex~
ercising its best judgment as to whether the
authorization of the investJ;nent is justified, and
as to ,,~hether the rights, welfare and interest of
the general public will be advanced."
Economic feasibility of proposed construction is a
factor considered by other commissions. See, for example,

Re Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., Tenn. R. R. and
P. U. Comm. (1941), 40 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129, at page 139.
Also, see Re Atlantic Gulf Gas Co., Federal Power Commission Opinion No. 207, Docket No. G-887, February 28,
1951.
Thus, in this case, on the basis of mere discussions
of possible purchases of natural gas by industries in the
Salt Lake City area, the Commission has found respondent's project to be economically feasible-such discussions centering around the need for gas and apparently
reaching no concrete agreement as to purchases of such
gas at a price certain. It is conceded that industries in
the Salt Lake City area will purchase natural gas if it
can be made available at a price which is not prohibitive;
but, the respondent has failed to produce gas sales contracts at the price at which it proposes to deliver natural
gas, and has failed to prove that it will have enough
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buyers at such proposed price to serve as a reasonable
guarantee of such business to warrant a finding that its.
projeet will be economically feasible.
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings and
Report do not support the Order .and the issuance of the
Certificate.

II. THE COMMISSION UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED TO AN UNKNOWN AND UNDETERMINED
GEOLOGIST THE POWER WITHIN ONE YEAR TO
MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED BY
LAW OF THE COMMISSION AND TO THEREBY
PERFECT AND EXTEND THE McGUIRE COMPANY CERTIFICATE; THIS ACTION OF THE
COMMISSION VIOLATED THE C.ONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER. POINT D.
POINT D
"(d) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THAT 'AN INDEPENDENT
GEOLOGIST OF RECOGNIZED PROFESSIONAL STANDING
ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION' MAY WITHIN ONE
YEAR OF APRIL 7, 1951, FILE WITH THE COMMISSION
A CERTIFICATE, THAT IN THE GEOLOGIST'S OPINION
'THERE ARE PROVEN GAS RESERVES COMMITTED TO
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY ADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LINE AND THE FACILITIES' AND IN THEREBY PERMITTING SUCH GEOLOGIST
TO CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY OF
THE ALLEGED GAS RESERVES WITHOUT FURTHER
HEARING THEREON, AND WITHOUT FURTHER DE.TERMINATION BY THE COMMISSION; THAT SUCH DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WAS UNLAWFUL AND IN EXCESS OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION IN THAT IT
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PERMITS SUCH GEOLOGIST TO PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS AND MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS EXCLUSIVELY RESERVED TO THE COMMISSION; THAT SUCH
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WOULD PERMIT SUCH
GEOLOGIST EX PARTE AND WITHOUT FURTHER HEARING TO FULFILL THE PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENT IN THE
COMMISSION'S ORDER AND MAKE PERMANENT THE
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY NO.
925."

STATE:JIENT UNDER POINT D
The Commission made the following statements in
its Findings and Report:
(1) "None of the fields from which the applicant
proposes to obtain gas, however, have been sufficiently
explored to prove the extent of the reserves" (R. 1168).
(2) "From the foregoing general findings, the Commission expressly finds that public convenience and
necessity require that the quantity of natural gas applicant proposes to furnish be supplied to the area within
the State of Utah covered by the application, and if adequate gas reserves are proved as herein provided public
convenience and necessity require the construction, op,eration and maintenance of the pipe line and facilities pro~
posed by rthe applicant" (R. 1169).
(3) "The Commission further finds that the estimated reserves in the area where the applicant has gas
purchase contracts are sufficient, if proved, to make the
construction of applicant's pipe line and facilities economically feasible" (R-1169).
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(4) "The Commission further finds that if said
reserves are proved, the applicant can secure gas purchase contracts to deliver the gas so proved and develop·ed into its pipe line" (R. 1169).
( 5) "The Commission further finds that the operation of the pipe line will be economically feasible with the
available market if the estimated reserves are proved;
* * *" (R-1169).
( 6) "* * * and that if said pipe line is economically
feasible the applicant can secure the necessary financing
for the construction of the same" (R-1170).
( 7) "The Commission further concludes, however,
that conditions should be imposed upon such authority
so granted requiring that within one year from the date
the order granting such certificate of convenience and
necessity shall be effective said Utah Natural Gas Company shall
'(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of
such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Commission the certificate of an independent geologist of
recognized professional standing, acceptable to
this Commission, that there are proven gas reserves committed to Utah Natural Ga.s Company
adequate to justify the construeJtion of the line
and facilities;' " (R. 1170).
In its Order granting Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity No. 925 (Exhibit D), on page 10 (R-1173)
the Commission ordered as follows:
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-'IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and made conditions of the certificate of convenience and necessity
herein issued that within one year from the date this
order shall be effective, said Utah Natural Gas Compan.y
shall
'(b) Concurrently with the furnishing of
such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Commission the certificate of an independent geologist
of recognized professional standing acceptable to
this Commision that there are proven gas reserves
committed to Utah Natural Gas Company adequate to justify the construction of the line and
facilities.'

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That if said Utah
Natural Gas Company shall fail within said one year
period to comply with the conditions herein imposed, then
the certificate of convenience and necessity hereb~
granted shall be null and void."
It can readily be seen that the Commission admitted
six times in its Findings and Report that the respondent
failed to show sufficient proven reserves of natural gas
entitling it to a certificate of convenience and necessity.
In its Findings and Report, the Commission stated six
times that respondent must yet prove an adequate gas
supply, and gave respondent one year to prove an adequate gas supply. In its Findings and Report, and in its
Order, the Commission held that respondent can prove an
adequate gas supply by filing with the Commission the
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certificate of an independent geologist of recognized
professional standing, acceptable to the Commission, that
there are proven gas reserves adequate to justify the
construction of the line and facilities.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT D
The Argwnent and Authorities will be presented
under the following subdivisions:
Such action of the Commission violates
the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the
State of Utah (Sec. 7, Art. 1) and the United
States of America (Sec. 1, F·ourteenth Amendment) in that it is a denial of the character of
hearing guaranteed by such clauses.
(1)

( 2) Such action of the Commission in effect
leaves its finding on a material fact based solely
on hearsay evidence.
(3) By such action the Con1mission has exceeded its jurisdiction in that it has improperly
delegated to an unnamed geologist, chosen and
paid by the respondent, the Com1nission's sole and
non-delegable power to determine the adequacy
of the respondent's gas supply.

*

*
*
*
( 1) Such action of the Commission violates
the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the
State of Utah and the United States of America
in that it is a denial of the character of hearing
guaranteed by such clauses.
It will be noted that subsection ( 3) of Section 76-4-24,
U.C.A. (1943), requires that the C-ommission have a hearSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing before it enters its order either denying or issuing a
·certificate of eonvenience and necesity. As may be readily
seen from Chapter 6 of Title 76, U.C.A. (1943), and
especially Sections 1, 10 and 16 thereof, the legislature
contemplated that such hearing be a full hearing with
the right of all parties to be heard and to present evidence, to cross-examine and rebut evidence of others, and
with the requirement that the Commission make findings
and issue its orders based thereon. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Commission have so .construed
the statutory requirements.
It is fundamental that the requirements of due process of law apply to administrative proceedings as well
as to judicial proceedings. As stated in 42 Am. Jur.,

Public Administrative Law, Section 137, pages 479-80:

"An administrative hearing in the exercise
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers must be fair,
open, and impartial. The right to such a hearing
is an inexorable safeguard and one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the
Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement.
There can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural
desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that
minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored. The breadth of administrative discretion
places in a strong light the necessity for maintaining in its integrity the essentials of a fair
and open hearing. When such a hearing has been
denied, the administrative action is void. The requirements of fairness are not exhausted in the
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taking or consideration of evidence, but extend
to the concluding parts of the procedure as well
as to the beginning and intermediate steps."
In fact, the very reason legislatures require hearings
is to comply with the procedural requirements of due
process of law. Quoting from 42 Am. Jur., supra, Section
138, pages 481-2:

"* * *. The manifest purpose of requiring a
hearing is to comply with the requirements of due
process of law. If such requirements are met
under the circumstances of the particular proceeding involved, the hearing is sufficient; and to
render a hearing unfair, the defect or the practice
complained of must be such as might lead to a denial of justice, or there must be an absence of one
of the elements deemed essential to due process
of law. A requirement of a hearing in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers has obvious reference
to the tradition of judicial proceedings with respect to those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in
a proceeding of a judicial nature. A requirement
of a full hearing means one in which ample opportunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evidence and argument, a showing fairly adequate to
establish the propriety or impropriety, from the
standpoint of justice and law, of the steps asked to
be taken. Under general requirements applicable
to quasi-judicial proceedings, or under the requirement of a full hearing, a party has the right
and the hearing must afford him the opportunity,
to defend the right involved, by argument, proof,
and the cross-examination of witnesses, and the
trier of the facts must reach his decision in :tccordance with the facts proved. * * *"
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In Morgan v. Un,ited States (Sup. Ct. lLS. 1936) 298

U.S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288, 1\Iorgan had been a party to a
hearing held pursuant to an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture directing an inquiry into the reasonableness
of existing rates charged by Inarket agencies for buying
and selling livestock at the Kansas City Stock Yards. The
statute under \vhich the Secretary had proceeded provided that, "after full hearing," if the Secretary was
of the opinion that rates charged were unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory, he could determine and
prescribe what rates should thereafter apply. 80 L. Ed.

1291. On appeal 1\Iorgan was attacking the order entered
by the Secretary as void on the grounds that he had not
been accorded the requisite hearing. The Court, through
Chief Justice Hughes, had this to say concerning the
raising of the due process question at 80 L. Ed. 1293:

"* * * in determining whether in conducting
an administrative proceeding of this sort the Secretary has complied with the statutory prerequisites, the recitals of his procedure cannot be regarded as conclusive. Otherwise the statutory
conditions could be set at naught by mere assertion. If upon the facts alleged, the 'full hearing'
required by the statute was not given, plaintiffs
were entitled to prove the facts and have the
Secretary's order set aside. Nor is it necessary
to go beyond the terms of the statute in order to
consider the constitutional requirement of due
process as to notice and hearing. For the statute
itself demands a full hearing and the order is
void if such a hearing was denied. (Citing cases)."
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In Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co. (Sup. Ct.
U.S. 1938) 305 U.S. 175, 83 L. Ed. 111, the Supreme
Court of the United States again had before it the question, among others, of what a statutory requirement of
a hearing meant. As stated by the Court, in an opinion
again by Chief Justice Hughes, at 83 L. Ed. 114:
"The Railway Labor Act, which applies to
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, excepts
any 'interurban' electric railway unless it is operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system
of transportation. The Interstate Commerce Commission is 'authorized and directed upon request
of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any
party interested to determine after hearing
whether any line operated by electric power' falls
within the exception. * * *"
In discussing the statutory prov1s1on the Court
stated, at 83 L. Ed. 116:
"The requirement of a 'hearing' has obvious
reference 'to the tradition of judicial proceedings
in which evidence is received and weighed by the
trier of the facts.' The 'hearing' is 'the hearing of
evidence and argument.' Morgan v. United States,
'298 U.S. 468, 480, 80 L. ed. 1288, 1294, 56 S. Ct.
906. And the manifest purpose in requiring a
hearing is to comply with the requirements of due
process upon which the parties affected by the
determination of an administrative body are entitled to insist. Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Louisville & N.R. Co. 227 U.S. 88, 91, 57 L. ed.
431, 433, 33 s. Ct. 185. * * *"
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In Alabama Po'lDer Co,mpany

City of Fort Payne
(Sup. Ct. Ala., 1939) 237 Ala. 459, 187 So. 632, 123 A.L.R.
1337, the Alabama Supreme Court had before it an appeal
somewhat similar to the one now before this Court. Pursuant to the Alabama statutes, the city of Fort Payne
applied to the Public Works Board of Alabama for permission to issue municipal revenue bonds for partial financing of a municipal electric distribution system in
Fort Payne. The statute provided that such permission
could be granted only after a public hearing. The Board
set it down for hearing and Alabama Power Company intervened and contested the issuance of such bonds and
thereafter appealed from an order consenting to such
issuance. In connection with the Point here under discussion, the Court had this to say at 123 A.L.R. 1343:
1\

"We do not think it can be doubted that the
proceedings authorized to be had before, and by,
the Board are of a character quasi judicial, in
which due process must be observed, and preserved to all persons whose legal rights may be
involved, and concluded by the deliberations and
determinations of the Board. Such proceedings
require the taking and weighing of evidence, and
a finding of fact based upon a consideration of
the evidence, and the making of an order supported by a finding upon substantial evidence
given before the Board.
"Nor will any one doubt, we take it, that the
'public hearing' provided for in the act 'has obvious reference to the tradition of judicial proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceedings in which evidence is received and weighed
by the trier of the facts.' ~ ~ *" (Citing and quoting from Morgan v. United States, supra.)
The Court concluded, at 123 A.L.R. 1345:
"We are, therefore, at the conclusion, (a) that
the intervenor had such an interest in the proceedings before the Board of Public Works as entitled
it to intervene in the proceedings there held; (b)
that such proceedings required a public hearing;
(c) that they have the character of a quasi judicial
proceeding, in which the right of due process must
not be ignored; * * *"
•

In general, "due process, of course, requires that
commissions proceed upon matters in evidence and that
parties have opportunity to subject evidence to the test
of cross-examination and rebuttal." Market Street R. Co.

v. Railroad Commission of California (Sup. Ct. U.S..,
1945) 324 U. S. 548, 89 L. Ed. 1171, 1182. See also authorities cited above.
It is true, of course, that administrative bodies such
as the Public Service Commission of Utah, even where
they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, are not limited
by the strict rules of courts concerning procedure and
admissibility of evidence. 76-6-1, U.C.A. (1943). But, as
stated by Justice Cardoza in Ohio Bell Telegraph Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1937) 301 U.
S. 292, 304, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1101 :
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"Regulatory comn1issions have been invested
with broad po,vers within the sphere of duty assigned to them by law. Even in quasi-judicial
proceedings their informed and expert judgment
exacts and receives a proper deference from
courts \vhen it has been reached "\vith due submission to constitutional restraints. (Citing
cases). Indeed, much that they do within the
realm of administrative discretion is exempt from
supervision if those restraints have been obeyed.
All the more insistent is the need, when power has
been bestotved so freely, that the 'inexorable safeguard,' * * * of a fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity. (Citing cases). The right
to sttch a hearing is one of 'the rudiments of fair
play' * * * assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement.
(Citing cases). There can be no compromise on
the footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural desire to be rid of harassing
delay, when that minimal requirement has been
neglected or ignored."
The Supreme Court of the United States had earlier
made the following observation in Interstate Commerce

Commission v. Louisville d!; N. R. Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct.
1913) 227 U. S. 88, 93, 57 L. Ed. 431, 434 :

"* * * But the more liberal the practice in
admitting testimony, the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence
by which rights are asserted or defended. In such
cases the Commissioners cannot act upon their
own information, as could jurors in primitive
days. All parties must be fully apprised of the
evidence submitted or to be considered, and must
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be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a
party maintain its rights or make its defense.
In no other way can it test the sufficiency of the
facts . to support the finding; for otherwise, even
though it appeared that the order was without
evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be
explained on the theory that the Commission had
before it extraneous, unknown, but presumptively
sufficient information to support the finding."
As pointed out in United States v . .Abilene & S. R.
Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1924) 265 U. S. 274, 68 L. Ed. 1016,
1023, by Justice Brandeis, the evidence upon which an
administrative body acts quasi judicially must be the
evidence adduced at the hearing and nothing can be
treated as evidence which is not introduced as such. In
accordance with this idea, it is firmly established that
a fair hearing is violated where a commission makes its
determination after taking judicial notice of certain matters without giving the opportunity to those involved of
explaining or disputing the matters judicially noticed.
Concerning this, we quote at length from Justice Cardoza's opinion in Ohio Bell Telegraph Co. v. Public Utili-

ties Commission (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1937) 301 U. S. 292, 81
L. Ed. 1093, beginning at page 1099:
"The fundamentals of a trial were denied to
the appellant when rates previously collected were
ordered to be refunded upon the strength of evidential facts not spread upon the record.
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"The Co1n1nission had given notice that the
value of the property would be fixed as of a date
certain. Evidence directed to the value at that
time had been laid before the triers of the facts
in thousands of printed pages. To make the picture Inore con1plete, evidence had been given as
to the value at cost of additions and retirements.
Without warning or even the hint of warning that
the case would be considered or determined upon
any other basis than the evidence submitted, the
Commission cut down the values for the years
after the date certain upon the strength of information secretly collected and never yet disclosed.
The company protested. It asked disclosure of the
documents indicative of price trends, and an opportunity to examine them, to analyze them, to
explain and to rebut them. The response was a
curt refusal. Upon the strength of these unkno\vn
•
documents refunds have been ordered for sums
mounting into millions, the Commission reporting
its conclusion, but not the underlying proofs. The
putative debtor does not know the proofs today.
This is not the fair hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation without trial.
"An attempt was made by the Commission
and again by the state court to uphold this decision without evidence as an instance of judicial
notice. * * * Courts take judicial notice of matters
of common knowledge. * * * For illustration, a
court takes judicial notice of the fact that Confederate money depreciated in value during the
war between the states (Wood v. Cooper, 2 Heisk,
441, 44 7; Hix v. Hix, 25 W. V a. 481, 484, 485), but
not of the extent of the depreciation at a given
time and place. * * * The distinction is' the more
important in cases where as here the extent of the
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fluctuations is not collaterally involved but is
the very point in issue. Moreover, notice, even
when taken, has no other effect than to relieve
one of the parties to a controversy of the burden
of resorting to the usual forms of evidence. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2567; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence,
16th ed. p. 18. 'It does not mean that the opponent
is prevented from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable.'
"What was done by the Commission is subject, however to an objection even deeper. Cf.
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 174,"175, 44
L. Ed. 119-121, 20 S. Ct. 77 ; West v. Louisiana,
194 U. S·. 258, 262, 263, 48 L. Ed. 965, 969, 970, 24
S. Ct. 650. There has been more than· an expansion
of the concept of notoriety beyond reasonable
limits. From the standpoint of due process-the
protection of the individual against arbitrary
action-a deeper vice is this, that even now we
do not know the particular or evidential facts of
which the Com.mission took judicial notice and
on which it rested its conclusion. Not only are the
facts unknown; there is no way to find them out.
When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a trial,
the party against whom they are offered may see
the evidence or hear it and parry its effect. Even
if they are copied in the findings '\Vi thout preliminary proof, there is at least an opportunity in
connection with a judicial review of the decision
to challenge the deductions made from them. The
opportunity is excluded here. The Commission,
withholding from the record the evidential facts
that it has gathered here and there, contents itself with saying that in gathering them it went
to journals and tax lists, as if a judge were to
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tell us, 'I looked at the statistics in the Library of
Congress, and they teach me thus and so.' This
wiU never do if hearings and appeals are to be
more than empty forms. * * *

"In Ohio the sole method of review is by petition in error to the Supreme Court of the State,
which considers both the law and the facts upon
the record made below, and not upon new evidence.
In such circumstances judicial review would be
no longer a reality if the practice followed in this
case were to receive the stamp of regularity. To
put the problem more concretely: how was it possible for the appellate court to review the law and
the facts and intelligently decide that the findings
of the Commission were supported by the evidence
when the evidence that it approved was unknown
and unknowable? In expressing that approval the
court did not mean that, traveling beyond the
record, it had consulted price lists for itself and
had reached its own conclusions as to the percentage of decline in value from 1925 onwards. It did
not even mean that it had looked at the particular
lists made use of by the Commission, for no one
knows what they were in any precise or certain
way. Nowhere in the opinion is there even the
hint of such a search. What the Supreme Court
of Ohio did was to take the word of the Commission as to the outcome of a secret investigation,
and let it go at that. 'A hearing is not judicial, at
least in any adequate sense, unless the evidence
can be known.'" (Citing cases).
Furthermore, a commission may not base its orders
on evidence procured on its own investigation and not
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introduced as evidence in the hearing. In the case of

United States v. Abilene &!; S. R. Co., Supra, the court
said, beginning at page 68 L. Ed. 1022 :
"The plaintiffs contend that the order is void
because it rests upon evidence not legally before
the Commission. It is conceded that the finding
rests, in part, upon data taken from the annual reports filed with the Commission by the plaintiff
carriers pursuant to law; that these reports were
not formally put in evidence; that the parts containing the data relied upon were not put in evidence through excerpts ; that attention was not
otherwise specifically called to them; and that objection to the use of the reports, under these circumstances, was seasonably made by the carriers
and was insisted upon. The parts of the annual
reports in question were used as evidence of facts
which it was deemed necessary to prove, not as a
means of verifying facts of which the Commission,
like a court, takes judicial notice. The contention
of the Commission is that, because its able examiner gave notice that 'no doubt it will be
necessary to refer to the annual reports of all
these carriers,' its Rules of Practice permitted
matter in the reports to be used as freely as if the
data had been formally introduced in evidence.
"The mere admission by an administrative
tribunal of matter which, under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, would
be deemed incompetent, does not invalidate its
order. (Citing cases). But a finding without evir
dence is beyond the power of the Commission.
Papers in the Commission's files are not alway~
evidence in a case. (Citing cases). Nothing can
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be treated as evidence which is not introduced
as such. (Citing cases) . If the proceeding had
been, in form, an adversary one, commenced by
the Orient system, that carrier could not, under
Rule xiii., have introduced the annual reports as a
whole. For they contain much that is not relevant
to the matter in issue. By the terms of the rule,
it would have been obliged to submit copies of such
portions as it deemed material, or to make specific reference to the exact portion to be used. The
fact that the proceeding was technically an investigation instituted by the Commission would not
relieve the Orient, if a party to it, from this requirement. Every proceeding is adversary, in
substance, if it may result in an order in favor of
one carrier as against another. Nor was the proceeding under review any the less an adversary
one because the primary purpose of the Commission was to protect the public interest through
making possible the continued operation of the
Orient system. The fact that it was on the Commission's own motion that use was made of the
data in the annual reports is not of legal significance.
"It is sought to justify the procedure followed
by the clause in Rule xiii. which declares that the
'Commission will take notice of items in tariffs
and annual or other periodical reports of 'carriers
properly on file.' But this clause does not mean
that the Commission will take judicial notice of all
the facts contained in such documents. Nor does
it purport to relieve the Commission from introducing, by specific reference, such parts of the
reports as it wishes to treat as evidence. It means
that as to these items there is no occasion for
the parties to serve copies. The objection to the
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use of the data contained in the annual reports is not lack of authenticity or untrustworthiness. It
is that the carriers were left without notice of the
evidence with which they were, in fact, confronted,
as later disclosed by the finding made. The requirement that, in an adversary proceeding, specific reference be made, is essential to the preservation of the substantial rights of the parties.
"The right of the carriers to insist that the
consideration of matter not in evidence invalidates the order was not lost by their submission
of the case without argument, and by their acquiesing in the suggestion that the presentation
of a tentative report by the examiner be omitted.
While the course pursued denied to the Commission the benefit of that full presentation of the
contentions of the parties which is often essential
to the exercise of sound judgment, it cannot be
construed as a waiver by the carriers of their legal
rights. The general notice that the Commission
would rely upon the voluminous annual reports
is tantamount to giving no notice whatsoever.
The matter improperly treated as evidence may
have been an important factor in the conclusions
reached by the Commission. The order must,
therefore, be held void."

In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio (U. S. D. C. 1928) 42 F. 2d 899, the plaintiff
brought suit for a temporary restraining order against
the Commission to restrain it from enforcing rates of
se-rvice established by the Commission. The plaintiff
claimed that the order of the Public Utilities Commission
was unfair and that its enforcement would be in violaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The rourt ordered a temporary injunction because the Comn1ission found, after examining its own
records, that the rate of Fifty-Five Cents per thousand
feet contracted by plaintiffs to be paid for natural gas
at wholesale 'vas unreasonable and excessive in comparison with wholesale rates obtained by other gas companies.
It was shown that the Commission used its own files of
schedules of other companies as evidence supporting
its order, but the files were not introduced in evidence
and no opportunity was given to the plaintiffs, either to
be heard respecting the files or to introduce testimony
respecting the nonapplicability of the files to the situation
confronting the plaintiffs. The court said on page 900:
"The schedules so referred to by the commission are not brought into this record, nor could
they, under the circumstances of the hearing, be
brought to our attention; for it is established that
the commission might not base its conclusions upon its files and other general information, unless
the same were put in evidence in the particular
proceeding, and opportunity given to the plaintiff to meet and explain them. The question is
fully considered by a three judge court in this
circuit, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Railroad .
Commission of Kentucky et al., 1 F. (2d) 805, 806,
citing decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States on that subject, and we are constrained to follow its conclusions."

In line with the foregoing, this Court has had occasion to comment upon the propriety of consideration by
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the Co1nmission of things not in the record. In the case
of Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commission (Sup. Ct. Utah 1944) 152 P. 2d 542, the Commission
had predicated one of its holdings upon matters which
were never made a part of the record. The court stated,
in reference to this, at 152 P. 2d 567:
"For example, in regard to the discussion of
post-war electrical revenues, the Commission referred to testimony of Th1r. Gadsby in another case
(No. 2652) which was pending before.the Commission at about this same time. Mr. Gadsby had no
opportunity at this hearing to explain this testimony to show why it would not be applicable to the
various situations involved in this case or to deny
the conclusions which the Commission drew from
it. Such references to matters which the Company has had no opportunity to explain or rebut
certainly cannot be commended.
"In Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P.
2d 287, 290, a similar point was raised. The question before the Commission was whether a railroad could be permitted to discontinue maintaining a station agent at Faust, Utah, without impairment of the services which the law required it
to furnish to the public. At this hearing no evidence was taken regarding the needs of various
sheepmen who used the road for movement of
livestock and feed. The Commission had had another similar case a short time before this hearing.
This earlier case involved the closing of the station at St. John some 12 miles a'vay fron1 the
Faust station. In the hearing on the St. John case
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considerable evidence was introduced concerning
the needs of the various sheepmen. In disposing
of the case involving the closing of the Faust
station, the Commission relied upon evidence
which had been introduced in the St. John case.
On certiorari this court held that this was error.
We said: 'The evidence adduced in the St. John
Station case in this regard cannot be considered
as evidence adduced in this case. While the same
counsel for the railroad may have appeared in ·
both cases, and the same witnesses testified for the
railroad in both cases, * * * yet the cross-examination which the railroad counsel might direct in
the Faust case to the witnesses who appeared in
the St. John case, if they appeared in the Faust
case, might vary materially because of the new
witnesses who appeared in the Faust case. The
Commission, like a jury, can consider such facts
in relation to evidence adduced which constitute
the common facts of life and which form the
common knowledge of mankind and can take judicial knowledge of such facts as a court may take
judicial notice of. Such facts permit the fact
finder to interpret evidence and articulate it to
the general facts of life. The Commission may
also, perhaps, take judicial notice of such facts and
practices as are generally known throughout the
whole field of railroad transportation; * * * but
it cannot take its special knowledge which it may
have gained from experience or from other hearings and base any findings or conclusions upon
such knowledge. That is fundamental.' To the
same effect see Spencer v. Industrial Commission,
81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618."

Why is the requirement that the evidence upon which
quasi judicial administrative action is taken must be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

118
presented as evidence in the hearing.~ As evidenced by
the foregoing authorities, "generally, a party to an administrative hearing is entitled to know the witnesses
and the evidence against him. There is no hearing when
the party cannot know what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an opportunity to test, explain,
or refute." 42 Am. J ur., Public Administrative Law, section 140, page 483.
These rights to cross-examine, refute, explain or
qualify evidence offered to prove a given assertion
cannot be overestimated. As Professor Wigmore says
of cross-examination in his treatise on the Law of Evidence (First Edition), Vol. II, Section 1367 :
"For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination
as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no
safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by crossexamination, and the conviction that no statement
* * * should be used as testimony until it has been
probed and sublimated by that test, has found
increasing strength in lengthening experience.
* * * Nevertheless, it is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."
But, what has the Commission done in this caseY
It has held a hearing to determine whether or not Utah
Natural Gas Company could show that the public convenience and necessity required the construction of its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

119
pipeline. At the conclusion of such hearing it found that
l~tah Natural Gas Con1pany did not have the proven gas
reserves necessary to supply such line. By the way it
conditioned its order it in effect found that a basic prerequisite to the right to build such pipeline was a showing
of proven reserves of gas sufficient to supply such pipeline. In other words, the proven reserves are necessary
before Utah Natural Gas Company has the right to construct the pipeline, and, under the wording of section 764-24 (1) and (3), U. C. A. (1943), before such a company
can engage in such construction the co1nn1ission must
have determined, after hearing, that the public convenience and necessity requires such construction. And yet,
after the hearing has been closed, the Commission provides that such a basic fact, upon which its action has
been predicated and will continue to be predicated, may
be conclusively established by the filing of a certificate
of an independent geologist that there are proven reserves committed to Utah Natural Gas Company adequate to justify the construction of the line and facilities.
A clearer case of the denial of a required fair hearing
cannot be conceived. Petitioner and other opponents of
the application will never be confronted by the geologist
and therefore will never have the opportunity to cross- examine him or inquire into the facts upon which he bases
such certificate. Petitioner and opponents, indeed the
Commission itself, will thereby be deprived of the only
~

test, as the experience of centuries has shown beyond
peradventure, of the credibility of a person asserting
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facts and of the trustworthiness of the asserted facts.
But, even worse; "not only are the facts unknown; there
is no way to find them out." Justice Cardoza in Ohio Bell
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra.
Such procedure, so contrary to the recognized requirements of a fair hearing in Anglo-American tradition, further deprives the Petitioner of an opportunity
to offer evidence to prove that the assertions of the
geologist may be unjustified in fact or to explain or
qualify his statements. Still further, such procedure
denies to the Commission the benefit of the enlightening
process of cross-examination, explanation, refutation and
qualification which the participation of opposition invariably affords and thereby fatally handicaps the Commission in obeying its statutory duty of looking primarily
to the public interest. Salt Lake and Utah R. Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, et al (Sup. Ct. Utah 1944)
106 Utah 403, 149 P. 2d 647, supra, and cases ~therein
cited.
(2) Such action of the Commission in effect
leaves its finding on a material fact based solely
on hearsay evidence.

Ill

The procedure followed by the Commission is faulty
for another reason. As heretofore pointed out, the Commission found that adequate proven reserves had not
been established at the hearing by the applicant-respondent. ],urther, the Commission, by its order and the condition attached thereto, has required that adequate
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proven reserves be established before construction can
be cormnenced under the certificate. By doing so, it has
recognized that a deterinination of adequate proven reserves is a necessary prerequisite to the determination
required of it by the statute that public convenience and
necessity requires such construction; which determination, in turn, is a necessary prerequisite to the commencement of construction by a public utility.
Yet, determination of whether or not there are adequate proven reserves will be made by the filing of a
•
certificate of a geologist \vith the Commission that such
reserves do exist, and nothing more. That certificate,
being an extra-judicial statement (or extra-quasi- judicial
statement, if you wish) or assertation, offered (and accepted) for the purpose of proving the matter asserted
would be the clearest sort of violation of the rule excluding hearsay evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. II,
section 1364. Thus, in effect we have the Commission
allowing its determination of a basic fact, upon which
its quasi-judicial determination required by the statute
depends, to be based solely upon hearsay.
This court, in several cases dealing with appeals
from proceedings before the Industrial Commission, has
held that a finding of fact cannot be based solely upon
hearsay. See Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comrnis-

sion (Sup. Ct. Utah 1942) 132 P. 2d 376, 380 and cases
there cited.
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It will be noted that, insofar as procedure before the
Industrial Commission is concerned, section 42-1-82, U.
C. A. (1943), provides that the Commission shall not
be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of
evidence. This statute has prompted this court to hold
that hearsay evidence is admissible before the Commission and may be considered by it but that a finding may
not be based solely upon hearsay. The reason for this
last restriction is, of course, that such evidence alone is
incompetent.
It is submitted that such rule should apply equally
as well to the Public Service Commission. While it probably can admit and consider hearsay evidence under section 76-6-1, U. C. A. (1943), it should not be allowed to
base a finding of a basic fact solely upon such incompetent evidence. The Commission has found that, at the
close of the hearing, there were inadequate proven reserves. It has required that adequate reserves be proven
before the certificate becomes operative. Yet, it has
provided that conclusive proof of such adequate proven
reserves may be established solely by hearsay evidence.
This it ought not be allowed to do.
(3) By such action the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in that it has improperly
delegated to an unnamed geologist, chosen and
paid by the respondent, the Commission's sole
and non-delegable power to determine the adequacy of the respondent's gas supply.
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The Con1mission has exceeded its jurisdiction and
statutory power in still another respect. Under section
76-4-24, l~. C. A. (19-±3), the legislature has directed that
the Com1nission shall hold hearings to determine whether
or not certificates of conYenience and necessity shall be
issued and shall 1nake the determination that a proposed
construction is required by the public convenience and
necessity. As heretofore pointed out, and as recognized
by the Commission in its order and the condition attached
thereto, such determination involves a showing of adequate proven reserves of natural gas. The applicable
statutes have no provision allowing the C-ommission to
delegate the responsibility of making such determination
for it. Such power to determine is more than ministerial
and is discretionary or quasi-judicial.
As stated in 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law,
sec. 73, page 387 :
"It is a general principle of law, expressed
in the maxim 'delegatus non potest delegare,' that
a delegated power may not be further delegated
by the person to whom such power is delegated.
Apart from statute, whether administrative officers in whom certain powers are vested or upon
whom certain duties are imposed may deputize
others to exercise such powers or perform such
duties usually depends upon whether the particular act or duty sought to be delegated is ministerial, on the one hand, or, on the other, discretionary or quasi-judicial. Merely ministerial functions may be delegated to assistants whose employment is authorized, but there is no authority
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to delegate acts discretionary or quasi-judicial in
nature. Authority from the legislature is necessary to the power of a commission to appoint a
general deputy who may exercise quasi-judicial
powers. If such deputy may be appointed or the
commission is given authority by the legislature to
deputize quasi-judicial matters to others, it may
do so. Statutory authority to a commission to employ agents, statisticians, experts, attorneys, and
such other assistants and employees as may be
necessary to perform its duties does not give the
commission authority, either directly or by implication, to deputize those rna tters which are
quasi-judicial in character."
The question of the power of Utah commissions to
authorize the performance by a deputy of quasi-judicial
functions has been before this court in a number of cases.
The leading Utah case in this regard is that of State

Tax Commission of Utah v. Katsis (Sup. Ct. Utah, 1936),
90 Utah 406, 62 Pac. 2d 120, 107 A.L.R. 1477. The ques·
tion before this court related to whether the Tax Commission could deputize the Commission's auditor with
the power to recompute sales tax returns and assess additional taxes and penalties. The court inquired into the
question of whether or not the act was ministerial or
quasi-judicial. The statute provided for penalties of
varying amounts, depending upon the manifest intention
of the tax payer in filing an insufficient return. The
court held that the determinations to be made were quasijudicial and could not therefore· be delegated to the auditor and said at page 412, Utah Report:
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"If the Co1mnission had power to deputize this
matter to the auditor and had actually done so,
it would then be the Co1nmission's act. The fact
that the legislature gave the Tax Commission
authority to employ agents, statisticians, experts,
attorneys, and other assistants and en1ployees as
may be necessary to perform its duties does not
give the Commission authority directly or by implication to deputize those matters which are
quasi judicial in character. It takes authority
from the Legislature to appoint a general deputy.
If such deputy may be appointed or the Commission is given authority by the Legislature to deputize quasi judicial matters to others, it may do so.
Dorr v. Clark, 7 Mich. 310; Andres v. Circuit
Judge, 77 Mich. 85, 43 N.W. 857, 6 L.R.A. 238;
Wilkerson v. Dennison, 113 Tenn. 237, 80 S.vV. 765,
106. Am. St. Rep. 821, 3 Ann. Cas. 297; Steinke
v. Graves, 16 Utah 293, 52 P. 386. Ministerialacts
may be delegated to othe-rs. 'Merely ministerial
functions may be delegated to an officer or committee.' Jewell Belting Co. v. Village of Bertha,
91 Minn. 9, 97 N.W. 424, 425, citing Harcourt v.
Common Council, 62 N.J. Law, 158, 40 A. 690.
" 'Where judgment and discretion are required of municipal officers they cannot be
delegated without express legislative authority.' "
In M oor1neister v. Golding, 84 Utah 324, 27 Pac. 2d
447, this court held the Department of Registration could
not take testimony by deposition without the grant of
express statutory authority. In the earlier case of Moormeister ,,,_ Department of Registration, 76 Utah 146, 288
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Pac. 900, it was stated that any determination of the' ,
issue rnust be on evidence produced in an open hearing
before the director of registration.
Even though the power be lawfully delegated as in
the Workmen's Compensation Act the person so deputized cannot make the determination that the Commission is required to make. In Utah Copper Company v.
Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 Pac. 24, 13
A.L.R. 1367 at page 1379 this court said:

"* * * The referee does not, and cannot, make
any award or make any binding order respecting
an award. That is a matter left to the determination of the con1mission itself, when the testimony
taken is submitted to and considered by the members of the commission. Taking testimony by a
referee is only one manner of investigating and
ascertaining the facts involved in any particular
proceeding."
In the case here the geologist is authorized in the
Commission's order to determine a fact that is the most
important issue in the entire proceeding, i.e. the proven
reserves. Days of trial before the Commission were
devoted to this issue. The Commission by its order has
effectively foreclosed Utah Pipe Line from its day in
court. Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. case on the petition for rehearing,
105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. (2nd) 790, at page 271 said:
I
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"The first prerequisite of a valid rate order
by the Commission is that it be preceded by a hearing and findings. Common sense dictates that
at such a hearing the legislature intended that
there be evidence adduced which would be reasonably calculated to resolve the issues presented for
determination. Common sense likewise requires
a holding that the findings required by statute be
made in accordance with the evidence so presented. If there is no substantial evidence to support an essential finding, that finding cannot
stand and a rate order predicated upon it must
fall. 4 • *"

In the case of Crow v. Industrial Commission, 104
Utah 333, 140 Pac. 2d 321, 148 A.L.R. 316, the appellant
Crow had been injured on the job and had received six
years' compensation from the insurance fund. The medical witnesses disagreed as to the extent of the injuries.
This court discusses what comprises a full hearing and
the duty upon a commission to participate in the determination of the issues and said: (page 337 A.L.R.)
"Where there is a conflict in the testimony,
and the weight and credibility to be given testimony of the various witnesses is the determining
factor, in order to accord a 'full hearing' to which
all litigants are entitled, the person who conducts
the hearing, hears the testimony, and sees the
witnesses while testifying, whether a member of
the board, or an examiner or referee, must either
participate in the decision, or where, at the time
the decision is rendered, he has severed his connections with the board, commission or fact finding
body, the record must show affirmatively that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

128
one who finds the faets had access to the benefit
of his findings, conclusions and impressions of
such testimony, by either written or oral reports
thereof. This does not necessarily require that
all of the commissioners must be present at the
hearing, or even that the one hearing the evidence
must concur in the result, but his opinion on the
testimony must be available to the com1nission in
making its decision. This is in harmony with the
law on this subject regarding commission and
, quasi-judicial triers of fact in the Federal Courts.
See 1 Vom Bauer's Federal Administrative La,v,
318 to 322, section 310 to 313; United States ex rel
Ohm v. Perkins, 2 Cir. 79 F. 2d 533; United States
v. Nugent, 6 Cir., 100 Fed. 2d 215; Morgan v.
United States, 1936, 298 U.S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288,
56 S. Ct. 906; Id., 1938, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773,
82 L. Ed. 1129.
"The showing here does not meet these requirements and the case is therefore reversed
and remanded for a rehearing, with costs to applicant."
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that
even though there had been a proper delegation by the
Industrial Commission, the Commission was nevertheless
called upon to make the ultimate decision and such decision must be made from the evidence adduced at the
hearing. In Andrew Revne v. Trade Comn~ission of Utah,
130 Utah 155, 192 Pac. 2d 563, 3 A.L.R. 2d 169 (1948) this
court held that a statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in that it per1nitted a percentage of the barbers in a locality to establish barbers'
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prices and fix the operation of barber shops. The opinions in the case review at length the leading authorities
on the delegation of powers and Mr. Justice Pratt particularly pointed out that the delegation was obnoxious
in that the person delegated to make the determination
would not be wholly uninterested in the result of his
finding. That situation obtains here in that the geologist
is to be selected by the McGuire Company.
It is submitted that the same rule should apply here.
The Commission by statute has been given the discretionary power, after hearing, to grant or deny a certificate of convenience and necessity. If it grants the certificate it must first determine that the public convenience
and necessity require the proposed construction. It has
seen fit to require in this case as a preliminary to the
effectiveness of the certificate a showing of adequate
proven reserves of gas; and yet, it has delegated the right
and power to make such determination to a stranger to
the Commission, chosen and paid by applicant-respondent. Clearly this is attempted delegation of a statutory,
non-delegable power.
Upon the basis of the forgoing, it is submitted that
the Commission erred in providing, by a condition attached to its order issuing the Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity, that the proof of adequate, proven reserves of natural gas required by it could be made and
determined, after the hearing had been closed and without
further hearing, by an unnamed geologist, chosen and
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paid by applicant-respondent, 1n that such procedure
denies the fair hearing required and guaranteed by the
statutes of Utah and the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States
of America; in that such procedure allows the determination of an essential fact to be based solely upon incompetent evidence .which violates the rule excluding hearsay
evidence; and, in that such procedure is an attempt by the
Commission to delegate a duty and a power non-delegable
under the applicable statutes of Utah. For these reasons
the Commission's order should be declared null and void.
III. THE COMMISSION F·AILED TO REGULARLY PURSUE ITS S·TATUTORY AUTHORITY.
POINTS H AND I.
POINT H
"(h) THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LAWFUL AUTHORITY IN ISSUING SUCH CERTIFICATE IN
THAT IT FAILED TO ACT AS A REGULATORY BODY AS
REQUIRED BY LAW, BUT IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED ITSELF A DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION COMMISSION."

STATEMENT UNDER POINT H
Sprinkled throughout the record are instances where
witnesses for Utah Natural Gas Company stated or intimated that they, or others, would not drill wells and
develop areas unless a certificate was issued. (For example, see R. 205-6, 208, 235, 551).
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In its Findings and Report, set out as Exhibit C to
the Petition for writ of certiorari, the Commission made
the following findings in connection with the point here
involved. (R. 1168)
"None of the fields from which the applicant
proposes to obtain gas, however, have been sufficiently explored to prove the extent of the reserves. It appears, however, that the exploratory
drilling program in all of the fields will be greatly
stimulated if the owners of the fields are assured
of facilities to transport their gas to a market if
such fields are developed."

(R. 1168):
"The officers of Byrd-Frost, Inc. appeared
at the hearing as witnesses in support of the application. During the past five years this company
has spent in excess of $2,500,000 in the State of
Utah in gas and oil exploration and drilling operations. The Commission finds that this company
is financially able to carry on an extensive drilling program in the fields above mentioned and
will, if a certificate of convenience and necessity
is granted in this case for the construction of a
pipe line, spend between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000 during the coming year in an intensified drilling program to determine as nearly as possible
the extent of the gas reserves in the fields from
which the applicant proposes to obtain its gas
supply."
(R. 1169) :

"The Commission further finds that the
granting of applicant's application is necessary
to stimula1te an exploration and development pro,_
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gram to dete~rmine the extent of said reserves,
and that one year's time is a sufficient period
within which such exploration and development
work should have progressed to a stage sufficient
to determine the eXJtent of such reserves."
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER
POINT H
As has been pointed out several times in this brief,
it is well settled in Utah and elsewhere that the interest
of the public is paramount in determining whether or not
a certificate of public convenience and necessity should
be issued. (See Arguments under Points A, B and C).
As further pointed out under Point C, the public interest
involved is primarily the interest of the public in the
territory or community which will use the service or
commodity to be offered.
The Public Service CQmmission was established by,
and exists under, the statutes contained in Title 76 of
U.C.A. (1943). It has been created by the legislature
through those statutes as an administrative body vested
with the power to "supervise and regulate" the public
utility businesses in the State of Utah. 76-4-1, U.C.A.
(1943). No place in those statutes is it given any power

whatever to take it upon itself to provide for and regulate the development of natural resources in the State
of Utah.
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It is a well settled fundamental of ad1ninistrative and
statutory law that administrative agencies, being creatures created by statute, have no power beyond those
conferred by the statute. As stated in 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, 'Section 26, page 316:
"Administrative boards, commissions, and officers have no common-law powers. Their powers
are limited by the statutes creating them to those
conferred expressly or by necessary or fair linplication. General language describing the powers
and functions of an administrative body may be
construed to extend no further than the specific
duties and powers conferred in the same statute.
In determining whether a board or commission
has a certain power, the authority given should
be liberally construed in light of the purposes for
which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full exposition of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to
the law. In the construction of a grant of powers,
it is a general principle of law that where the end
is required the appropriate means are given. Implication of necessary powers may be especially
appropriate in the field of internal admi~istra
tion. However, powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution. Official
powers cannot be merely assumed by administrative officers, nor can they be created by the courts
in the proper exercise of their judicial functions."
As stated by the S.upreme Court of Oregon in Layman v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission,
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mentary and fundamental principal, which no one will
dispute, that a commission, created by the legislature to
administer a statute, is wholly limited in its powers and
authority by the law of its creation. No more unwholesome doctrine could be suggested than that such a body
is vested with discretion to ignore or transgress these
limitations even to accomplish what it may deem to be
laudable ends. That would be to leave room for that
'play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power'
condemned in Y ick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
1064, 1071, 30 L. ed. 220, 226. If the statute is not workable then the remedy is with the legislature * * *"
The legislature of the State of Utah has not seen
fit to grant to the Commission the power and the duty
of seeing that the mineral resources of the State of Utah
are developed. The legislature is the proper body to say
when and by whom such shall be done. It does not befit
this Commission, or any regulatory body so constituted,
to attempt to expand its powers beyond the scope of those
powers specifically and carefully traced by the legislature.
The North Dakota Board of Railroad Commissioners
was faced with a similar problem in 1928. In the case of
Re Montana-Dakota Power Co., P.U.R. 1929A, 369, there
was before the Commission conflicting applications of
Montana-Dakota and Scranton Electric for certificates
to serve substantially the same area with electric power
line facilities. Scranton made quite a point of the fact
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that ~fontana-Dakota's electricity would be generated
with gas fron1 Montana, "\Yhile Scranton would use coal
from North Dakota to generate its electricity. In reference to this contention the Commission stated, at pages
376-7:

"* * * The necessity for protecting the investment in the coal mine is stressed. While witnesses
for the Scranton Electric Company have testified
that the proposed transmission line and local
plants are incidental to the coal mining interest,
we consider the electric interest as the only issue
in these cases * * * The question which appears
to be uppermost in the minds of those interested
in the Scranton properties is whether the electric
current to serve the territory covered hy the proposed highline shall be generated by the use of
gas from Montana or lignite from North Dakota.
"While the desire to build up a large mining
industry in the state is a commendable one, the
question for this Commission to determine is
which company will best serve the communities
along the line of the Milwaukee Railway, Marmuth, to Hettinger, inclusive, with electric energy.
The Commission does not believe that the people
in those communities through unduly high electric
light rates should be required to bear the burden
of building up a mining industry which is dependent upon the partial drying of the coal, which pro- ·
cess at this time has not passed the experimental
stage."
That the powers of the Public Service Commission
of Utah are limited and the Commission has no right to
determine state policy is emphasized in a case before the
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Utah Commission decided in 1924 Re Clays 1914 E., P.
U. R. Annotated, page 178. There Clay applied for a
certificate from the Commission for authority to construct and operate an aerial tramway from a railway
terminal in Salt Lake County to Alta to convey ore, rock
and freight. At the hearing the applicant showed there
were a large number of companies in the Alta area unable to mine and mill their ores because of low grade and
that the expense of transportation by team and wagon
to the rail head was prohibitive; that there were large
and valuable ore deposits to be worked and that it was
in the public interest that mining be encouraged and that
unless the tramway were built these valuable ore deposits would be lost. The Commission denied the application recognizing that even though it would be in the
general public welfare that mining be encouraged and
the tramway built the Commission had no power to
authorize such construction.
That it is not in the province of the Comn1ission to
determine the public policy is well settled. In Central

Northwest Business Men's Association v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 168 N.E. 890 at 894, it was said:
"It is not given to the Commission to determine the public policy of the state (citing cases).
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ice as an extension of street car service is not desirable as a matter of public policy is a finding in
a field which the Commission may not enter."
If the power to perforn1 an act is not clear from the
statute, then the courts should decide against the exercise of any such power. To this effect are:

State ex rel Thatcher v. Boyle, et al., Public Service
Commission (Mont.) 204 Pac. 378. (S.yllabus 1)
Public service commissions-Administrative body having limited powers.
1.

"The Public Service Commission is a mere
administrative agency, and has only limited
powers, to be ascertained from the statute creating it (Laws 1913, c. 52); and any reasonable
doubt as to the grant of a particular p·ower will he
resolved against the existence thereof."

Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,
et al., Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 21 Fed.
2d, 4, beginning at page 19 says :
"It is well settled that the powers of a state
Commission are special and limited, and they can
exercise only such authority as is legally conferred
by express provisions of law, or such as is by fair
implication and intendment incident to and included in the authority expressly conferred for the
purpose of carrying out and accomplishing the
objects for which the Commission was created,
and that any reasonable doubt of the existence of
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any particular power in the Commission should be
resolved against the exercise of such power. State
ex rel. Railroad Com'rs v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
57 Fla. 526, 49 So. 39; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 194, 29 S. Ct. 451, 53
L. Ed. 753; Board of R. Commissioners of Oregon
v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 17 Or. 65, 19 P. 702; 10
c. J."
See also the numerous authorities collected in Volume 1 of P.U.R. Digest at 555.
Apparently the Public Service Commission of Utah
was not, in the proceedings below, so mindful of the public interest it is charged to protect. It hastened to award
its certificate to an applicant who had insufficient gas
but wanted to find some in Utah, without even considering the application of Petitioner to see what it had to
offer. Apparently it felt justified in jeopardizing the
interest of the consumers in the area to he served to the
extent that they may not get any gas after all or may
have to pay higher rates if they do get gas (see Argument under Point F) for the benefit of those few. who
wish to see if they can find some gas in possible structures discussed in the record. Self justification is not
enough. In doing so, it is submitted that the Commission
exceeded its lawful authority in usurping powers it has
not been granted and in failing to perform the principal
duty it has been given, namely, to look first to the interest of the public in the area and community to be
served.
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POINT I
THAT THE COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LAWFUL AUTHORITY IN ADOPTING THE VIEW THAT THE
FIRST APPLICANT IN POINT OF TIME SHOULD BE
GIVEN PREFERRED CONSIDERATION AND IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT THE QUESTION OF PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION IS AS TO WHO CAN BEST FURNISH THE PROPOSED SERVICE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST."
"(i)

ST ...-\TE~IENT UNDER POINT I
The Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent, filed
its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity in this case on May 29, 1950, and on November 17,
1950, filed an amended application, and the Commission
immediately gave notice of a hearing upon said application to be held on December 11, 1950. On that date,
December 11, 1950, petitioner Utah Pipe Line Company
filed its petition for intervention, setting forth that it
then had on file with the Federal Power Commission an
application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to construct a pipe line from New Mexico to
Salt Lake City, serving the same approximate area as
that proposed to be served by the Utah Natural Gas
Company. The hearing proceeded on the 11th of Dece·mber and was concluded on the 2d day of February,
1951. During the course of the proceedings, petitioner
Utah Pipe Line Company filed with the Public Service

Commission of Utah its application for a certificate of
convenience and necessity to serve the same area on the
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26th day of January, 1951. The Commission refused to
go into the merits of petitioner's application and limited
petitioner's participation in the hearing merely to that
of opposing the application of Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent. On March 12, 1951 the Commission
entered its order granting the certificate of convenience
and necessity to Utah Natural Gas Company.
By its action in proceeding to the final issuance of
the certificate of convenience and necessity to Utah
Natural Gas Company while refusing to consider in any
manner the application of Petitioner for a similar certificate to serve the same area, the Commission has in effect
given a preference to the application which was filed
prior in time.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT I
The great weight of authority is to the effect that
where there are several applicants for a certificate of
convenience and necessity to perform the same service
in the same community, the controlling question should
be which applicant is best qualified to serve the public
and not merely which one was the first to apply.
The Civil Aeronautics Board, in choosing between
two applicants for authority to serve the same air carrier route, has held that it must consider the comparative
public interests and select the carrier most qualified to
provide the needed service. Re North Central Case,
Docket No. 415, December 19, 1946. The Colorado Public
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Service Com1nission held, in Re Will is Application, Nos.
8968, 8969, Decision No. 307 41 (June 23, 1948), that
the Co1nn1ission will issue a certificate to the one of two
rival applicants ""ho establishes most conclusively his
preparedness and physical and financial ability to operate successfully.
In Re Helena Bttts Applications, Docket No. 994,
Report & Order No. 1498, 1927, the Public Service ComInission of Montana held that the controlling consideration in the preference of applicants for certificates should
be the choice of that applicant best fitted to carry out
the duties irnposed by the certificate. Likewise the New
Han1pshire Public Service Commission held in Re White
11/ountain Power Company, 14 N.H.P.S.C.R. 208, 1931,
that as between two rival power utilities seeking to operate in the same territory, the one which seemed rto be
better equipped for furnishing adequate service should
be granted the authority.
The illinois Supreme Court said in Bartonville Bus
Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill. 200, 157 N.E. 175,
that priority in the field does not of itself govern the
granting of a certificate for motor carrier service, although it is an element to be considered, but the proper
consideration is which applicant under the facts and
circumstances shown by evidence will best serve the
public interests.

And, in the case of In Re Gibson, 26

Calif. R.C.R. 1925, the Public Service Commission of
California held that the Commission gives little or no
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consideration to the date of the filing of an application
in reaching a decision after formal hearings upon two
or more applications wherein the respective applicants
seek authority to operate a stage service over similar
or identical routes, but a careful review is given not
only to the time, character and nature of the investigations made as to the necessity of a proposed stage
service, but also to the experience and financial ability
and resources of the respective applicants.
Many states have adopted the view that the time of
filing of the application for a certificate of convenience
and necessity should have no bearing on which of several
applicants should be chosen to operate in the field. The
South Dakota S·upreme Court said in Re Dakota Trans-

portation, Inc., 291 N. W. 589, 35 P.U.R. (N.S.) 442,
at page 450:
"The legislature has granted no rights of
priority in an applicant who first applies for a
certificate. The public interest clearly did not
require the granting of both applications for certificates to operate over the same route. The
principal consideration was not which applicant
was first in point of time, but an administrative
question of deciding which applicant would better
serve the public interest was primarily involved.
A view of the report and decision of the Commission as to the authority granted to the Black Hills
Transportation Company is not before. us, and
we do not undertake to determine whether or not
the Commission acted reasonably in such matter.
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We hold that the priority of making application
for certificate was not a controlling factor in determining 'vhich of the two applications, if either,
should be granted."
And the Ohio Supreme Court said in Re Sohngen
v. Public Utilities Commission, P.U.R. 1928 C, 753, 115
Ohio St. 449, 154 N. E. 734, that mere priority of filing
of an application for a certificate of convenience and
necessity for the operation of motor busses does not
entitle the applicant to any pre-emption of route in the
territory traversed.
The Washington S-upreme Court also held in Re
State ex rel. B. & M. Auto Freight v. Department of
Public Works, P.U.R. 1923 E. 101, 124 Wash. 234, 214
Pac. 163, that priority in making an application for a
certificate of convenience and necessity to operate motor
vehicles over a particular route has no controlling effect
in selecting the carrier which should receive a certificate.
The North Dakota Public Service Commission has
adopted the view that priority in the filing of applications for certificates of convenience and necessity to operate and contruct electrical properties should not be controlling, and all applications timely filed should receive
equal consideration in determining the choice of the
applicant. Re Montana-Dakota Power Company, P.U.R.
1929 A, 369.
If considered at all, the time of filing of the application for a certificate of convenience and necessity is
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looked to only when all applicants appear to be equally
qualified. As Mr. Hall stated in his article Certificates
of Convenience and Necessity, (1930) 28 Michigan Law
Review 276:
"It frequently happens that a commission will
have two or more applications for permission to
serve the same territory. If public convenience
and necessity will not be served by the issuance
of a certificate to more than one, the Commission
is confronted with the necessity of choosing among
the petitioners. It is clear that mere priority in
the time of filing an application, while a factor,
is not the determining one in the selection of an
applicant. Priority in service, rather than priority
in time is the important consideration. However,
other things being equal, priority in time of filing
an application is controlling. It should be used,
however, only as a last resort."
In Re Yellow Cab and Baggage Companu. Docket
M.R.O. 246, Report & Order No. 1510, May 9, 1928, the
Public Service Commission of Montana held that priority
in application filing is a material factor only when everything else is equal between ap.plicants and where the
Commission has already determined that public convenience and necessity warrants the granting of a certificate
over the proposed routes. Likewise the Arkansas Suprenle Court reached the same decision in the case of
Camden Transit Company v. Owen, 1946, 209 Ark. 861,
192 S.W. (2) 757, 63 P.U.R. (N.S.. ) 448, that the fact that
one applicant for a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a bus line files his application before a
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rival applicant does not create any controlling priority
in favor of the first applicant as the filing date is merely
one element that 1nay be properly considered by the
Commission in determining 'vhich applicant should receive the permit. In Re W·ilcox (Idaho Public Utilities
Comm. 1916) P.U.R. 1916C, 35, the facts were:
On November 29, 1915, Jones filed with the Commission an application for a certificate of convenience and
necessity to build a gas plant in Idaho Falls, Idaho. On
December 9, 1915, Wilcox filed an application to construct
the same type of plant for the same city. On January 10,
1916, Wilcox filed a petition in intervention in Jones'
proceedings.

On January 17, 1916, Jones petitioned to

intervene in Wilcox's proceedings.

The Commission

heard the applications together on January 31, 1916.
Page 37 - ". . . We are met at the threshold
with the proposition as to what weight should be
given the application of Jones by reason of its
priority alone. If all other conditions and facts
surrounding the two applications were equal, then
the preference should be given to the party first
making proper ap.plication therefor ... "
"The question that is squarely presented is,
from all the evidence, facts and surroundings of
these cases, which applicant is entitled to a certificate~ The preference should be given to that
party who is acting in good faith, has the funds
or financial backing to carry his plans into execution within a reasonable time, and who will construct a modern up-to-date plant."
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They then reviewed Wilcox's plan of financing and found
it very satisfactory and adequate. Then, at page 38, the
Commission said :
"The controlling factor in a controversy of
this kind is the public convenience and welfare.
Making a concrete application of that rule to the
present proceeding, the question naturally arises,
which one of these applicants will be able to render the best service to the public~"
They answered the question by awarding Wilcox the
certificate.
As will be seen from the foregoing authorities, the
primary factors to be considered by any public service
commission prior to the granting of a certificate of convenience and necessity 'Yhen there is more than one applicant seeking to render the same service to the same
community are-which of the applicants is best qualified
to render the desired service, taking into due consideration financial qualifications as well as physical, and which
applicant is best able to serve the public interest. In
safeguarding the public interest, only when the Commission finds that all applicants are equally qualified in
these respects should it consider which applicant first
filed its application for a certificate of convenience and
necessity.
Instead of considering the comparative qualifications
of the Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent, and the
Utah Pipe Line Company, petitioner, the Conunission in
this instance apparently adopted the sole test of which
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applicant first filed its petition and limited Utah Pipe
Line Company's participation only to that of opposing
Utah Natural Gas. In this instance it was impossible
for the Commission to have considered the relative merits
of both applications, and, in obviously adopting the view
that the one which was prior in time should prevail, it is
submitted the Commission erred.

IV. THE C.OMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN THE PROCEEDINGS
AND IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF PETITIONER. POINTS F, J & K, AND
E, G AND M.
POINTS F, J AND K
THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN THAT IT SHOULD NOT HAVE
RULED ON APPLICANT'S CASE AND GRANTED SUCH
CERTIFICATE UNTIL IT HAD FIRST GIVEN UTAH PIPE
LINE COMPANY, INTERVENER, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
A FULL HEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERVENER IN CASE NO. 3578 THEN PENDING BEFORE THE
COMMISSION, WHICH APPLICATION PROPOSED TO SUPPLY NATURAL GAS TO CONSUMERS OF SUBSTANTIALLY
THE SAME AREAS AS PROPOSED TO BE SUPPLIED BY
"(f)

APPLICANT, AND A'l A IESS COST TO THE CONSUMER. t•
"{j) THAT TI-IE COMMISSION ACT~D A.H..HlTRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, AND OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

..

'-
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IN LIMITING THE PARTICIPATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE
COMPANY 'AS TO WHY THE PETITIONER'S (UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY) APPLICATION SHOULD NOT BE
GRANTED' AND IN NOT PERMITTING UTAH PIPE LINE
COMPANY TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS THEN PENDING BEFORE THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION THE
APPLICATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY FOR A
CERTIFICATE TO BUILD A PIPELINE FOR THE CARRYING OF NATURAL GAS FROM NORTHWESTERN NEW
MEXICO TO SALT LAKE CITY AND INTERMEDIATE
POINTS, AND IN NOT PERMITTING UTAH PIPE LINE
COMPANY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF, ALL AS SET FORTH IN THE PETITION FOR LEAVE
TO INTERVENE FILED BY UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY."
"(k) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT PROCESSING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY IN CASE NO.
3578, AND IN NOT HAVING A FULL HEARING THEREON
OR A JOINT HEARING THEREON WITH THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION, BEFORE RULING IN CASE NO.
3504-AMENDED."

STATEMENT UNDER POINTS F, J AND K
At the commencement of the hearing upon the
amended application of lTtah Natural Gas Company in
Case No. 3504 on December 11, 1950, petitioner, Utah
Pipe Line Company, presented to ~the Public Service
Commission of Utah its petition for leave to intervene in
the proceedings, setting out in such petition that said
Utah Pipe Line Company had then pending before the
Federal Power Commission its application for certificate
of convenience and necessity to bui1d a natural gas pipeline system extending a distance of approxirnately 392
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miles from a point in Northwestern New Mexico near
Aztec, ~e"T ~Iexico, to a point or points in and near Salt
Lake City, Utah; ~that by such application to the Federal
Power Commission it proposed to serve substantially the
same area proposed to be served by Utah Natural Ga.s
Company under its application before the Public Service
Commission of Utah in case No. 3504; that Utah Pipe
Line Company was of the opinion and did believe that
Utah Natural Gas Company had wholly inadequate reserves of natural gas to furnish the requirements of
its proposed pipeline system; and that Utah Pipe Line
Company desired to intervene in the proceedings concerning the Utah Natural Gas Company's application
in order to show that Utah Natural Gas Company's reserves were inadequate and that, consequently, its plan
was not feasible, and to show that the Utah Pipe Line
Company had adequate reserves and could furnish the
facilities and the natural gas and could more adequately
meet and fulfill the convenience and necessity of the
public, and could thereby assist said Commission in properly safeguarding the public interests.
The Utah Natural Gas Company objected to the
intervention of Utah Pipe Line Company in such a manner, and thereupon the Public Service Commission ruled
(R. 12) that the participation of Utah Pipe Line Company in the proceeding would be limited to the purpose
of showing "why the petitioner's (Utah Natural Gas
Company's) application should not be granted."
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After such restriction of Utah Pipe Line Company's
intervention, and between the close of the first session of
the hearing and the beginning of the second session of
the hearing, Utah Pipe Line Company, on January 26,
1951, filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah
its application entitled, "In the Matter of Application of
the Utah Pipe Line Company," case No. 3578, wherein
Utah Pipe Line Company set forth its proposal to construct and operate a natural gas pipeline system as set
forth in the application theretofore filed with the Federal
Power Commission and hereinabove referred to, and
requested that the Commission issue to it a certificate
or other form of authorization for the construction and
operation of the proposed facilities.
At the same time it filed its application in case No.
3578, Petitioner requested the Commission, in writing, to
arrange with the Federal Power Commission for a joint
hearing of the Utah Public Service Commission and the
Federal Power Commission. The Utah Public S·ervice
Commission refused to consider the request of petitioner
for a joint hearing and made no investigation into the
merits of said request whatsoever.
Without considering such application of Utah Pipe
Line Company for a certificate to supply natural gas to
consumers of substantially the same areas as proposed
to be supplied by Utah Natural Gas Company and at a
less cost to the consumers, the Public Service Commission proceeded to conclude the hearing concerning thP
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lTtah Natural Gas Company application and to issue to it
the certificate of convenience and necessity herein complained of; n1aking no attempt to inquire into the merits
of the application of Utah Pipe Line Company in an
effort to n1alre cel.'ltain that the Commission was granting
the certificate to the applicant who could better serve the
public interest, convenience and necessity it is charged
with safeguarding.

In the early part of the brief in our Statement of
Facts we have detailed the events which transpired when
Mr. Turner, General Counsel for Delhi Oil Corporation
and appearing for Utah Pipe Line Company presented
its petition for leave to intervene. Mr. Turner in detail
stated to th·e Commission what Utah Pipe Line Company
would he prepared to prove and we invite the court's
attention to this statement (R. 1148-1153). In substance,
Mr. Turner stated that Utah Pipe Line was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Delhi Oil Corporation; that Delhi
owns substantial oil and gas holdings in New Mexico
with approximately 1 trillion feet of gas available to
Utah Pipe Line; that the holdings of Delhi are so extensive as to be common knowledge and the subject of considerable comment; that it is generally known that Delhi
has been negotiating with industrial consumers of the
Salt Lake area and that these negotiations are down to
the last stages; that the right of way has been surveyed;
that all steps have been taken and the necessary filings
made with the Federal Power Commission; that Utah
Natural is merely trying to preempt the Salt Lake City
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industrial market and well knows that it does not have
sufficient gas reserves; that it would be impossible for
Utah Natural to support any line without it being an
interstate line and that the Federal Power Commission
would be the body that must pass upon an interstate
line; that it is in the public in1terest that two projects not
be completed and two lines supported; that Utah Pipe
Line has the necessary proven gas reserves; that it is
acting in good faith and will take prompt steps to complelte its pipeline; that it is in the public interest for the
com1nission to hear the competing projects at the same
time.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT F
Section 76-4-24 U.C.A. (1943) as construed by this
Court in Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, et al.,
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, and other cases, provides
that the paramount concern of the Commission in certificate cases is the public interest. It is submitted that
the Commission cannot properly protect such interest
where conflicting applications are pending and are being
urged without considering the merits of all such applications before granting a certificate.
While the Utah courts have not, up until the present
time, had an opportunity to pass directly upon the question raised by this point, the Illinois Supreme Court in
the case of Black Hawk Motor Transit Company v. Illi-

nois Commerce Commission, (1943) 48 N.E. 2d 341, 49
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P.U.R.(N.S.) 438, held that where there are two applications pending to render the same service to the sarne
approximate area, the Commission should hear the evidence on the merits of both applications before granting
a certificate of convenience and necessity to either applicant. The facts of that case were that the Illinois Highway Transportation Company, appellee, had filed an
application with the illinois Cormnerce Commission for a
certificate of convenience and necessity to extend its
operations as a motor carrier between Peoria and Decatur. The appellant, Black Hawk 1\fotor Transit Company, was made a respondent to this petition, inasmuch
as it already operated partially along the proposed new
route. On November 13, 1940, six days prior to the
hearing on the above petition, Black Hawk filed an application for a certificate to operate a similar service hetween Peoria and Decatur. Black Hawk's petition came
on for hearing on December 3, 1940, and was continued
over to January 3, 1941. On December 5, 1940, the
hearing on the Highway Transportation Company's application was resumed, at which time Black Hawk filed a
motion to consolidate the two cases so that the evidence
taken in each case would be considered in both cases.
On December 11 the Commission denied the motion to
consolidate and on January 3, 1941 the petition of the
appellant Black Hawk Motor Transit Company again
came on for hearing, at which time appellant renewed its
Inotion to consolidate. On January 8, 1941, the Illinois
Commission entered an order in the appellee's proceeding granting the petition of appellee, Highway TransporSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tation Company, for a certificate of convenience and
necessity to operate a bus line between Peoria and Decatur. Then, on January 22, 1941, there was a further
hearing of appellant's petition, at which time counsel for
appellee entered a motion to dismiss the application of
appellant for the reason that a certificate h~d already
been granted to appellee, Highway Transportation Company, involving substantially the same route. Appellant,
Black Hawk, then filed a motion for rehearing in appellee
Highway Transportation Company's case for the reason
that the Commission had granted the certificate before
the hearing on its application had been concluded and all
of its evidence was in. On February 25, 1941, the Commission granted appellant's motion for rehearing in the
Highway Transportation Company's case and on March
4, 1941, both cases came on for hearing and both Black
Hawk and Highway Transportation Company presented
more evidence. On March 18, two separate orders were
entered by the Commission, one affirming the granting of
a certificate 1to appellee, Highway Transportation Company, and the other denying the application of appellant,
Black Hawk Motor Transit Company. Black Hawk perfected its appeal and the~ Supreme Court of Illinois had
the following to say in regard to the right of consolidation of cases involving applications for a certificate of
convenience and necessity to perform the same service
in the san1e community:
". . . The refusal to consolidate or to integrate the evidence is subject to review, but only
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tion "\Ya::; abused, and, if abu~ed, \Yhether the result
"\Yas injurious or prejudicial to appellant's right
to a fair and impartial hearing.
~~counsel

for appellee concede in their brief
and argument that if in either proceeding the
parties "\Yere denied an opportunity to present
con1petent and proper evidence it would require a
reversal. Our consideration n1ust, therefore, be
directed to that question.
~' ...

There are three forms of consolidation
of cases recognized by the authorities: (1) Where
several cases are pending involving substantially
the same subject matter, a method of avoiding
the trial of each case separately is to stay the
proceedings in all but one, the decision in the
others to be settled by that reached in the one
trial; (2) 'Yhere several cases involve an inquiry
into the same event in its general aspects, the
cases may be tried together, but vvith separate
docket entries, verdicts, and judgments, the consolidation being limited to a joint trial; and (3)
where several actions are pending which might
have been made the subject of a single proceeding,
the cases, by consolidation, become merged into
one in which the rights of the parties are determined. See Lumiansky v. Tessier, (1912) 213
Mass. 182, 99 NE 1051, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1049.
The instant case comes within the second classification above mentioned and our inquiry must be
limited to the questions of whether appellant has
been prejudiced by the Commission's refusal to
integrate the evidence and consolidate the hearings on the two applications as a joint proceeding,
and whether the refusal to consolidate amounted
to an abuse of discretion.
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"When the applications of both utilities are
viewed in connection with all the amendments and
consents to restrictions to be included in any certificate issued by the Commission, they both cover
substantially the same extended service and route.
Both parties proved and the Commission found
that the service petitioned for is required from the
standpoint of convenience and necessity. The controlling question in controversy before the Commission was which utility was entitled to the, certificate, and a determination of that question could
only be fairly made from a consideration of all the
evidence in both cases and appellant's counsel was
led to believe that such would be done. But, on
January 8, 1941, while appellant's proceeding was
still pending, the Commission entered an order
granting a certificate to the appellee. This action
demonstrated that the evidence in the two cases
was not considered together. The Commission,
however, acknowledged the error by granting a
rehearing, and on March 18, having all the evidence in the two records before it, simultaneously
entered an order in each case. It cannot, therefore, be reasonably said it did not consider all the
evidence."
Other courts have also considered the general problem here involved. In the case of Hazard-Hyden Bus
Company v. Black, 169 SW2d 21, the Division of Motor
Transportation of Kentucky had before it eight applications for certificates to operate bus lines over approximately the same area, which had all been filed during
1937. No one pressed for a hearing on the applications
and none was held until February 3, 1942, at which time
the application of the Hazard Hyden Bus Company was
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set for hearing, the Conunission announcing that it would
consider at that time only the application as it applied
to a certain area in 'vhich the other applicants were not
interested. However, the Co1nmission received evidence
relating to the proposed bus service over the entire area,
including that in 'vhich the other seven applicants desired
to render the same service and granted a certificate to
Hazard-Hyden.

Since the applicants were not present

at this hearing and did not offer evidence in their own
behalf, they filed motions for rehearing, which were
denied, and an appeal was perfected to the Circuit Court
of Kentucky wherein the order granting the certificate
was reversed so that a new hearing could be held, at
which time all of the applicants could offer evidence as
to the merits of their petitions. The Hazard-Hyden Bus
Company appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
and that court said at page 23 :
"KRS 281.410 provides that an appeal may
be taken to the Franklin circuit court from the
action of the Division of Motor Transportation
within twenty days after the rendition of the
order of the division. Certainly, during this time
or until an appeal has been taken, the Division of
Motor Transportation has jurisdiction to correct
any error or mistake on its part or for cause
shown to set aside the order. The facts disclose·d
by the record show that the appellees did not have
a full and complete hearing before the Division
of Motor Transportation, and the circuit court
correctly referred the case back to the division."
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In the case· of Crowell & Spencer Lumber Company
v. Public Service Commission, 157 La. 676, 102 So. 866,
the Louisiana Court held that a commission order entered
in a proceeding in which some of the parties had not
appeared and in which another party had made only a
perfunctory defense after the case had been ordered to
trial over its objection that an injunction operated as a
bar to the proceeding, should be set aside so that all
parties in interest might have an opportunity to be heard
before the Commission.
Under the public utility law and practice of Utah
still another reason exists. As will be observed from the
amended application of Utah Natural Gas Company and
the petition to intervene and applications of Petitioner,
the proposed pipeline systems of the two would deliver
approximately the same amount of gas to the ultimate
market, but the line and facilities of Utah Natural Gas
Company would cost approximately $32,000,000 whereas
Petitioner's line and facilities would cost only approximately $22,000,000. The evidence presented before the
Commission soon disclosed, as pointed out in the statements and arguments under Points A and B, that the
difference in cost was largely made up by the necessity
of treating and compressing the gas to be used, if found,
by Utah Natural Gas c·ompany.
From the opinion and decision in the case, of Utah

Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, (Sup.
Ct. Utah 1944) 107 Utah 155, 152 P. 2d 542, it will be
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seen that the Conunission, with this court's approval,
considers the ''prudent investment value" rather than
the "fair value" as the basis upon which to dete:rmine
utility rates to be charged to the public. From the very
beginning of the hearing it was obvious that there was
a wide discrepancy in the amount of money which would
have to be invested in the respective projects. Yet, the
Commission refused to hear any evidence in relation to
the project which was offered as the more economical
one and proceeded to certificate the project which would
cost at least $10,000,000 more than the othe·r under the
most favorable circumstances. How can such action, hy
any stretch of the imagination, be considered as compliance with the paramount duty of looking to the public
interest.
Commissions, under similar statutes and circumstances, have held time and time again that the public
interest involved requires a determination of which ap·plicant can best serve the community at the least possible
cost to the consumer. In Re N. Central Case, C.A.B.,
Docket No. 415, December 19, 1946, the prime consideration was which applicant is most qualified to provide the
needed service; in Re Willis, Application Nos. 8968, 8969,
Docket No. 30741, June 23, 1948, the Colorado Commission decided it would issue the certificate to one of two
rival applicants who established most conclusively his
preparedness and financial ability to operate successfully; in Re Wilcox, P.U.R. 1916C, 35, the Idaho Com-

Inission held that a certificate for the construction of a
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gas plant should be granted to the one who had assured
himself of the feasibility of the enterprise and had the
necessary capital at his command; and in Re Helena Bus
Application, Docket No. 994, Report and Order No. 1498
(1927), the Montana Commission stated that the controlling consideration in the preference of applicants for
certificates should be the choice of that applicant who is
best fitted to carry out the duties imposed by the certificate. (The foregoing cases are discussed under Point I.)
Petitioner's application did not receive equal consideration with Utah Natural Gas Company in the pro. .
ceedings below. Petitioner's role in the proceedings
below was restricted to that of opposing the application
of Utah Natural Gas Company and it had no opportunity
to show the Commission that its gas reserves were proven
and that they were many times gre:ater than the unproven
reserves of Utah Natural Gas Company. Petitioner did
not have an opportunity to show the Co1nmission belo'v
its highly adequate financial qualifications as compared
with those of respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company.
Furthermore, Petitioner was not allowed to show that
its project would serve the public more adequately, and
at a "prudent investment" of much less than the project
of Utah Natural Gas Company. Indeed, the PetitioneT
was not allowed to show, and the Con1mission had no way
of knowing, which project would best serve the public
interest the Commission is required to protect.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, it is submitted that
the action of the Commission in granting the certificate
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to Utah Natural Gas C.ompany without first considering
the application of Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious.
ARGU~fENTAND

AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT J

In Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Service
Commission, 105 Utah 230, 142 P. 2d 873, the appellant
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. alleged that the commission
acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing to allo'v
appellant to make a comparison between toll charges of
independent operators and its own charges. The Supreme
Court, at page 265, held "It was error not to allow
Mountain States to make a comparison in this case."
The commission had, after a hearing, ruled that Mountain States should adjust their intra-state rates to ;their
inter-state rates which were considerably lower. Mountain States had sought to show how its intra-state rates
compared with rates charged by independents, but was
denied this right.
In this case, Petitioner sought to intervene, alle·ging
among other things that it could supply natural gas at
a lower cost to consumers than could Applicant-Respondent.
Certainly it would seem that one of the prime. factors
concerned in determining which of two applicants could
better serve the public interest would be the cost of the
natural gas sold to the public. Yet, in spite of the fact
that Petitioner had alleged in its petition to .intervene
that it was ready and willing to show that it could
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furnish gas at a lower cost to the consumers than could
Utah Natural Gas Company, it was denied the chance to
prove it. The Commission was. charged with the duty
of considering the public interest and yet, with Petitioner
asking for permission to so prove, the Commission com. pletely ignored the claim of Petitioner that it could serve
the public better at a lower cost. In failing to inquire
into this vital factor in protecting the public interest
when it could easily have done so by allowing Petitioner
to intervene, the Commission clearly acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.
Especially is this true in light of the subsequent procedure followed by the Commission. Having restricted
Petitioner's intervention to nothing more than that of
a protestant, the Commission proceeded to hear the application of Utah Natural Gas Company, to ignore Petitioner's application for a certificate and its application for
a joint hearing with the. Federal Power Commission, and
proceeded to issue the certificate here complained of to
the Utah Natural Gas Company without ever having
considered the~ factors which Petitioner so clearly brought
to the attention of the Commission in its petition to intervene.
ARGUMENT UNDER POINT K
In its request to the Commission for a joint hearing
with the Federal Power Commission, the petitioner
pointed out fuat :
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(1}

The Natural Gas Act provides for cooperative

procedure, which in no wise impairs the jurisdiction and
authority of the State Commission.
(2)

The Federal Power Commission wrote a letter

on December 21, 1950, asking the Utah Public Service
Commission whether or not the latter desired a joint

hearing.
(3)

Section 1.37 (c) of the Federal Power Com-

mission's Rules and Regulations, provides:
"(c) Conferences. Inasmuch as experience
has proved that infonnal conferences are the
means most often used to enable commissions to
work together to promote good regulations, affording means whereby common understandings
may be reached, and the imposition of inconsistent
or conflicting regulations upon companies subject
to both Federal and State control may be avoided,
and means whereby State co:m..-rnissions may secure
the assistance in-State regulatory work which sections 209 and 17, respectively, of the Federal
Power and Natural Gas Acts authorize the Federal Power Commission to extend, any commission, Federal or State, should always feel free to
suggest a conference to anorther commission, concerning any matter of regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of either, with respect to which it is
believed that a cooperative conference may be in
the public interest. The commission desiring a
conference upon any such matter should notify
other interested commissions without delay, and
thereupon the Federal Power Commission or a
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State commission, as may be agreed, will promptly
arrange for a conference in which all interested
commissions will be invited to be represented."
The Commission is undoubtedly not as experienced
in the matter of certifying gas pipelines as is the Federal
Power Commission. As heretofore pointed out, the
statutes under which the two Commissions operate are
very similar, each being charged with safeguarding the
p.ublic interest. By holding a joint hearing with the
Federal Power Commission, indeed, by just conferring
with the Federal Power Commission, the Public Service
Commission of Utah could have availed itself of the vast
experience of the Federal Power Commission in determining which of the two applicants then before it could
better serve the public interest.

It is difficult to see

how any commission charged with the duty of

protec~

ing the public interest in such situations could deem the
public interest adequately protected without inquiring
into the merits of any application made to it under the
terms of the statute.
where there

we~re

Especially would this seem true

conflicting applications before it for

substantially the same certificate to serve substantially
the same segment of the public. In the case now before
this Court the Commission steadfastly refused to consider the p.roposal of Petitioner in any form and proceeP.ed to issue the: certificate to the applicant who had
presented a conflicting application. It is. submitted that
1n so doing and by refusing even so Inuch as to direct
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an inquiry· to the Federal Power Co1nmission as to the
advisability and feasibility of a joint hearing, the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
POINTE
THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND UPON INADEQUATE NOTICE
IN PERMITTING THE APPLICATION OF UTAH NATURAL
GAS COMPANY TO LAY DORMANT UNTIL THE 17TH
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1950, AT WHICH TIME THE APPLICATION WAS AMENDED, AND ~N THEN SETTING THE
CASE FOR HEARING FOR DEMEMBER 11, 1950, AFTER
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION ON NOVEMBER 24TH, 26TH
AND 28TH, 1950, OF THE PROPOSED HEARING."
"(e)

STATEMENT UNDER POINT E
On May 29, 1950, Utah Natural Gas Company, respondent, filed an application with the Public Service
Commission of Utah entitled, "In the Matte~r of the
Application of Utah Natural Gas C·ompany for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity." In such application Utah Natural Gas Company applied for a certificate
to construct, operate and maintain a 22-inch natural gas
pipe line extending from the area in and around San
Juan County in the S.outheastern portion of the State of
Utah, Northerly and Westerly through portions of the
Counties of San Juan, Emery, Carbon, Wasatch and
Utah, and into the County of Salt Lake at a point at or
near Salt Lake City. In addition to said main pipe line,
applicant stated that it proposed to construct such lateral
lines as should be necessary to effect delivery of such
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natural gas to the consumers or purchasers thereof. Such
application was given case No. 3504 and was allowed to
remain on the docket of the said Public Service Commission without any action whatsoever until the date hereinafter noted. On November 17, 1950, Utah Natural Gas
Company filed an amended application altering the prodect for which it sought a certificate of convenience and
necessity by making application for a secondary gas pipe
line of 8% inches max:imum size, in addition to its requested main gas line of 18 inch max:imum size, from the
San Juan County area, extending from alleged gas fields
in the Counties of Sevier, Wayne and Emery, "northerly

and westerly to Salina in the County of Sevier, thence
southerly from Salina to Richfield, thence northerly from
Salina through Gunnison, Manti, Ephra:im and Moroni,
connecting with said main line at Fountain Green in
the County of Sanpete."
Notwithstanding the fact that the first application
was allowed to lay dormant upon the docket of the Public
Service Commission for many months, and notwithstanding the fact that material changes were made in the proposed application of Utah Natural Gas Company by the
filing of its amended application, nevertheless the Commission immediately gave notice of a hearing upon said
application and set said amended application for hearing
on December 11, 1950.
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ARGlT:JIENT AND .A.lTTHORITIES UNDER POINTE
lJtah Xatural Gas Co1npany, in allowing its original
application to lay dor1nant for aln1ost six 111onths without
requesting a hearing thereon, demonstrated to the public
in general, and to petitioner in particular, that no action
"~ould be taken on respondent's application for son1e
time, or that "\Yhen a hearing was requested, petitioner
would have ample time in which to work out and decide
upon its necessary course of action in order to file its
own application if it was to be heard at the same time
as that of respondent. However, on November 17, 1950,
respondent materially amended its original application
and it "\Vas then set down for an immediate hearing by
published notice made beginning on November 24. Petitioner could have had only 17 days to analyze the effect
of respondent's amended application upon its own pToposed activities, in addition to planning its own procedure as to opposing the application of respondent and
proposing its own application. Petitioner realized that
its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve the same approximate area with natural gas
should be considered, along with that of respondent, in
order that the Commission might consider the merits of
both applicants in regard to the financial feasibility and
physical practicality of the two proposed pipe lines and
award the certificate to the applicant more qualified to
serve the public interest. It must be remembered that
Petitioner is not a resident of Utah. Petitioner's home
office is in Dallas, Texas, a considerable distance from
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Utah, so that any correspondence between the two points
requires about three days mailing time. As a result,
Petitioner had even less time than would appear within
which to prepare the necessary papers and forward them
to Utah and to formulate its plan of procedure.
In setting the hearing on the application of the Utah
Natural Gas Company so soon after the filing of the
amended application by respondent, the Commission in
effect deprived this Pet~tioner, and any other interested
party, of the opportunity of filing its application in time
to have it considered immediately along with that of the
respondent. Petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has
been prejudiced by this hasty action of the Commission
in that its application for a cert~ficate of convenience
and necessity for an interstate pipe line is still pending
before the F·ederal Power Commission and the Federal
Power Commission is likely to disfavor the· granting to
petitioner of a certificate for an interstate line·, in view of
the fact that a certificate has already been granted by
the Utah Commission to another company to serve the
same area as that proposed to be served by this petitioner.
Even more serious, however, is the prejudicial effect
upon the interest of the. public involved. In so important
a matter as the construction of a natural gas pipe line of
the magnitude proposed, how could the public be

bene~

fitted by so much haste in setting down the application
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and forcing it to final conclusion with the issuance of a
certificate without considering the conflicting application
of Petitioner'
The ~Iontana Public Service Con1n1ission in the case
of Re Montana-Dakota Utilities Company, 32 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 121, said at page 128:
"Before a hearing is held in deterinining the
reasonableness of utility rates the public and :the
Utility should be given reasonable notice of the
hearing by the Commission. Justice requires that
all parties to the proceeding have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present their respective
interest."
·
This was a rate regulation matter and the Commission went on to say that from the record it appears that
the parties had 22 days within which to prepare their
cases after actual notice of the hearing and that the
Commission thought this was ample time in view of the
fact that as early as two months prior to the actual notice
date. the utility had knowledge of the fact that a hearing
on its rates would be held in the very near future. Such
was not the case with Petitioner in this instance. Because
of the long period of time during which respondent's
Utah Natural Gas Company, application was allowed to
lay dormant with no request for a hearing, this petitioner
had no reason to anticipate when the hearing on respondent's application would be set and especially the rapidity
with which a setting would be made immediately after
such application had been amended.
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The Utah Commission has said in the case of Re
Ogden Gas Company, P.U.R. 1929B, 127, that it is the
duty of the Commission in all cases where applications
are made for permission to serve in the capacity of a
public service utility to permit other interests that will
be affected to be represented and h.eard at a hearing
which should be public according to the provisions of the
statute. Such was not the case in the present matter
before this court. By setting the hearing on the amended
application of the respondent, Utah Natural Gas Company, only 17 days after the request for same·, the Commission in effect deprived this petitioner of an opportunity to file its application for a certificate to serve the same
area as that proposed to be served by respondent, and
to have its application considered along with that of
respondent. It is submitted, therefore, that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and upon inadequate notice in permitting the application of the Utah
Natural Gas Company to lay dormant from the 29th day
of May, 1950, to the 17th day of November, 1950, at which
time the application was amended, and in setting the case
on that drute for hearing on December 11, 1950.
POINT G
"(g) THAT THE COMMISSION ACTED ARTIBRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN ISSUING SUCH CERTIFICATE
IN THAT THE EFFECT OF SUCH ISSUANCE IS TO PERMIT UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY TO PRE-EMPT THE
MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS PENDING THE RESULT OF
WILDCAT DRILLING BY APPLICANT'S ASSOCIATES."
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STATE~IENT

UNDER POINT G

In its findings and re.port n1ade in Case No. 3504 amended, the Commission found that ''the applicant
(Utah Natural Gas Company) will not be engaged in the
exploration for or production of natural gas at the
sources, but will rely for its supply upon gas produced
by others."
The Commission found that "none of the fields frorn
which the applicant proposes to obtain gas, however,
have been sufficiently explored to prove the extent of
the reserves."
The Commission further found that the applicant,
Utah Natural Gas Company, had gas purchase con1tracts
with Byrd-Frost Inc., and others, "all of whom are
owners of substantial oil and gas acreage in the fields
above 1nentioned. While, as set forth above, these fields
are not yet proved, the Commission finds that one year
is a sufficient time in which the owners of said fields could
do sufficient exploration and develop·rnent work to adequately determine the gas reserves therein."

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES UNDER POINT G
The obvious effect of the issuance of the certificate
here involved without finding as a basis for such issuance
that the Utah Natural Gas Company has the gas reserves
to serve and to satisfy the S·alt Lake City market and
that Utah Natural Gas Company has the financial comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mitments and ability to build and to operate a pipeline
from the supposed source of its gas supply to the Salt
Lake City area, is to grant to such company a market for
gas pending the problematical outcome of its exploratory
. work within the unproven fields from which it proposes
to secure natural gas.
As hereinbefore set out, an applicant for a certificate of public convenience and necessity in a case such
as this, must prove to the satisfaction of the Utah Public
Service Commission the following:
1. A market for its gas;
2. Gas reserves sufficient to serve and to satisfy
such market; and
3. Adequrute financing, either through its own r~
sources, or the resources of those who have
committed themselves to grant financial aid in
the construction and operation of the proposed
natural gas pipe, line.
Here only one of these basic ingredients of a proper
showing was proved before the Commission, i.e., the
existence of a market.
As heretofore poinJted out, the determination of the
Commission in such case should be based on concrete
facts, which facts can then form the basis for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
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fore the Conuuission, yet the Findings and Report of
such body is a bundle of hopes, desires and "ifs". Mere
proof of a market is not sufficient to form the basis for
the granting of a certificate-yet such is the case here.
Public service commissions should fully understand
the effect of the issuance of a certificate of p.ublic convenience and necessity. As succinctly stated by the Federal Power Commission in Re Kansas Pipeline & Gas Co.,
(1939) 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 321, at page 342:
"When we consider that one effect of the
issuance of a certificate to construct and opeTate
facilities to and in a given area is to preclude from
the territory other construction or operation except .under a certificate issued by us, the necessity
that the present applicants be financially able to
consummate their proposed construcrt:ion becomes
the more apparent."
If such statement is made by a commission whose main
problem in the case before it is a determination of
whether or not there is adequate financing, such statement could, a fortiori, be made in the case here before
us involving a commission, which, by the very wording
of its Findings and Report, was troubled with both the
problem of adequate financing and the even greater problem of adequate reserves.
It is obvious that only one natural gas pipeline will
extend from the Four Corners Area to the Salt Lake

City market. Such being the case, it is incumbent upon
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the Commission, in granting a market to one of conflicting applicants to determine which applicant shall
best serve this area. The Utah Statute looks not to the
applicant but to the convenience and ne·cessity of the
public and clearly contemplates that applications forcertificates shall be granted on that basis alone-not on 1the
basis of the desires and speculative plans of an applicant. Utah Pipe Line Company was not given the proper
consideration in this case, and neither was the public.
The public, being the beneficiary of the proper decision,
or the victim of an improper decision, is en1titled to due
consideration of all applications by the Commission. Such
consideration would, of necessity, require a comparison
of the finances and reserves of various applicants who
propose to serve the Salt Lake City area. Having before
it. only the evidence presented by Utah Natural Gas
Company, the C:ommission could not find rthat such company is best able to serve the public convenience and
nece:ssity.
Reduced to its bare facts-or lack of such factsthis case involves an applicant who, although failing to
prove adequate reserves and adequate financing, has been
given by the Commission a hunting license, the practical
effeet of which is to allow such applicant to attempt to
secure proof of facts which should have been proved at
the time of the hearing on its application~ Nowhere in
the Law Reports can be found a certificate couched in
terms of speculation, hope: and desire, as here. Granted
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ance of a certificate tto a party or parties who can adequately transport gas to the Salt Lake City area, the
next query should logically be whether or not the applicant now before the Comn1ission can best serve the public
convenience and necessity in such respect. With only one
applicant before the Commission, as here, and with a
conflicting application being given no consideration by
the Commission, as here, it was impossible to determine
whether Utah Natural Gas Comp·any could best serve the
public. And yet, the Commission issued the cert,ifica.te
and thereby has, in effect, permitted Utah Natural Gas
Company to pre-empt the market during the one year
period allowed by the Commission. In so doing, the
Co1nmission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
POINT M
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION AND IT.S FINDINGS AND REPORT AND OR.DER,
AND EACH OF THEM, ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS ONE AND SEVEN OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES."
"(m)

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITES UNDER POINT M
(a)

Laws of the State of Utah.

The Legislature has prescribed m Sec. 76-4-24,
U.C.A. (1943), that before a commission can issue a certificate it must properly determine after a hearing held
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for such purpose that the; public convenience and necessity require the particular construction proposed by an
applicant. This requires, of course, a determination
that the particular applicant has the wherewithal to
meet the requirement, which in the instance of a gas
pipeline would mean, as a minimum, adequate proven
gas reserves and adequate financial commitments. The
Commission has, in effect, by the mru;mer in which iJt has
made its findings and conditioned the certificate, recognized that such showings must be made by the applicant.
The statute in no way indicates that the commission
could allow the applicalllt to forego the showing of such
basic prerequisites at the hearing and later show them
after lthe hearing and record had been closed. In fact,
the clear import of the statute is to the contrary. Furthermore, as pointed ou't in the Argument and Authorities under Point I, the· Commission has, in fact, followed
a course of proceedings which has given priority to the
applicant filing first in time, consistently foreclosing conside·ration of Petitioner's conflicting application.
(b)

Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of the
State of Utah and the. United States.

As heretofore pointed out undeT Sec. (a) of the
Argument and Authorities under Point D, by allovving
the determination of 1the question of adequate proven
gas reserves through the filing of a certificate after the
hearing had been closed by an unnan1ed geologist, the
Commission has denied the hearing provided for in the
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statute and required as a fundamental procedural right
under the due process clauses of the Constitutions of
both the State of lTtah and the United States.
(c)

Section One of Article One of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.

Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah
provides in part as follows:
"Section 1.
All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties;
to acquire, possess and protect property."
The law is well settled that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of constitutional provisions
forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law. Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road
Company e.t al. vs. A. P. Sandford et al., (U. S. Sup·. Ct.
1896) 164 U. S. 578, at page 592, 164 Sup.. Ct. 560 at
page 565. The word "man" in such a Constitutional provision has also been held to include corporations. Dayton Co. and Iron Co. vs. Barton, (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1899)
53. S. W. 970, 971, 103 Tenn. 604. Use of the word "man"
as in Section One of Article One of the Utah Constitution
is the same type of use as Constitutional framers have
used before. 1t is patent that the framers of the Utah
Constitution when speaking of the inalienable right of
men to acquire, possess and protect property must have
had in their minds that such right would extend to and
include all legal entities, including partnerships, associations, corporrutions and trusts.
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Although it may be true that some courts have held
that a certificate of convenience and necessity is not
property in the ordinary sense of the word, it cannot be
denied that .the holder of a certificate can acquire property by virtue of such. In fact, a public utility cannot
acquire property contemplated by Section 76-4-24 without
having first secured such a certificate.
In the proceeding below Petitioner was completely
foreclosed throughout from affirmatively presenting its
case. It had no op·portunity to show that it was, in fact,
entitled to the ce:rrtificate. While Petitioner may still
have the "technical" right to insist upon the processing
of its application, such insistance would be a futile gesture, and, indeed, a very hollow right. The certificate
has been issued and the devilment done.
Thus, in effeCJt, the Utah Public Service Con1mission,
by its arbitrary and capricious action, has failed and
refused to allow Utah Pipe Line Company to acquire,
possess and protect property within the State of Utah.
Had there been a comparison of Utah Pipe Line Company's case with that of the Respondent and had there
been a determination that the Respondent in truth and
in fact should be granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity based on clear and concise evidence
pointing up that itt could best serve the public convenience and necessity of the State of Utah, Utah Pipe Line
Company would have no standing before this Court other
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than to protest the adequacy of proof presented by the
Respondenrt. In this instance, however, Utah Pipe Line
Con1pany has been effectively foreclosed from exercising
its right granted to it by virtue of its permit to do business within the State of Utah by the Constitution of the
State of U tab..
CONCLUSION
The public interest in the determination of this case
by this court cannot be over-emphasized. For many
years the Utah public has waited for the time when ne·w
homes, schools, apartment buildings and large and small
industry would have an adequate supply of natural gas.
Any action by a commission which delays the arrival of
that time should nort be treated lightly. Time is of the
essence. The gas is needed now. Obviously the more
gas supply behind any projected pipeline, the greater
the stability to industry and the greater the security
to the home user of gas. A major industry may come
to Utah if an adequate reserve supply for 20 years or
more is dedicated to the line. It will not be attracted if
that industry must depend on an uncertain and inadequate gas supply. Ultimately the public interest will
demand rthat the enormous gas reserves of Utah Pipe
Line be admitted through the Utah gate, and that Utah
l~ipe Line Company build its line. If in due time gas
is developed in Utah from wildcat drilling, that gas, if
found in adequate quantities, will not be lost to Utah,
but will extend the usef~ life of petitioner's pipeline.
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It must be apparent that it is not in the public interest
for !two pipelines to he built and paid for by the public.
It must also be apparent that to build the line enormous
reserves are required. An inadequate supply is the
equivalent of no gas at all because at the beginning a
full supply is required to finance the line.
Mr. Irwin Clawson, attorney, representing some 29
industrial users of gas, whose only interest in the proceeding was to see that the Commission obtained more
gas for the area (R. 1018), after listening to the testimony and at its close, told the Commission that he did
not care whether the gas supply came from Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, Utah Natural Gas Company or
Utah Pipe Line Company; that "What we want is more
gas" and said:
"On behalf of my clients I suggest to the
Commission that the public interest and necessity
demands that before a decision is reached that
the Commission see what the market affords, and
tP.en on the basis of the knowledge thus obtained,
grant the certificate. And we urge at this time
that before. a decision is reached that the Commission hear the Utah Pipeline and make their
decision on the basis of the combined evidence,
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line to as quickly as possible 1nake their showing
as to what they've got so that the Commission can
reach a decision on so1nething that needs a decision very shortly." (R. 1020, 1021)
The extensive drilling in the Counties of Duchesne,
Uintah, Box Elder, Utah, Summit, Millard and Washington by major oil companies and by wildcatters and
far removed from the projected location of the pipeiine
of Utah Natural shows that such drilling will occur when
geologists for those companies conclude

~the

discovery of

oil is possible or probable and further shows that no
certificate or lack of certificate from the Public Service
Commission of Utah for a pipeline is going to influence
this drilling.
In this case, where Utah Natural has wholly faiied
to make a sufficient showing of adequate gas reserves
or of required financing; where the Commission has
failed to permit Utah Pipe Line to have any hearing
on its projected line; and where the Commission has
delegated to a geologist the power to make the basic
determination which is the foundation of all grants of
certificates of convenience and necessity for a natural
gas pipeline, the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction

in granting the certificate, violated the constitutional
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rights of petitioner, acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in the proceedings and failed to follow the rules of fair
play.
Respectfully submi~tted,

C. W. WILKINS
J. GLENN TURNER
Attorneys for
Utah Pipe Line Company,
Petitioner.

Of Counsel
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
920 Continental National Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
TuRNER, ATwoon, WHITE, McLANE & FRANCIS
Suite 1711
Mercantile Bank Bldg.
Dallas 1, Texas
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